BRAIN GAME - artykuły ze strony ATP

[Damian]

You’ve Been Upgraded! Alcaraz’s Winning Strategy vs. Ruud

Spoiler:

Spaniard hit 61% of groundstrokes as forehands
Carlos Alcaraz’s unsung hero in his US Open final win over Casper Ruud was his run-around forehand.

Alcaraz defeated Casper Ruud 6-4, 2-6, 7-6(1), 6-3 in the US Open final on Sunday, due in large part to him hitting a slew of run-around forehands standing in the Ad court to counter the Norwegian’s full-court press towards his backhand. Ruud played a tactically savvy final by flattening out his high, heavy groundstrokes and ripping them repeatedly at Alcaraz’s backhand wing. It almost worked. Ruud won a higher percentage of baseline points: 45 per cent (64/141) to Alcaraz’s 43 per cent (59/136).

Alcaraz’s tenacity to upgrade to forehands standing in the Ad court saw him turn 97 groundstrokes from backhands into forehands. In a match decided by only five points (127-122), this specific battle was as important as any other to Alcaraz in capturing his first Grand Slam title.

Alcaraz Groundstrokes (excluding returns, volleys & overheads)

Forehands = 61% (195)
Backhands = 39% (125)
Total = 320
On the surface, Alcaraz hit many more forehands than backhands. But once you examine where Alcaraz was standing when he hit them, you get a better idea of a hidden layer of his successful match strategy.

Alcaraz Forehand Groundstrokes

Run-Around Forehands = 97 (standing in the Ad court)
Normal Forehands = 98 (standing in the Deuce court)
Ruud made Alcaraz hit 125 backhands, and if Ruud had his way, the 97 run-around forehands would also have been Alcaraz backhands. If that were the case, Ruud would surely have secured both hands on the silver trophy. Ruud basically threw the kitchen sink at Alcaraz’s backhand through the Ad court.

Alcaraz Total Groundstrokes

Struck standing in the Ad court = 69% (222)
Struck standing in the Deuce court = 31% (98)
Total = 320
Alcaraz’s run-around forehand was solid in the opening two sets, with six errors and one winner from 40 shots. It stood tall in the final two sets with six errors and eight winners from 57 shots. In fact, Alcaraz made his last six run-around forehands in the third set and 16 straight in the fourth set before finally missing one. His run-around forehand was the rock he desperately needed to close out the match. Alcaraz hit 125 backhands for the match, committing 21 backhand errors while capturing five winners. The run-around forehand gave the overheating backhand much-needed relief.

Alcaraz At Net

The net was also a safe haven for the 19-year-old Spaniard to deflect the fight to another part of the court. Alcaraz won 71 per cent (15/21) serving and volleying and an extremely solid 76 per cent (34/45) coming forward overall. His willingness to come forward to finish points makes him a dangerous multi-dimensional opponent with so many places on the court to beat you.

Rally Length

The average rally length for the final was a crisp 4.1 shots, with almost two out of three points (65%) played in the 0-4 shot rally length.

Rally Length Played

0-4 Shots = 65%
5-8 Shots = 23%
9+ Shots = 12%
Alcaraz forged a small but significant advantage in the shortest two rally lengths, accounting for 88 per cent of total points. He lost the long rallies 16-13, but it didn’t hurt him because it only accounted for 12 per cent of total points.

Rally Length Won/Lost

0-4 Shots = Alcaraz 84/Ruud 79
5-8 Shots = Alcaraz 30/Ruud 27
9+ Shots = Alcaraz 13/Ruud 16
It was a very close final with history on the line. Upgrading 97 backhands to forehands could very well have been the centerpiece.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/brain-g ... caraz-ruud

[Damian]

Brain Game: Here's How Holger Rune Stunned Djokovic In Paris Final

Spoiler:

A fearless Serve + 1 forehand approach underpinned the Dane's success
Novak Djokovic won five more points in the match. Holger Rune ran a specific serve strategy that won the point 16 of 18 times. There’s your upset in a nutshell.

Rune defeated Djokovic 3-6, 6-3, 7-5 in the Rolex Paris Masters final on Sunday on the back of dominating his service games with a Serve + 1 forehand approach. It was almost unstoppable. Rune won 89% (16/18) of points when he started with a serve and a forehand approach. In comparison, he came to the net only eight times behind a Serve +1 backhand approach, winning just three (38%).

Hit a serve. Hit a forehand approach. Collect the most impressive silverware of your emerging career.

Rune’s winning strategy was to take time away from Djokovic and take control of the point as quickly as possible. Rune served and volleyed eight times, winning five. He made contact with the ball 38 per cent of the time inside the baseline, compared to Djokovic’s 33 per cent. Rune took advantage of every opportunity to lean on the ball and make Djokovic defend. Rune hunted more forehands (165-147), repeatedly putting himself in an offensive situation in the point. Fortune favours a north-south strategy.


Rune was also the more opportunistic player on the court. He only saw three break points in the match, and converted every one. In stark contrast, Djokovic amassed 12 break points in the two hour and 33 minute encounter, but only managed to convert two of them. It must have felt like sand slipping through his fingers.

Rune’s forehand was the difference maker in short rallies with his Serve +1 strategy. Once the point flowed into longer exchanges, it was his backhand that stole the show. Overall, Rune crushed 17 backhand winners to Djokovic’s six. It was a well-oiled, two-pronged attack that has catapulted Rune into the Top 10 in the Pepperstone ATP Rankings.

ATP WTA LIVE | Follow the Pepperstone ATP Race To Turin In Real Time

Rune’s court position provided another leverage point that helped him pull off an unlikely victory. He hit 37 per cent of his backhands inside the baseline trying to extract as many errors from Djokovic as possible. By comparison, the Serb only made contact with 26 percent of his backhands inside the baseline. The Dane stepped into the ball. The Serb too often let it passively come to him.

Rune was on a mission to move forward as often as possible to secure victory. Another data point that supports Rune’s superiority in the rally was his court movement. Rune ran 2739 metres for the match, while Djokovic was significantly higher at 2981 metres. Too much running for the former world No. 1.

Rune’s offense was simply spectacular, but so was his defense. If he wasn’t swarming the net, he was scampering side-to-side at the back of the court slicing forehands and backhands on the dead run to stay alive in the point. Djokovic hit 90 per cent topspin in the match, while Rune was only at 78 per cent. That’s a strong defensive stat for the 19-year-old. Rune played 58 per cent of his shots cross court, while Djokovic was lower at 54 per cent.

You May Also Like: Rune Rules In Paris! Dane Stuns Djokovic
Defense goes cross court.

Rune’s stunning victory serves as a playbook for the younger generation to upset the established stars. Attack the net at will. Stay in the point with “squash-like” slice.

Run like the wind and admire your newly acquired personal-best ranking.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/rune-br ... paris-2022

[Damian]

Brain Game: Djokovic Gives Ruud The Run-around

Spoiler:

Serbian backs away to find a path to victory
Run-around forehands > backhands.

Novak Djokovic defeated Casper Ruud 7-5, 6-3 in the Nitto ATP Finals title match Sunday in Turin, with his run-around forehand proving to be the difference-maker from the back of the court. Djokovic is widely thought to have the premier backhand in our sport, but it stood second fiddle to his run-around forehand when he was playing out of the Ad court.

This final was always going to be about control of the Ad court, as that is how Casper Ruud loves to organise his baseline patterns of play. According to Infosys ATP Second Screen, Ruud directed 75 per cent of his backhands cross court through the Ad court and 41 per cent of his forehands.

His goal was to lock Djokovic in the backhand cage and overwhelm him with a copious amount of backhand groundstrokes. It’s a strategy that often frustrates opponents and provides them with few offensive options. It has been a key pattern of play in Ruud’s run to the final in Turin.

Djokovic’s run-around forehand was the perfect antidote.


