BRAIN GAME - artykuły ze strony ATP

[DUN I LOVE]

Zakładam ten temat, żeby nie wchodzić w paradę dyskusjom w "kilka słów o strategii w tenisie".

Analiza finału IW.

BNP PARIBAS OPEN
Brain Game: Nadal Wins Forehand Festival


In the BNP Paribas Open final, Nadal hit a serve and then a forehand 85 per cent of the time.

Spoiler:

Craig O'Shannessy breaks down the BNP Paribas Open final between Rafael Nadal and Juan Martin del Potro.

The 2013 final of the BNP Paribas Open proved to be a spectacular festival of the forehand.

Rafael Nadal defeated Juan Martin Del Potro 4-6, 6-3, 6-4 in one of the greatest examples in the modern era that the forehand is clearly the ultimate weapon of choice in today’s game.

Nadal and Del Potro combined to hit 40 forehand winners and only five backhand winners with 56 per cent of total points (100 of 177) ending with either a forehand winner or error.

Both players upgraded to a forehand at every opportunity, often running into or even past the alley in their backhand court to crush their more dangerous groundstroke. Turning backhands into forehands helped turn neutral balls into offensive situations and often doubled the target area as it could now be effectively hit down the line as well as cross court.

The other major advantage of run-around forehands is the disguise it brings with the open stance, robbing any anticipation the opponent may have of where the shot is going.

Nadal dominated with 22 forehand winners, hitting eight in both of the opening two sets and finishing with six in the deciding set. Del Potro hit 18 forehand winners with six in the first set, five in the second and seven in the deciding set.

Del Potro also had a forehand return winner which won him break point in the opening set to get back on serve at 2-3 after falling behind 0-3 to begin the match. He ran well outside the alley in the Ad court to rifle it back cross court behind Nadal to climb back into the match.

Both players committed more forehand errors than winners with Nadal making 30 (27 groundstroke/3 return) and Del Potro 29 (26 groundstroke/3 return). Both Nadal and Del Potro will take those numbers all day long as what also must be considered is how many errors their forehands force on the other side of the net and the pressure it builds in their opponent’s mind.

Serve +1
A major part of the dominant forehand strategy comes into play with a tactic called Serve +1 where the server hits a forehand as the first shot after serve – essentially combining the strengths of the serve and the forehand into one unit.

Nadal hit a serve and then a forehand 85 per cent (53/62) of the time, winning 66 per cent of these points. Del Potro hit a serve and then a forehand slightly more at 87 per cent (68/78) of the time but could only manage to win 54 per cent of those points.

This is a key tactic used by many of the world’s best players but Nadal and Del Potro are more committed, or obsessed, than most with this ultimate first strike combination.

Both players heavily targeted their opponent’s backhand with their serve direction which also helped them hit a forehand as their first shot after the serve.

On first serves, Del Potro made Nadal hit 85 per cent backhands but only 61 per cent of the time on second serves as Nadal was able to run around several second serves directed to his backhand and hit them as forehands. Nadal was so persistent with this strategy that he was even able to create forehand returns off second serves that were landing on the center line in the Ad court directed towards his backhand.

Nadal also targeted Del Potro’s backhand with his first serve, making him hit 71 per cent backhands but Del Potro hit 77 per cent forehands off Nadal’s weaker second serve. Del Potro in particular stood far behind the baseline to return second serves to allow him enough time and space to run around and wind up with heavier artillery.

Both players would at times used the surprise strategy of serving wide to their opponent’s forehand on second serves to hopefully catch them cheating running around their backhand.

Nadal ultimately wore Del Potro down, turning it into a physical battle of legs and lungs. The final was as good as it gets at showcasing forehand firepower and the willingness to hit it from any part of the court.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... Wells.aspx

[Sempere]

Analiza finału w Miami.

Brain Game: Murray Out-grinds Ferrer


Andy Murray hit more backhands than forehands in his win over David Ferrer.