Overall, 67 per cent of Djokovic’s forehand and backhand groundstrokes were struck standing in the Ad court, which is a testament to Ruud’s Ad court intentions. Djokovic hit 81 backhands standing in the Ad court and 51 run-around forehands. Here’s how they performed:

Djokovic Groundstrokes
• Backhands = 81 (10 errors/5 winners)
• Run-Around Forehands = 51 (3 errors/4 winners)
• Normal Forehands = 65 (6 errors/5 winners)

Djokovic’s backhand performed solidly, ending up -5 with 10 errors and five winners. In the second set, Djokovic only committed three errors from 37 backhands. In fact, he only made one error from his last 25 backhands while collecting one winner and forcing four errors.

Knowing that the run-around forehand was doing the heavy lifting in the Ad court, Djokovic’s backhand came to life late in the match and he hit with more freedom and velocity, particularly down the line to cleverly change directions against Ruud.

The analytics of Djokovic’s run-around forehands were eye-opening. He ended +1 with three errors and four winners from 51 shots. The run-around forehand only committed one error from its last 37 shots while amassing four winners and forcing three errors. It was the engine room that constantly repelled Ruud’s baseline barrage.

You May Also Like: History-Maker Djokovic Claims Nitto ATP Finals Crown
Ruud’s baseline game is built on owning the Ad court with a combo of rock-solid backhands and marauding run-around forehands that pull the opponent wide off the court. Djokovic was able to throw a wrench into Ruud’s plans by cracking 51 run-around forehands and switching strategic gears to actually be the one hunting his opponent’s backhand.

Djokovic’s master plan to secure victory at the finish line was to not donate any free points to Ruud. The Serb made his last 10 forehand groundstrokes (normal & run-around) as well as his last 10 backhand groundstrokes. With history on the line, Djokovic has built his legend on smothering defense as well as finding ways to inexplicably draw errors from his opponents.



It felt like the match was on a razor’s edge from start to finish but Djokovic ended up winning a commanding 57 per cent (64/112) of points to Ruud’s 43 per cent (48/112). Djokovic won more points serving (44-37) and more returning (20-11).

Overall, Ruud played to his strengths and employed the same game plan that got him to the final. The problem for the Norwegian was that person standing on the other side of the court knew the playbook and had an ideal counter plan.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovi ... brain-game

[Damian]

Brain Game: Djokovic Dominates In His Domain To Dismiss Tsitsipas

Spoiler:

Learn how Serbian defeated Tsitsipas on Sunday
The baseline is his domain.

Novak Djokovic won the Australian Open for a record tenth time on Sunday with a 6-3, 7-6(4), 7-6(5) victory over Stefanos Tsitsipas. The baseline is where he repeatedly took control over the fortnight in Melbourne, and Tsitsipas was simply the last man standing at the back of the court to be knocked over.

Djokovic finished the tournament ranked No. 1 in baseline points won at a staggering 55.8 per cent (423/757). Only 16 players managed to be win greater than 50 per cent of their points from the back of the court.

You May Also Like: Perfect 10: Djokovic Returns To No. 1 With 22nd Major At AO
Tsitsipas came into the final having won a respectable 49.8 per cent (320/642) of his baseline points. That win percentage got well and truly roughed up against the Serbian in the final, plummeting all the way down to 39.2 per cent (49/125). No matter what else happened around the baseline battle, that win percentage proved too low for Tsitsipas to carry to victory.

The table below shows just how dominant Djokovic was in baseline play against all opponents in Melbourne this year.

2023 Australian Open Djokovic Opponents: Previous Matches & vs. Djokovic

Opponent Previous Matches vs. Djokovic
R. Carballes Baena - 33.6%
E. Couacaud 50.0% 35.4%
G. Dimitrov 59.3% 40.4%
A. De Minaur 56.8% 31.5%
A. Rublev 51.4% 41.4%
T. Paul 49.2% 39.8%
S. Tsitsipas 49.8% 39.2%
AVERAGE 52.8% 38.0%
Djokovic’s six opponents after the first round averaged winning a solid 52.8 per cent of their baseline points. But that total was savaged against Djokovic all the way down to 38 per cent. Playing Djokovic from the back of the court proved mission impossible for everyone standing on the other side of the court.

Djokovic’s seven opponents fared much better at the net, collectively winning 65 per cent (66/102) of their baseline points against the Super Serbian. The problem is that they oftentimes found it so tough to get to the net against Djokovic’s deep, penetrating groundstrokes.

Tsitsipas hit slightly more winners (40-36) than Djokovic in the final, but he committed 22 (76-54) more errors. Relentless baseline pressure heavily contributed to that total. Djokovic relied on his forehand much more than his backhand in his run to the title.

Djokovic Groundstroke Performance (7 matches)

Forehands
• Winners = 111
• Errors = 165
• +/- = -54

Backhands
• Winners = 38
• Errors = 162
• +/- = -124

When subtracting winners from errors, Djokovic’s forehand was -54, which was markedly better than the -124 off the backhand wing. Djokovic may very well have the best backhand on the planet, but his forehand is still the prime mover.

The average rally length in the final was 4.76 shots per point, which is just where Djokovic wanted it. The Serbian dominated in mid-length rallies of 5-8 shots more than anywhere else, and surprisingly lost the long rally battle of 9+ shots by a single shot.

Rally Length vs Tsitsipas

0-4 Shots
• Djokovic = 69
• Tsitsipas = 64
• Advantage = +5

5-8 Shots
• Djokovic = 22
• Tsitsipas = 8
• Advantage = +14

9+ Shots
• Djokovic = 21
• Tsitsipas = 22
• Advantage = -1

Djokovic’s triumphant return to Melbourne was built on dominating with forehands and backhands more than any other strategic factor.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovi ... brain-game

[Damian]

Wrecking Ball: Medvedev's Bewitching Backhand

Spoiler:

Learn how the 27-year-old earned his fourth title of 2023
Nobody on the planet loves backhand-to-backhand rallies more than Daniil Medvedev.

Medvedev defeated Jannik Sinner 7-5, 6-3 in the Miami Open presented by Itau final on Sunday on the back of dominating backhand exchanges through the Ad court.

The secret sauce of Medvedev’s flat, “knuckle-ball” backhands is that they are almost impossible to do anything with. They come at you flat and low, skidding through the court. They are not fast enough that you can use the raw power back against him or slow enough to step in and dominate. They live in a maddening “middle world” that bamboozle opponents into self-destruction.

You May Also Like: Medvedev Wins Maiden Miami Title, Fourth Trophy Of 2023
Backhand Groundstroke Performance

Medvedev

• Total = 97

• Errors = 5

• Winners = 3

• Opponent Forehand Errors From A Backhand = 6

• Opponent Backhand Errors From A Backhand = 12

• Opponent Backhand Volley Error From A Backhand = 1

Sinner

• Total = 92

• Errors = 19

• Winners = 0

• Opponent Forehand Errors From A Backhand = 3

• Opponent Backhand Errors From A Backhand = 1

Medvedev’s unorthodox backhand only yielded five errors from 92 shots, or one error every 18 backhands. Sinner’s more aesthetically pleasing backhand committed 19 errors from 92 backhands, which was good for one error every five backhands. It was a miss-match that provided Medvedev with a “go-to” winning pattern of play from start to finish.

Medvedev’s backhand was able to extract 12 backhand errors from Sinner, while the Italian was only able to extract a solitary backhand error from Medvedev from his own backhand. Overall, Medvedev hit 97 forehands and 97 backhands for the match and had little desire to hit run-around forehands in the Ad court. Medvedev only hit 10 run-around forehands in the Ad court, while Sinner hit 41.


Medvedev knew his backhand was the wrecking ball.

What’s fascinating about Medvedev’s backhand is that he voluntarily hits it from extremely deep in the court. Medvedev made contact with his backhand 46 per cent of the time from further back than two metres behind the baseline. Sinner made contact just 16 per cent of the time with his backhand from the deep section of the court.

What’s also interesting to note is that Medvedev’s backhand strategy enabled him to hit more backhands inside the baseline than Sinner. Medvedev hit 20 per cent inside the baseline, while Sinner was just at 11 per cent.

He stands deep where he can’t be hurt and quickly moves forward to hurt you when the opportunity arises.

The Official App Of Tennis | Download ATP WTA Live App

Sinner’s backhand started the match well, making only two errors from the first 22 backhands struck. It was a vastly different story at the start of the second set, where Sinner committed five backhand errors from the first twelve backhands hit. Four of those errors were committed from not being able to handle a Medvedev cross court backhand.

Medvedev’s backhand got off to a flyer, making the first 30 backhands in a row, including one winner, and forcing seven opponent errors. Medvedev’s backhand was the rock he relied on in the second set, making only two errors from 31 backhands while extracting eight errors from Sinner.

Medvedev’s backhand remains an enigma for opponents. Medvedev won a healthy 61 per cent (45/74) of his baseline points for the match. Sinner only managed to win less than half of that, at 30 per cent (19/64).

Medvedev’s bewitching backhand strikes again.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/medvede ... brain-game

[Damian]

31 For A Big 1! How Rublev Turned His Backhand Into A Rock Against Rune

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the Monte-Carlo final
Thirty-one straight backhands in the court with the match on the line.

Andrey Rublev defeated Holger Rune 5-7, 6-2, 7-5 in the Rolex Monte-Carlo Masters final by putting 31 straight backhands in the court from 1-4 down in the deciding set. Rublev missed his thirty-second backhand in the net going down the line serving at 6-5 40/0. It was an inconsequential error. An ace out wide at 40/15 on the ensuing point sealed a momentous victory.

Rublev’s backhand was the rock that got him over the finish line. Rublev also extracted seven errors using his backhand groundstroke from 1-4 down in the final set, with four being a Rune backhand, which overheated deep in the deciding set.

During the same period, with Rune leading 4-1 in the deciding set, Rune’s backhand broke down under self-imposed pressure. The Dane hit 31 backhands, committing six errors while hitting two winners and only extracting one error from Rublev (a forehand groundstroke).

Rublev’s backhand was always going in. Rune’s was much more of a wild card as the finish line rushed hard at both players.


The deciding set also featured three crucial moments in which Rune’s forehand return, serve, and overhead let him down. Rublev was a single point from trailing a double break when serving at 1-4, 30/40. He went with a surprise first-serve location, and it worked perfectly. For the match, Rublev served 52 per cent of his first serves out wide in the Ad court and 44 per cent down the T. On this hyper-critical point, he went with the secondary pattern down the T, and Rune sliced a forehand return just wide.

The pressure metre suddenly exploded on the slow red clay.

The second crucial moment came with Rune serving at 4-2 in the third set. He double faulted in the net on the first and third point of the game and was broken to 15. The pressure to close the match was clearly affecting the 19-year-old Dane.

Serving at 5-5 in the deciding set, Rune put back-to-back overheads in the net and double faulted again on break point. While Rublev kept his head, and his backhand in the court, Rune was rushing and missing.

You May Also Like: Rublev Rallies To Maiden Masters 1000 Title
Rublev’s returns were also instrumental in his comeback from 1-4 in the deciding set. He only made two return errors while extracting two errors from Rune’s Serve + 1 forehand and backhand groundstroke. Rune, on the other hand, yielded seven return errors (three backhand/four forehand) while forcing just two Serve +1 errors from Rublev.

Rublev seemed to be more under pressure from the baseline throughout the match, but his stats stood tall against Rune from the back of the court when the red clay dust finally settled. Rublev won 51 per cent (60/95) of his baseline points for the match, while Rune was at 46 per cent (57/123).

Rune came to the net slightly more for the match but failed to finish points when it mattered. Rublev won an impressive 78 per cent (14/18) coming forward, while Rune won just 40 percent (8/20) at net.

The drop shot had worked so well for Rune to the final, but it evaporated in the heat of the match against Rublev. Rune won just 47 percent (7/15) of points in which he used his drop shot in the final, providing another underperforming area that contributed to his defeat.

Rublev’s victory was as much mental as it was physical. He said in his post-match interview that "And today I was at least [thinking], 'Okay, if you're going to lose today at least please believe until the end', and that is what I was trying to do in the third set, hoping that maybe I would have one extra chance to come back or something and in the end I was able to do it.”

Never go away. Never give up. The finish line is full of surprises if you just keep your head.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/rublev- ... brain-game

[Damian]

Forced To Play On Struff’s Terms, Alcaraz Still Finds Path To Victory

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the Madrid final between Alcaraz and Struff
Take time away to prepare. Relentlessly come forward to pressure. Get under your opponent’s skin.

Carlos Alcaraz survived a blistering attack from Jan-Lennard Stuff to win the Mutua Madrid Open final 6-4, 3-6, 6-3 on Sunday with something resembling his B or C-level game. It certainly wasn’t his A game, as Struff swarmed the net and mentally rattled the 20-year-old’s cage. But it’s a testament to the Spaniard’s mental toughness that he was made to feel so uncomfortable on the court and still found a way to be first over the finish line.

The match was very much dictated by Struff, who came to the net a staggering 52 times in three sets, winning 33 points up front (63 per cent). That was vastly superior to the German’s win percentage at the back of the court, which ended up at just 43 per cent (32/75).

Struff’s harrowing forays forward created discomfort and despair at times for Alcaraz. Struff turned the Magic Box into a pressure cooker and was on a roll early in the third set, holding break point on Alcaraz’s serve at 1-1, Ad out. Alcaraz saved break point and won seven of the next nine points to break Struff and surge to a 3-1 lead in the deciding set. That sequence proved to be the most pivotal in the final.

Alcaraz Serve Direction
Alcaraz served primarily to Struff’s backhand return, making the German hit 70 per cent (58/83) backhand returns for the match. That was mainly due to Struff successfully crushing his forehand return at the start of the match. Struff’s initial seven forehand returns in Set One produced one return winner and forced four forehand Serve +1 errors from Alcaraz. Alcaraz cleverly moved the battle to the backhand return, where he extracted 10 return errors in Set 1, five in Set 2, and critically, 10 again in the Set 3.

Losing serve at 1-2 in the third flipped the momentum and gave Alcaraz a new lease of energy from the partisan crowd. Struff’s backhand return suffered, as he failed to put seven of his last eight backhand returns of the match in the court. In the third set, Struff hit only four forehand returns and 20 backhand returns. Alcaraz finally had a strategy he could sink his teeth into.

Return Location
In stark contrast, Alcaraz only made contact with three returns for the match within four metres of the baseline. He was typically six metres behind the baseline or more, trying to take big cuts at returns. Alcaraz didn’t make contact with any returns inside the baseline.

Struff, on the other hand, made contact with all second-serve returns around two metres inside the baseline and only made contact with one first-serve return further back than one metre behind the baseline. Struff even made contact with 10+ first-serve returns inside the baseline.

Struff was playing a north-south match. Alcaraz was much more about trying to dip returns below the height of the net to force errors, and also pass on the next shot.

Alcaraz Passing Shots
In similar fashion to the serve targets, Alcaraz also directed his focus to Struff’s backhand volley when the German came forward. Overall, Struff hit 15 forehand volleys and 28 backhand volleys. Struff hit three forehand volley winners while only yielding two forehand volley errors. The backhand volley contributed eight winners but committed 10 errors.

With Struff serving at 1-2, 30/40, in the third set, he served and volleyed behind a first serve. He dug out a low forehand volley but found himself too close to the net with little reaction time against Alcaraz’s forehand down-the-line passing shot. Struff’s reflex backhand volley flew over the baseline and Alcaraz seized the momentum he needed to take the title.

We are used to witnessing Alcaraz produce such a high level in finals and play the match on his terms. In many ways, it is even more impressive to see him have to fight himself and struggle mightily against Struff to find a way to win.

In many ways, Alcaraz had to conquer himself first in order to conquer Struff.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/alcaraz ... brain-game

[Damian]

Daniil The Dismantler: How Medvedev Magic Shut Down Rune's A-Game

Spoiler:

Brain Game analysis breaks down the Rome final
Daniil Medvedev dismantles your game.