Spoiler:

Craig O'Shannessy breaks down the Sony Open Tennis final.

It’s difficult to imagine anyone in the world out-grinding Spanish workhorse David Ferrer, but that’s exactly how Andy Murray found victory in the final of the Sony Open in Miami. Murray saved a match point, winning 2-6, 6-4, 7-6(1), in a punishing, defensive battle that amazingly saw the ultra-fit Ferrer cramping at the end of the match.

Murray hit more backhands than forehands, hit the ball with less velocity, played deeper in the court, came to the net less and was broken more, but at the end of the day somehow got the job done in one of the most physical hard court finals you could imagine.

Ferrer could easily have been the victor. When he held match point at 6-5 in the third set, he stopped the rally to challenge a call. The Hawk Eye review showed Murray’s shot caught the back part of the baseline.

Murray played a far more defensive, error-prone match than normal but one of the tests of true champions is the ability to get the job done when you are not at the top of your game. The match ended up as a last man standing affair and an exhausted, resilient Murray did the unthinkable of beating the world’s best grinder at his own game.

Backhand Battle
Murray hit 305 backhands for the match and 277 forehands, representing 52% of all groundstrokes and approach shots for the match. This made for longer, more grueling points.

Murray finished with five backhand winners for the match but made 40 backhand errors, including 32 groundstrokes and eight from the return of serve. He hit 11 forehand winners (nine groundstroke/two return) and made one less total forehand errors with 39 (31 groundstroke/eight return).

In general, forehands count for around three out of every four groundstroke winners at the ATP World Tour level and players will generally run all the way to the alley in their opposite court to turn a backhand into a forehand.

Even though Murray has one of the best backhands in the world, he typically will look to upgrade to a more potent forehand at every opportunity. For example, Murray hit 56% forehands in his semi-final win against Richard Gasquet, including 55 run-around forehands in the Ad court.

But against Ferrer, Murray settled for backhands more often in the Ad court, which was a major contributor to the match being so close and physical. In short, Murray’s overuse of his backhand hurt him far more than it helped him. It also directly helped his opponent turn more backhands into forehands and create a much more even contest.

In the final, Ferrer hit 297 (51%) forehands and 277 (49%) backhands, running around his backhand in the Ad court more so than Murray to upgrade to his more lethal forehand.

Ferrer hit four forehand winners and one backhand winner for the match and made 43 forehand errors (34 groundstroke/nine return) and 36 backhand errors (27 groundstroke/ nine return).

Ferrer also has one of the best backhands in the world but is always on the prowl in the Ad court to upgrade to a forehand. In his semi-final victory over Tommy Haas, Ferrer dominated with 69% forehands for the match, which helped restrict Haas to hitting only hitting 37% forehands. That’s a winning strategy every day of the week that leads to more tennis being played on Sunday afternoons.

Standing Deep
An unusual aspect of the Murray/Ferrer final was that Murray stood further back than Ferrer but was still able to win the match. Murray made contact with the ball 83% of the time behind the baseline while Ferrer was at 80%. Most of the time the player who stands up in the court wins the match, but it had less importance in this highly physical battle.

Ferrer had the slight edge when the points were shorter but Murray got the better of him in the longer, grinding exchanges. When the points were 10 shots or less Ferrer won 82 to Murray’s 78 but Murray won 28 points when they were extended past 10 shots to Ferrer’s 19.

At 3-3 in the third set we had the highly unusual statistic that there were 11 holds of serve and 13 breaks of serve.

Both players directed exactly 64% of total groundstrokes through the Ad court, pounding away at their opponent’s backhand wing. Surprisingly, Ferrer was hitting the bigger ball, with his average groundstroke speed at 73mph compared to Murray’s 71mph.

Ferrer was credited with 50 unforced errors for the match to Murray’s 45 as both players struggled to play at his best against an opponent with a very similar game style to his own.

Ferrer was the more adventurous to the net, winning 71% (15/21) of his points while Murray only won 50% (seven/14) of the time coming forward.