Playing your “A-Game” is next to impossible against Medvedev, who willingly absorbs your best punches and silently disrupts your winning patterns. Medvedev defeated Holger Rune 7-5, 7-5 in the Internazionali BNL d’Italia final on Sunday by dismantling Rune’s strengths and finding another level at the end of both sets to secure victory. There were seven specific battles in which Medvedev managed to craft an advantage over Rune to capture his first clay-court title.

You May Also Like: Medvedev Clinches First Clay-Court Crown, Triumphs In Rome
1) Medvedev Owned Ad-Court Rallies
Medvedev’s primary baseline tactic was to make the match a backhand-to-backhand war of attrition through the Ad court. Medvedev’s ultra-flat, uber-consistent backhand is almost impossible to do anything with.

Medvedev Backhand Placement

67% cross court
15% middle
18% down the line
Rune Backhand Placement

46% cross court
25% middle
29% down the line
Medvedev shoveled two out of every three backhands crosscourt, handcuffing Rune in baseline exchanges. Overall, Rune hit 108 backhand groundstrokes, which included 14 errors and three winners. Rune also hit 54 run-around forehands in the Ad court for six winners and six errors. The Ad court belonged to Medvedev.

2) Rune’s Underperforming First Serve

Rune made a lowly 49 per cent of his first serves (33/68) for the match, only winning 52 per cent (17/33) of those points. Rune was broken four times, specifically due to these underperforming first-serve stats, but won a competitive 63 per cent (22/35) of his second-serve points. A key factor of Rune’s low numbers behind his first serve was Medvedev’s deep return position, where he regularly made contact six metres behind the baseline. Rune could not go through him, or around him.

Medvedev Return Hit Points vs. Rune

Rome Final Medvedev Return Position
Hawkeye graphic courtesy of ATP Media
Medvedev consistently put Rune on the back foot at the baseline after a first serve, or landed it at his shoelaces as he attempted to serve and volley. Medvedev directed 81 per cent of his first-and-second-serve returns to the middle and backhand thirds of the court, trying to immediately enter into an oxygen-depraving backhand-to-backhand rally against Rune.

3) Rune Serve & Volley
Serve and volley is a natural counter-attack against a deep returner, but with Rune landing less than half his first serves, the tactic always felt dangerous in this match. Overall, Rune won seven of twelve serve-and-volley points, but was even in the second set with three won and three lost. Medvedev did a masterful job of mitigating this potentially damaging tactic.

4) Rune Drop Shots
Drop shots are a classic secondary tactic on clay that compliment a strong primary pattern of play, such as initially pushing your opponent deep behind the baseline before yanking them forward. Rune hit 10 drop shots in the match, with eight coming from his backhand wing. He only won four of ten, and they failed to disrupt Medvedev’s baseline patterns.

5) Net Points Won
Rune came to the net a healthy 26 times in the match but only managed to win 50 per cent (13) of those points. Medvedev countered by winning 13 of 20 (65 per cent) at net, providing another strategic victory.

6) Baseline Points Won
The primary pattern of play of blasting groundstrokes back and forth over the Roman red dirt was easily won by Medvedev.

Medvedev=53% (39/74)
Rune=43% (29/68)
Rune hit 131 forehand groundstrokes for the match, but Medvedev absorbed the punches like a true clay-court heavyweight. Rune struck nine winners with his forehand but contributed 17 errors as Medvedev consistently absorbed and repelled Rune’s forehands.

7) Court Position

Medvedev Court Position

Inside Baseline=23%
Within 2 Metres Of The Baseline=44%
Past 2 Metres=33%
Rune Court Position

Inside Baseline=21%
Within 2 Metres Of The Baseline=45%
Past 2 Metres=34%
Surprisingly, Medvedev played slightly more inside the baseline than Rune while at the same time not standing in the ultra-deep baseline location quite as much.

Medvedev’s first clay-court title came from playing solid tennis on his side of the net and forcing Rune to play his “B-Game”. What a wonderful way to spend a Sunday afternoon.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/medvede ... brain-game

[Damian]

Djokovic's Key Against Ruud To Earn Tennis Immortality

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the Roland Garros final
The first set was the match.

Novak Djokovic defeated Casper Ruud 7-6(1) 6-3, 7-5 in the Roland Garros final on Sunday by withstanding a brutal onslaught in the opening set that left the Super Serbian doubled over in exhaustion after only nine games.

Djokovic was tight, and the ball was consistently out of his strike zone. Ruud was playing perfectly, and Djokovic was struggling mightily. Playing when tight extracts an immeasurable amount of extra energy from the body. Djokovic was not his usual self, yet he somehow found a way to win one of the greatest sets in Grand Slam final history.

Ruud led 4-1 in the opening set and had Djokovic on the proverbial ropes. The Norwegian could not finish what he started. Djokovic broke back trailing 2-4 by extracting two forehand errors and two backhand errors. He saved a break point at 3-4, 30/40, and finally ran away with the tie-break 7/1. It was a brutal set that quite possibly only Djokovic could have found a way to the finish line in.

You May Also Like: Djokovic Wins Roland Garros For Historic 23rd Major Title
Djokovic stole the opening set by completely dominating the 0-4 rally length.

Set 1: Rally Length

0-4 Shots: Djokovic 30/Ruud 12 (Djokovic +18)
5-8 Shots: Djokovic 7/Ruud 17 (Djokovic -10)
9+ Shots: Djokovic 10/Ruud 12 (Djokovic -2)
Djokovic created a substantial 18-point advantage in the opening set in the 0-4 shot rally length, winning 30 points, while losing 12. The longer the rally went, the more it favoured Ruud. The shorter the rally length, the more Djokovic got to breathe and recover to fight another day.

The average rally length in the opening set was a bruising 6.3 shots, which was much longer than the 4.9 shots in set two and 4.5 shots in set three. The primary tactic to finish points quickly for the Serbian was to go immediately to the net.

Djokovic Net Points Won

Set 1=11/15
Set 2=4/6
Set 3=5/6
Djokovic had to seek the refuge of the net in the opening set to avoid longer rallies where he lost more points than he won. Djokovic started tight, missing two drop shots in the opening return game, and a simple overhead in the next game that made him play more defensively than normal.

Against Alcaraz in the semi-finals, Djokovic could use the power of his opponent’s groundstrokes back against him. Against Ruud, the ball was slower and higher out of the strike zone, and Djokovic struggled to do anything to hurt his opponent. Combined with his tightness, Djokovic was expending maximum energy, and the ball was going anywhere.

Djokovic won 43 per cent (26/60) of baseline points in the opening set, while Ruud won 48 per cent (29/61). Djokovic and Ruud both hit 15 winners in the opening set, but that would signal the end of Ruud’s aggression in the match. Ruud only hit seven winners in the second set and nine in the third. By comparison, Djokovic ramped up his aggression, striking 15 winners in set two and a substantial 22 winners in the third set.

The shot that grew in importance for Djokovic was his forehand.

Djokovic Forehand Winners

Set 1 = 8 winners/13 errors = -5
Set 2 = 8 winners/8 errors = 0
Set 3 = 12 winners/8 errors = +4
The average rally length for the final was a substantial 5.4 shots, and once Djokovic got the first set under his belt, it was his aggressive forehand that he rode to victory.

Djokovic now stands alone with 23 Grand Slam titles. The opening set of today’s final may very well be one of the toughest physically and mentally he has ever had to withstand.

The reward is tennis immortality.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/roland- ... brain-game

[Damian]

How Alcaraz's Scintillating Serve Toppled Djokovic's Return In The Wimbledon Final

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the memorable championship match
Big serves win big titles.

Carlos Alcaraz defeated Novak Djokovic 1-6, 7-6(6), 6-1, 3-6, 6-4 on Sunday to win his first Wimbledon title on the back of a stunning serving performance. Alcaraz relied heavily on his first serve to close out the match, making six straight first serves at 5-4 in the fifth set to clinch the most significant victory of his career. He served 22 service games in the final, but none mattered more than the last one.

The following serve-related statistics identify that Alcaraz took his serve up a notch or two against Djokovic compared to his previous six matches to the final.

You May Also Like: Magical Alcaraz Ends Djokovic Streak In Classic, Claims Wimbledon Crown
Average Serve Speed
Alcaraz served harder in the final with his first and second serves than in any match he played in the tournament. Djokovic’s potent return game required a serve recalibration.

Alcaraz Average First Serve Speed

Rd 1 vs. J. Chardy - 118.4 mph
Rd 2 vs. A. Muller - 119.8 mph
Rd 3 vs. N. Jarry - 119 mph
Rd 4 vs. M. Berrettini - 118 mph
QF vs. H. Rune - 118.6 mph
SF vs. D. Medvedev - 114.8 mph
Final vs. N. Djokovic - 121.3 mph
Alcaraz failed to reach a first-serve average of 120 mph in any match to the final. Against Djokovic, he elevated to an average of 121.3 mph. Djokovic won 30 per cent (28/94) of first-serve return points for the match but only 26 per cent (5/19) in the deciding fifth set.

Alcaraz won 70 per cent (66/94) of his first-serve points in the final, which rose to 74 per cent (14/19) in the fifth set. That was the highest win percentage of any of the five sets. Alcaraz recognised what the moment called for.

Alcaraz Average Second Serve Speed

Rd 1 vs. J. Chardy - 97.7 mph
Rd 2 vs. A. Muller - 99.9 mph
Rd 3 vs. N. Jarry - 101.8 mph
Rd 4 vs. M. Berrettini - 100.3 mph
QF vs. H. Rune - 101.5 mph
SF vs. D. Medvedev - 97.5 mph
Final vs. N. Djokovic - 102.5 mph
Alcaraz won 50 per cent (28/56) of his second-serve points in the final against Djokovic, which took it out of the liability column against arguably the best returner in the world. That’s a win in anyone's book.

Alcaraz only won 14 per cent (1/7) of second-serve points in the opening set but finished strong, winning 70 per cent (7/10) in the fifth set. The extra speed on the second serve kept Djokovic from stepping in and forcing Alcaraz Serve +1 groundstroke errors.

Body First Serves
Alcaraz cleverly served a lot at Djokovic’s body in the final to give the Serbian a third location to defend against.

Alcaraz First Serve Direction (Deuce & Ad Courts)

Wide = 34
Body = 24
T = 36
Djokovic First Serve Direction (Deuce & Ad Courts)

Wide = 54
Body = 8
T = 56
Alcaraz served triple the amount of first serves at the body than Djokovic (24 to to jam the Serbian and give him a third target area to worry about. It worked a treat. Overall, Alcaraz had 34 per cent (32/94) of his first serves unreturned, while Djokovic was significantly lower at 25 per cent (30/118).

The icing on the cake for Alcaraz was hitting nine aces to three against the Serbian. Three of those aces came in the fifth set. Alcaraz won all five service games he served in the fifth set, with only one of his service games reaching Deuce.

Overall, Alcaraz clubbed more than twice the amount of winners than Djokovic (66 to 32), but this match boiled down to a straightforward tennis equation of hold serve/break serve.

No shot helped Alcaraz put two hands on the golden trophy more than his scintillating serve.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/alcaraz ... brain-game

[Damian]

Brain Game: De Minaur Picked Wrong Fight Against Sinner

Spoiler:

Italian leveraged huge advantage from the baseline
It was strictly a baseline brawl. Alex de Minaur managed one baseline winner in 105 points against Jannik Sinner. Strategically, it was the wrong fight to pick.
Sinner defeated De Minaur 6-4, 6-1 in the final of the National Bank Open Presented by Rogers on Sunday on the back of overpowering the Aussie from the back of the court. Both players had little interest in coming to the net to finish points. Sinner appeared at the net only four times (won 4/4), while De Minaur won 5/9 at the front of the court. He needed to camp there more often.

Both players elected to stay in their comfort zone from the back of the court, which provided the Italian with a huge strategic advantage. Sinner won an impressive 57 per cent (44/77) of points from the baseline, while De Minaur could only muster 39 per cent (28/72). This style of play was always going to favour the heavy-hitting Italian, as he could extract error after error from De Minaur in gruelling back-court exchanges.

The Official App Of Tennis | Download ATP WTA Live App

Baseline Points Won
Set 1: Sinner = 52% (23/44); De Minaur = 44% (18/41)
Set 2: Sinner = 64% (21/33); De Minaur = 32% (10/31)
Total: Sinner = 57% (44/77); De Minaur = 39% (28/72)

The shot that broke down the most was De Minaur’s forehand, with 21 errors and a solitary winner. Sinner committed 18 forehand errors but collected four winners. Sinner’s primary pattern was to constantly attack De Minaur’s flat forehand, taking away his time to prepare his hands and feet correctly.

De Minaur’s backhand is typically a rock, but this side also bled more errors than usual. De Minaur committed 17 backhand errors, with no groundstroke winners. Sinner committed 14 backhand errors, with two winners. It didn’t matter whether the ball flowed through the Deuce or Ad court. Sinner was almost always the player leaning on the ball, while the Aussie was hard-pressed to apply the pressure necessary to force the errors he required.

<a href='https://www.atptour.com/en/players/alex ... view'>Alex de Minaur</a> was outgunned by <a href='https://www.atptour.com/en/players/jann ... ew'>Jannik Sinner</a> in the Toronto final.

Average Groundstroke Speed
Forehands: Sinner = 127 km/h; De Minaur = 110 km/h
Backhands: Sinner = 120 km/h; De Minaur = 102 km/h

Sinner enjoyed an 18 kmph average speed difference with backhands and a 17 kmph average increase in forehand speed. With the ball constantly returning at a significantly faster speed than it left, De Minaur’s groundstroke game broke down as the match progressed.

Sinner was happy to blast his groundstrokes cross court all day long and generally avoid going down the line too much, staying away from lower percentage patterns of play.

Sinner Groundstroke Direction
Forehands = 65% cross court; Backhands = 67% cross court

De Minaur, on the other hand, clearly tried to play away from Sinner’s more potent forehand wing, avoiding Deuce court rallies where his forehand was directly pitted against Sinner’s.

De Minaur Groundstroke Direction
Forehands = 44% cross court; Backhands = 81% cross court

This was always going to be a tough match-up for De Minaur, as Sinner employs a similar back-court game style but with a lot more firepower. Running and defending for a living gets more challenging as you progress through the draw.

This is a well-deserved maiden Masters 1000 victory for Sinner. It’s also an excellent learning opportunity for De Minaur, as he must further develop his game to be more of an all-court threat or create more pressure from the back of the court, especially with depth, height and superior court position.

Sinner took home a Masters 1000 title. De Minaur took home the knowledge of the upgrades needed to capture one for himself in the near future.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/brain-g ... -de-minaur

[Damian]

The Surprise Tactic That Helped Djokovic Beat Alcaraz In Epic Cincinnati Final

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the memorable three-set clash
Think it’s foolish to serve and volley behind your second serve? Wrong. It’s foolish not to.

Novak Djokovic served and volleyed six times behind his second serve, winning every point on his way to a thrilling 5-7, 7-6(7), 7-6(4) victory over Carlos Alcaraz in the Western & Southern Open final on Sunday.

The back of the court was failing Djokovic early on as torrid baseline exchanges took their toll in the blistering Cincinnati heat. The Serbian suffered from heat exhaustion after only a handful of games and cleverly changed gears to attack the net with approach shots and serve and volley. Djokovic also served and volleyed twice behind his first serve, winning one of them. No other strategy he employed came close to winning 88 per cent (7/8) of the time. Alcaraz served and volleyed 10 times, winning eight, with all of them being behind a first serve.

Djokovic initially served and volleyed behind his second serve at 5-5, 0/15 in the opening set. It was a clever counter to Alcaraz’s ultra-deep return position. Djokovic hit a heavy kick second serve to Alcaraz’s backhand return and got well inside the service line for the volley, knocking off a backhand volley winner. In fact, all six of Djokovic’s serve and volley forays forward behind his second serve were to take advantage of Alcaraz standing extremely deep to return serve.