Murray ran slightly less than Ferrer for the match (3512 metres to 3703 metres) but both players were completely exhausted with the match lasting two hours and 45 minutes.

Serve It Up
Another unusual aspect of the match is that Murray was broken more times than Ferrer (eight to seven) but still won. Both players would be unhappy with how they served, with Ferrer only winning 32% of his second serve points and Murray marginally better at 38%.

Both players directed every second serve to the backhand side with the exception of one surprise second serve hit by Murray in the deuce court wide to the forehand. Ferrer was able to get a little more on his second serve, averaging 92mph, while Murray’s average second serve speed was only 81mph.

In the end, Murray survived a Hawk-Eye challenge on match point from Ferrer that kissed the baseline. An inch or two deeper and Ferrer would have been crowned the Sony Open Tennis champion.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... errer.aspx

[Rroggerr]

Craig O'Shannessy analizuje taktykę Rogera na ostatni mecz z Nadalem.

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BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Rafa Gets Upper Hand By Finding Roger's Backhand
Cincinnati, U.S.A.


Roger Federer won only one point when Rafael Nadal's return went to his backhand.

Spoiler:

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Rafa Gets Upper Hand By Finding Roger's Backhand
Cincinnati, U.S.A.


Roger Federer won only one point when Rafael Nadal's return went to his backhand.

Craig O'Shannessy examines the Cincinnati quarter-final between Rafael Nadal and Roger Federer.

For Roger and Rafa, it’s all about finding the backhand.

No other tactic matters nearly as much in this magical match-up as the simple pattern of pressuring the opponent’s backhand until it breaks. Rafael Nadal defeated Roger Federer 5-7, 6-4, 6-3 in the Cincinnati quarter-finals in a high quality encounter that once again focused on this pivotal tactic.

In a match that featured 70 percent total errors (138 errors – 58 winners) more than half (74) of the errors from all strokes were from the backhand wing of both players. Nadal’s backhand was relatively more solid with four winners and 29 errors (21 groundstroke – eight return) while Federer’s backhand accounted for two winners and 45 errors (26 groundstroke – 19 return). In heavyweight battles like these, the role of the forehand is to win the match while the role of the backhand is to not lose it.

Federer played aggressively and attacked more than normal on the quicker center court in Cincinnati and got close to victory when leading 7-5, 3-3 and 0-30 on Nadal’s serve. The snapshot of the 0-30 point paints a broader picture of the match strategy, particularly as points like this one take on greater importance to the final outcome.

Down 0-30, Nadal hit a high percentage jam first serve to Federer’s backhand, then pounded two more forehands to Federer’s backhand before finishing at the net with a forehand volley. Nadal matched up a serve, two forehands and a volley against a backhand return and two more backhands. The odds for Nadal winning that pattern are high.

In the biggest moments in their 31-match head-to-head rivalry this pattern has played itself out countless times on different continents. At 15-30 Nadal again served to Federer’s backhand and played behind for a forehand winner. The 30-30 point featured a 20-shot rally with both players desperate to hit forehands and ended with Federer barely missing a forehand winner down the line. An inch difference and Federer could well be living to fight another day. Nadal clinched the game when Federer netted a backhand cross court.

Federer also got to 30-all at 4-4 in the second set but once again it was two more backhand errors that stopped Federer in his tracks.

Federer’s 26 groundstroke backhand errors were overwhelmingly forced by Nadal’s forehand. Nadal pressured 19 from his forehand, six from his backhand and one from an overhead and a volley. Nadal’s heavy forehand proved once again to be the perfect battering ram to attack Federer’s one-handed backhand.

Federer’s two backhand winners both came in the first set with one of them sealing set point at 6-5, 40-15 with a crushing topspin cross court winner for the ages. Nadal’s four backhand winners included two passing shots and two deft lob winners over Federer’s head.