You May Also Like: Djokovic Saves MP, Stuns Alcaraz For Cincinnati Title
The advantage of Djokovic’s slow, heavy second serve is that it takes much longer than normal to reach the returner, enabling Djokovic excellent court position for his first volley well inside the baseline. The kick serve also jumps up high out of the opponent’s strike zone, giving them little power to use back at the server.

It was a masterful strategic manouevre that seemed counter-intuitive to everyone but Djokovic. It was straight out of the Patrick Rafter playbook.

Djokovic served and volleyed behind his second serve a few points later at 5-5, 15/40. This time, it was a slow, 94 mph slice second serve out wide in the Deuce court. Again, Alcaraz stood extremely deep to return and made contact with the ball around 13 feet behind the baseline. Djokovic hit his second volley for a winner as Alcaraz was left sitting on the court after losing balance trying to chase the ball down.

Djokovic’s gutsiest call to serve and volley behind his second serve occurred at 6/6 in the second set tie-break. He had just saved a match point on the previous point by approaching the net, and he desperately needed another quick point as heat exhaustion saw him doubled over as they changed sides.

The Official App Of Tennis | Download ATP WTA Live App

Alcaraz stood in a traditional position closer to the baseline to return Djokovic’s first serve, but it was a fault. Alcaraz moved well back behind the baseline to return the second serve, which the Serbian duly noted. Djokovic hit a 95 mph slice second serve to Alcaraz’s forehand return, and two backhand volleys later had won the point. Djokovic’s body was failing him from the extreme heat, but his strategic mindset and warrior mentality carried him to the finish line.

In the opening set, Djokovic only won 40 per cent of his baseline points and appeared at the net just four times. In the second set, he still only won 42 per cent of baseline points but appeared at the net 14 times, winning 11. He was back in the match.

Alcaraz’s Achilles’ heel in the match was his return of serve. Djokovic only committed 18 return errors, while the Spaniard collected more than double that amount with a staggering 37 return errors, including 25 from the forehand wing. Alcaraz committed at least one return error in both tie-breaks and every one of Djokovic’s 18 service games except one. Alcaraz could not figure out where to stand to return, especially against Djokovic’s second serve. Sometimes, he was making contact nine feet inside the baseline, and sometimes 18 feet behind the baseline. He never locked onto a return location that looked comfortable.

Sneaking straight in behind stealthy second serves saved Djokovic’s legs and lungs from further punishment at the back of the court. It showed tremendous courage and conviction, but ultimately, it was an easy choice, with Alcaraz giving up so much ground to start the point.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/alcaraz ... brain-game

[Damian]

How Djokovic Won The Battle Of Legs & Lungs Against Medvedev

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the championship match at Flushing Meadows
Live by the sword, die by the sword.

Daniil Medvedev gambled on extending baseline rallies into oblivion against Novak Djokovic in the US Open final on Sunday night. He held a set point in the second set, but ultimately came up well short with his master plan.

Novak Djokovic defeated Medvedev 6-3, 7-6(5), 6-3 by surviving a war of attrition that featured a staggering 54 points in the nine-plus shot rally length. The opening point of the match was 19 shots long, and two points later, they traded a bruising 23-shot rally. Djokovic won them both, and Medvedev’s intentions were crystal clear. It was going to be a battle of legs and lungs.

The rally length for the final was a lactic acid-inducing 6.3 shots. As a comparison, the average rally length was 4.4 shots in Medvedev’s semi-final victory over Carlos Alcaraz. It was just 4.2 shots for Djokovic in his semi-final victory over Ben Shelton. Medvedev averaged running 25 metres per point, while Djokovic was slightly higher at 26 metres per point. Those totals were considerably higher for both players than any of their other matches for the tournament.

Medvedev signaled from the first game that he was going to set up shop deep behind the baseline and would refuse to budge. It is extremely rare to see a match feature more points in rallies of nine or more shots than in five to eight shots, but that is precisely what Medvedev’s dogged game style produced.

You May Also Like: Djokovic Defeats Medvedev For US Open Title, 24th Major
Rally Length

0-4 Shots =53% (113)
5-8 Shots = 22% (47)
9+ Shots = 25% (54)
The problem for Medvedev was that Djokovic gained a significant edge in the more abundant shorter rallies.

Rally Length - Points Won

0-4 Shots: Djokovic 63/Medvedev 50
5-8 Shots: Djokovic 29/Medvedev 18
9+ Shots: Djokovic 26/Medvedev 28
In rallies up to nine shots long, Djokovic won 92 points to 68. Medvedev crafted a slim two-point advantage in points of nine or more shots, but that would never carry him to the finish line.

What Djokovic did well was adapt.

It must have felt like playing against a brick wall for the Serbian, so he took his battle to the net to keep points short and make Medvedev have to hit passing shots all evening long.

Serve & Volley Points Won

Djokovic = 20/22
Medvedev = 0/0
Net Points Won

Djokovic = 37/44
Medvedev = 16/22
It was baffling to see Medvedev fall behind on the scoreboard and not switch up strategies and swarm the net. When Medvedev lost a close five-setter in the 2019 US Open final against Rafael Nadal, he came to the net 74 times, winning 68 per cent of those points (50). He also served and volleyed 29 times, winning 76 per cent (22). Medvedev’s gamble to only come to the net half as much as Djokovic (22-44) and not serve and volley at all never gained traction.

Djokovic’s primary strategy in baseline rallies was to attack Medvedev’s forehand in back-and-forth deuce-court exchanges. It was a smart strategy that has also paid dividends against Medvedev in the past.



Groundstroke Performance

Forehands

Djokovic: 9 winners/28 errors = -19
Medvedev: 10 winners/40 errors = -30
Backhands

Djokovic: 6 winners/29 errors = -23
Medvedev: 5 winners/32 errors = -27
It was perplexing to watch Medvedev fall further and further behind in baseline points won and not update his game plan.

Baseline Points Won

Djokovic = 48.8% (59/121)
Medvedev = 38.0% (52/137)
In the third set, Medvedev only won 27.6 per cent (8/29) of his baseline points as Djokovic finally gained some real momentum. Medvedev only came to the net six times in the third set, winning three.

The final was a brutal baseline battle that took its toll on both players. As we have seen time and time again, it was Djokovic who was the last one standing to collect the silverware.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovi ... brain-game

[Damian]

How Djokovic's Brick-Wall Backhand Ruled The Paris Final

Spoiler:

Novak Djokovic hits 57 per cent of his groundstrokes from the backhand side en route to victory over Grigor Dimitrov in the Paris final.

Brain Game analyses Djokovic's win against Dimitrov
The backhand built an impenetrable brick wall.

Novak Djokovic defeated Grigor Dimitrov 6-4, 6-3 in the final of the Rolex Paris Masters on Sunday by relying heavily on his backhand to control the flow of points from the back of the court.

This was a defensive, old-school approach from Djokovic, who only went to the net five times and hit just 15 run-around forehands standing in the Ad court for the match. Djokovic invested heavily in his backhand, and after a rocky start, it paid dividends with his 40th ATP Masters 1000 crown.

Djokovic committed six errors in his first 13 backhand groundstrokes (excluding returns & volleys), as Dimitrov successfully attacked it with his slice backhands and aggressive run-around forehands. Djokovic said post-match that he thought both players were tight at the beginning of the match, but it was the Serbian who settled down the quickest.

Djokovic made his last 29 backhands of the opening set and cranked up the pressure on Dimitrov to basically have to hit winners to collect points. Overall, Djokovic hit more backhands than forehands for the match as he was content to build points through the Ad court and force Dimitrov to red line his game to win baseline exchanges.

You May Also Like: Djokovic Downs Dimitrov In Paris For 40th Masters 1000 Crown
DJOKOVIC GROUNDSTROKES

Total Shots
Backhands = 57% (101)
Forehands = 43% (76)

Winners
Backhands = 3 winners
Forehand = 2 winners

Errors
Backhands = 15
Forehands = 9

Forcing Opponent Errors
Backhands = 11 (5 forehand/4 backhand)
Forehands = 9 (8 forehand/1 backhand)


Djokovic’s master plan was to trade as many backhand blows as necessary through the Ad court to wear down Dimitrov’s one-hander. Djokovic hit a sizable 73 per cent of his backhands cross court, 10 per cent through the middle and just 17 percent down the line. Dimitrov, by comparison, only hit 60 per cent of his backhands cross court, 23 per cent through the middle and 17 per cent down the line.

Dimitrov may very well have felt comfortable rallying to Djokovic’s backhand through the Ad court, but it had the flow-on effect of reducing the number of aggressive forehands he could find. Dimitrov hit just 52 per cent forehands for the match (101 forehands/93 backhands), which was never going to get the job done.

Djokovic turned it into a defensive battle by primarily playing backhand to backhand and also by playing from deeper in the court. Dimitrov simply couldn’t find a way to go through, over, or around Djokovic’s proverbial brick-wall backhand.

RALLY HIT POINT COMPARISON

Shots Hit Inside The Baseline
Djokovic = 14%
Dimitrov = 19%

Shots Hit Within Two Metres Of The Baseline
Djokovic = 52%
Dimitrov = 67%

Shots Hit Past Two Metres
Djokovic = 34%
Dimitrov = 14%

The telling statistic is that Dimitrov could not take advantage of Djokovic’s very deep court position, where he contacted the ball over a third of the time (34%) past two metres behind the baseline. Dimitrov won a commendable seven of 10 points at the net, which begs the question: Why didn’t he go to the net twice or three times that amount to keep harvesting the superior winning percentage at the front of the court?

Dimitrov’s baseline woes also flowed over to his return game. Dimitrov only won six of 32 (19%) return points against Djokovic’s first serve and five of 16 (31%) against the Serbian’s second serve. Dimitrov failed to put a sizable 50 per cent of Djokovic’s first serves back in the court and failed to see a single break point for the match.

Djokovic often wins matches by bossing opponents to all points of the court. In this match, he went into lockdown mode by betting big on his backhand.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovi ... brain-game

[Damian]

Why Novak Threw Out His Old Playbook Against Sinner

Spoiler:

World No. 1 brought a very different battle plan to Sunday's Nitto ATP Finals title match

Play to win.

Novak Djokovic defeated Jannik Sinner 6-3, 6-3 in the Nitto ATP Finals title match on Sunday by updating his game plan and mentality.

“I had to step it up,” Djokovic said post-match when talking about his dominant victories in the semi-final against Carlos Alcaraz and final against Sinner. “I had to win the matches and not wait for them to hand me the victory. I think I have tactically played different today than I have in the group stage against Jannik,” Djokovic said.

So what did Djokovic do differently? He stopped grinding with his backhand and let his forehand be the star of the show from the back of the court. Djokovic hit more backhands than forehands against Sinner in the group stage, but that flipped in the final, where his forehand punched a hole right through Sinner’s potent baseline game.

Djokovic Groundstrokes (excluding returns, volleys & overheads)
• Forehands = 101 (3 winners/11 errors/extracted 22 errors from Sinner)
• Backhands = 76 (1 winner/8 errors/extracted 10 errors from Sinner)

The writing was on the wall early on. With Djokovic leading 3-1, 15-0 serving, he had hit 19 forehand groundstrokes and committed just one error. He had collected a winner, but most importantly, six of those forehands immediately extracted an error from Sinner. Djokovic’s average forehand groundstroke speed for the match to date was significantly higher than Sinner's.

You May Also Like: Djokovic Secures Another Record With Turin 'Big Title'
Average Forehand Groundstroke Speed (First Four Games)
• Djokovic = 138 km/h (86 mph)
• Sinner = 119 km/h (74 mph)

Djokovic was uncorking forehand after forehand, while Sinner spent most of his time defending with his forehand on the run. Their baseline performance in the opening set could not have been more different.

Baseline Points Won Set 1
• Djokovic = Won 65% (15/23)
• Sinner = Won 33% (9/27)

Sinner enjoyed a lot of success in their round-robin match by locking Djokovic in the “backhand cage” and making him repeatedly hit backhands cross-court. Djokovic ensured this match would be different by hitting more run-around forehands in the Ad court and trading more shots through the Deuce court. Djokovic hit 17 run-around forehands for the match, not coughing up a single error. He hit one forehand winner and extracted five groundstroke errors (three forehand/two backhand) from Sinner.

Djokovic’s forehand got off to a flyer at the beginning of set two. He broke Sinner to love in the opening game, making 11 forehands in the game. Sinner committed three forehand errors and one backhand error in the game. Every one of those errors came from a Djokovic forehand.

Djokovic won 10 straight points to begin set two as his serve and forehand proved unstoppable. Djokovic’s “play to win” mentality also washed over to his serve. He only dropped three points for the match on his first serve (won 29/32) and only lost five on his second serve (won 9/14). The Serb crushed 13 aces and saved both break points he faced for the match. Sinner tried to venture forward to the net to win points but got shut down there as well, only winning three of eight.


This was a statement win for Djokovic after losing to Sinner in a third-set tie break in the round robin stage. It’s also an exclamation point on another stellar season that saw him go 55-6 and collect seven titles.

In the final, Djokovic nailed the game plan, the execution, and the attitude required to overcome Sinner on his home turf. Djokovic always impresses with his movement, technique, and warrior-like attitude. With this victory, his tactical adjustment and the ability to put the opponent first set him apart.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/brain-g ... vic-sinner

[Damian]

How Sinner flipped the Australian Open final against Medvedev

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the championship match
January 28, 2024
Jannik Sinner defeats Daniil Medvedev in five sets in the Australian Open final.Daniel Pockett/Getty Images
Jannik Sinner defeats Daniil Medvedev in five sets in the Australian Open final.
By Craig O'Shannessy
Daniil Medvedev led Jannik Sinner 6-3, 5-1, 15/15 on serve. Until this innocuous moment, he was in complete control of the Australian Open men’s singles final.

Medvedev then dumped a Serve +1 forehand in the net, and things started sliding away from him in a hurry. His 22-year-old Italian opponent never looked back to record a 3-6, 3-6, 6-4, 6-4, 6-3 victory to notch his first Grand Slam title.

Medvedev barely held on to win the second set, with the writing on the wall in the last couple of games of set two. Sinner suddenly found his mojo and wasn’t missing. In the blink of an eye, Medvedev went from dominating rallies to barely hanging on in the point. Sinner finally relaxed enough to hit the ball. Medvedev never found that freedom again in the match.

You May Also Like:Sinner rallies from two sets down to win Australian Open title
Baseline Points Won
Sinner started slowly in the critical baseline exchanges and always looked to be the one trying to force a shot into a location where it didn’t really belong. Then, all of a sudden, things flipped, and you got the feeling that Sinner couldn’t miss, and Medvedev was just a shot away from dumping a groundstroke into the net.

Baseline Points Won Per Set

Set 1: Sinner 48% / Medvedev 54%
Set 2: Sinner 30% / Medvedev 62%
Set 3: Sinner 51% / Medvedev 34%
Set 4: Sinner 62% / Medvedev 29%
Set 5: Sinner 63% / Medvedev 30%
Total: Sinner 50% / Medvedev 42%

Sinner got crushed from the back of the court for two sets, winning just 38 per cent (28/74) of baseline exchanges. And just like a light switch was flipped, he found the right speed, height, spin and depth that was required to make Medvedev uncomfortable from the trenches. Sinner won 38 per cent of groundstroke points in the first two sets, but managed to win 63 per cent (45/72) in the last two.

Sinner went from missing a lot in the first two sets to almost couldn’t miss in the last three.