The serving patterns in the match closely mirrored the baseline patterns with Nadal serving 87 percent to Federer’s backhand on first serves. Federer hit 57 backhand returns off first serves for the match, winning 24 percent (14) of these points. Federer won 37 percent (3/8) when returning first serves with his forehand, but it’s not enough to make any impact on the final outcome.

Nadal was also able to win the arm wrestle on second serves, making Federer hit 60 percent backhands where Federer could only convert four of 15. Federer mixed a little more with his serving patterns, making Nadal hit 59 per cent backhands on first serves and 61 percent on second serves.

Another critical tactic that flows from serve location is the desire to hit the more potent forehand as the first shot after the serve. Federer hit 86 percent forehands (59/68) as the first shot after the serve, winning 59 percent of those points. Federer only won one point for the entire match when he started the point with a serve and then a backhand. Nadal hit a serve and a forehand to start the point 75 per cent of the time, winning 70 percent with the forehand and 35 percent with the backhand.

Federer will take confidence from the defeat as he heads towards the US Open as he played at a much higher level than the previous round against Tommy Haas and certainly had looks to win the match late in the second set.

Nadal moves on to face No. 6 seed Tomas Berdych in today’s semi-final.

Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... derer.aspx

[filip.g]

BRAIN GAME: RAFA TURNS MILOS’ MISSILES INTO BOOMERANGS

Craig O'Shannessy breaks down the Montreal final between Rafael Nadal and Milos Raonic.

In the opening game of Sunday’s Coupe Rogers final, Milos Raonic fired a 149mph ace out wide in the Ad court that electrified the crowd and gave hope that he had the necessary tools to beat Rafael Nadal on such a big stage.

But the reality of constructing points, developing patterns, playing defence and breaking down an opponent’s will soon set in and Nadal dominated the match in all of these areas en route to a 6-2, 6-2 victory to earn his 25th ATP World Tour Masters 1000 crown.

The real issue for Raonic was not how hard he could hit his serve but what he was going to do with the ball when it came back. Nadal’s masterly performance reminded everyone that the top of the food chain in world tennis at the moment is dominated by the best returners in the world – not the biggest servers.

Raonic may have one of the biggest flamethrowers in the game, but the reality is that more than half his first serves came back in play as did around 70 per cent of his second serves. Three quarters (64/86) of all points for the match needed further attention from the back of the court.

The majority of points in tennis are not like shooting an arrow, where it’s a quick one-way ride to a final destination. They are far more like throwing a boomerang as you need to expect the ball to come back and plan to be in the right position to receive it.

Raonic, 22, had an outstanding tournament in reaching his first ATP World Tour Masters 1000 final and moving to No. 10 in the Emirates ATP Rankings, the first Canadian to do so. Raonic is the youngest member of the Top 10 and he will learn from lessons like Sunday’s as he continues his rise.

Raonic was on the back foot when rallies began. He hit 46 first serves for the match and was only able to win exactly half (23) of those points. Nadal, with a comparatively slower first serve, hit 40 first serves and won 28 (70 per cent). Of Raonic’s 23 first serves made, he only hit four aces and Nadal committed seven return errors. So he had to then construct 12 points against one of the best baseliners in the world.

Things were even tougher on second serves for Raonic, where Nadal only made four return errors from 23 serves. Raonic hit three double faults (Nadal none), leaving Raonic with 16 points to find a way through or around Nadal.

Returning serve was an issue for Raonic as well. He hit 20 backhand returns (15 first serve/five second serve), committed eight backhand return errors and only won four points for the match starting with a backhand return.

Once the rally began, it was Nadal’s forehand that dominated the back of the court with nine winners and only 10 errors. Raonic, who was looking to pull the trigger on almost every shot, only hit three forehand groundstroke winners and committed 12 errors.

Raonic was always looking to hit run-around forehands and protect his backhand, but he made six backhand errors from 19 total backhands in the match – about one in every three shots. Raonic did try and approach to keep the points shorter but could only win 50 percent (6/12) at the front of the court.