The Official App Of Tennis | Download ATP WTA Live App

Rally Length
Sinner underperformed in short rallies of 0-4 shots in the first two sets, winning just 43 per cent (24/56). It felt like he always had a chance to miss the court, while Medvedev played rock solid, prowling the baseline. Then, in the third set, things wildly changed for the Italian, as he won 61 per cent (22/36) of critical short rallies in 0-4 shots. Over the last three sets, Sinner won a remarkable 58 per cent (56/97) of short rallies to run away with the title.

The average rally length for the match was a lengthy 5.57 shots. Sinner struggled mightily in this area for almost two sets and then basically couldn’t miss in the three most important sets of his life.

Forehands vs. Backhands
Sinner’s forehand started slow, with just five winners in the first two sets while contributing 17 errors. It then caught fire in set three, amassing 17 winners and 26 errors over the remaining three sets.

In stark comparison, Medvedev accumulated eight forehand winners in the first two sets, but only managed five over the remaining three sets. Medvedev hit eight backhand winners for the match, while Sinner managed five. This match developed into a contest where both players tried to play aggressively from the back of the court, where not missing took precedence over cracking a winner.

Overall, Sinner won just one more point than Medvedev for the match (142-141). But that’s not how it felt. Medvedev dominated the first 85 minutes of the contest to win the first two sets. Sinner took a stranglehold on the remaining 139 minutes to win the title.

It’s not how fast you start. It’s how strong you finish.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/sinner- ... brain-game

[Damian]

How Alcaraz's forehand decided the Indian Wells final

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the clash between Alcaraz and Medvedev
March 18, 2024
Carlos Alcaraz defeats Daniil Medvedev in straight sets in the Indian Wells final.Clive Brunskill/Getty Images
Carlos Alcaraz defeats Daniil Medvedev in straight sets in the Indian Wells final.
By Craig O'Shannessy
Forehands > backhands.

Carlos Alcaraz defeated Daniil Medvedev 7-6(5), 6-1 in the final of the BNP Paribas Open Sunday on the back of playing with his bigger baseline weapon more often throughout the one-hour, 42-minute final. Alcaraz won an extremely healthy 54 per cent (41/76) of his baseline points, while Medvedev only managed to win 38 per cent (27/71) from the back of the court. The shots they were hitting from the back told the real story.

You May Also Like: Alcaraz beats Medvedev to retain Indian Wells title
Alcaraz Groundstrokes

Forehands = 57% (112)
Backhands = 43% (85)
Medvedev Groundstrokes

Forehands = 48% (91)
Backhands = 52% (99)
The best way to think about the relationship between forehands and backhands is a sword and a shield. The forehand is the sword, born and bred to be an attacking weapon. The backhand is the shield and is meant to keep you alive in the point much more than hitting winners. Forehands typically account for around 70 per cent of winners from the back of the court, with backhands making up just 30 per cent.

Alcaraz hit 57 per cent of his groundstrokes as a forehand, while Medvedev only hit 48 per cent. This directly impacted the high number of baseline points Alcaraz won and the lower total Medvedev could possibly accumulate. This was always going to be a baseline brawl, and Alcaraz gained control by upgrading more often to his superior forehand weapon.

Watch extended highlights:




Medvedev has one of the best backhands on the planet, but it still can’t compete with a lethal forehand such as Alcaraz’s. Medvedev surged to a 3-0 lead in the opening set mainly because he could make in-roads into Alcaraz’s backhand. Alcaraz committed seven backhand errors in the opening three games while not hitting a winner. On the forehand side, he had one forehand winner, committed three errors and forced two forehand errors from Medvedev.

Alcaraz controlled the flow of shots from the back of the court throughout the match by upgrading to run-around forehands in the Ad court instead of hitting backhands. Alcaraz hit 22 run-around forehands, immediately extracting four errors from Medvedev while yielding only two errors.


The set point in the opening set was a prime example of how Alcaraz’s forehand ruled the roost, especially on big points. Medvedev served at 5/6 in the tie-break, and Alcaraz hit a forehand return and a forehand groundstroke on five of the next six shots. Alcaraz cleverly controlled the point through the Deuce court with his forehand against Medvedev’s forehand. The Spaniard sometimes ripped the ball hard and also took pace off and looped the ball high to deny Medvedev rhythm in the point.

The point ended when Medvedev tapped out of the extended crosscourt exchange and took a forehand down the line to desperately find Alcaraz’s backhand. His shot landed in the alley and Alcaraz won a hard-fought set. The match essentially ended with that forehand error.

Alcaraz hit 30 forehands in the second set, striking three winners, committing just two errors, but most importantly, extracting five errors from Medvedev. It is telling that four of the five errors Alcaraz forced were forehands from Medvedev.

It’s tough to win a match of this magnitude when your opponent’s sword is sharper than your own.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/alcaraz ... brain-game

[Damian]

Sinner's brilliant backhand: This jaw-dropping stat from the Miami final will shock you

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the Miami final
March 31, 2024
Jannik Sinner uses his backhand dominance to defeat Grigor Dimitrov with the loss of just four games on Sunday.Elsa/Getty Images
Jannik Sinner uses his backhand dominance to defeat Grigor Dimitrov with the loss of just four games on Sunday.
By Craig O'Shannessy
Zero backhand groundstroke unforced errors. Zero.

Jannik Sinner defeated Grigor Dimitrov 6-3, 6-1 in the final of the Miami Open presented by Itau on Sunday on the back of one of the best backhand performances of his career. Sinner hit 57 backhand groundstrokes (excluding volleys) for the match and only missed two. Both errors were on the dead run and came off the end of his racquet. Everything else for the 72-minute final found the court.

Sinner won the opening set with a running backhand down the line passing shot winner that took the wind out of Dimitrov’s sails. Sinner won the match with another backhand down the line winner to put an exclamation point on a backhand performance for the ages. Sinner’s backhand numbers seem unreal compared to Dimitrov’s.

Watch Extended Final Highlights:


Sinner Backhand Groundstrokes

57 hit
2 winners
2 errors
7 errors forced on the next shot
Dimitrov Backhand Groundstrokes

67 hit
4 winners
14 errors
4 errors forced on the next shot
Sinner hit 34 backhand groundstrokes in the second set. He put every single one of them in the court. In contrast, Dimitrov hit 33 backhand groundstrokes and yielded seven errors. Sinner’s stunning backhand is built with a plethora of small adjusting steps to the ball, followed by stepping forward to the contact point with ideal spacing and timing. Sinner brings the racquet back low in his backswing which helps drop his body down behind the ball. He is always in position and always looking to hurt his opponent with some of the biggest backhands on Tour.

You May Also Like: Sinner shines to storm to Miami title
Sinner’s backhand return also stood tall in the match.

Sinner Backhand Returns

24 returns hit
0 return winners
3 return errors
Dimitrov Backhand Returns

33 returns hit
1 return winner
9 return errors
Sinner only yielded three backhand return errors for the match, while Dimitrov committed nine. This match had the feeling that whenever Sinner needed a point, he was perfectly comfortable mining Dimitrov’s backhand to win it.

The Official App Of Tennis | Download ATP WTA Live App

Baseline Performance
Dimitrov’s road to the final in Miami was built on improving his court position by stepping forward toward the baseline to take the ball early. It worked incredibly well to the final, as he was able to take away time from opponents in baseline exchanges. Unfortunately for him, it didn’t work at all against Sinner, as the Italian could absorb Dimitrov’s groundstrokes and send them back with interest.

Baseline Points Won
Sinner = 57% (33/58)
Dimitrov = 36% (18/50)

Dimitrov could only win one out of every three points from the baseline and only half (7/13) of his points at net. He was stuck between a rock and a hard place, unable to develop any tactic that would help him sink his teeth into the match.

The power level off the ground was basically identical for both players. Dimitrov averaged 80 mph off his forehand, while Sinner was at 79 mph. Both players averaged 69 mph off the backhand wing. Speed wasn’t Dimitrov’s problem. Sinner’s rock-solid footwork and immaculate technique simply wouldn’t break down, no matter how Dimitrov attacked it.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/sinner- ... brain-game