Raonic’s urgency to win the point before it really got started backfired against one of the most experienced baseliners in the world. Raonic’s inconsistency relieved pressure on Nadal. This empowered Nadal to play more aggressively after he neutralised the point.

Often times losses like these are inevitable and even necessary for younger players to help figure out the right mix of aggression and consistency. Raonic will be a better player for the experience and you expect he will soon win a match from the lessons learnt in Montreal. After all, everyone has to take their lumps.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... aonic.aspx

[Rroggerr]

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Unbreakable Nadal
Cincinnati, U.S.A.


Rafael Nadal has his serve broken just four times (4/18) in Cincinnati.

Spoiler:

Craig O'Shannessy examines the Cincinnati final between Rafael Nadal and John Isner.

Nothing matters more in a tennis match than converting break points.

Getting to break point against Rafael Nadal is one thing, but converting it is so much more difficult, it is almost like playing an entirely different sport.

Nadal defeated John Isner 7-6(8), 7-6(3) in the Western & Southern Open final at Cincinnati on Sunday and saved all three break points he faced to win back-to-back hard-court titles for the first time in his career.

Crunch time in this match came late in the first set as Nadal faced two break points at 5-6, 15/40 – which also carried the added weight of being two set points for Isner.

At 15/40, Nadal hit a 110 miles per hour hard slice down the middle that Isner barely reached with his backhand return and sent it floating wide down the line. This was the primary first serve pattern for Nadal in the deuce court, attempting 22 serves down the T, making 17 and winning 13. The effectiveness of this serve was complemented by Nadal’s secondary pattern out wide in the deuce court to Isner’s forehand, where he attempted 11 first serves and won all seven of the first serves he made.

Nadal faced his second break point on the next point at 30/40 and the most observers, including Isner, thought Nadal would use his favourite lefty slider out wide to Isner’s backhand in the Ad court.

In an ominous message to the rest of the ATP World Tour of just how much confidence Nadal has at the moment, he sent a 113mph ace right down the middle to Isner’s forehand. Isner, anticipating the serve going the other way, didn’t move as his second set point went flying right by him. In the Ad court Nadal mixed his first serve location a lot more than normal, attempting 18 first serves down the middle and winning 10 compared to only 12 out wide to his favorite lefty location, where he won eight.

One of Nadal’s many strengths is to put his opponent first and get inside his head to figure out what he is anticipating, staying a step ahead with the patterns during the match.

This was clearly evident on the next point at deuce as Nadal served another pressure-packed ace – this time a gutsy second serve out wide to Isner’s forehand, who was headed the other way anticipating it going to his backhand. Isner had been trying to run around second serves all match to upgrade from a backhand to a forehand return, so this was the perfect time to catch him at his own game.

Isner then missed a backhand return long off a first serve on the next point to send the set to a tie-break. From 15/40, Isner didn’t get a ball back in the court as Nadal took his game, both physically and mentally, to another level.

Nadal, again, used the surprise second serve wide to the forehand in the deuce court at 5-5 in the first set tie-break, as Isner barely got a racquet on it and sliced a forehand return long. Another huge point where he successfully anticipated Isner’s movements and strategy. Isner held his third set point with Nadal serving at 6-7 and Nadal again surprised with a first serve to the forehand, which Isner sliced back to Nadal’s forehand and Isner made a backhand error from deep in the court on the next shot. Nadal won the first set with a wicked forehand jam second serve at 9-8 that Isner could not get back over the net.

Nadal saved his third break point of the match at 3-3, 30/40 in the second set, when he again jammed Isner’s forehand with a second serve and ended up at the net hitting a deft backhand volley winner two shots later.

Nadal was only broken four times from 18 opportunities (22 per cent) for the tournament, while he was able to break 13 times from 35 attempts (37 per cent). Nadal’s outstanding year so far, in which he has now won nine titles, is built on his toughness in break point situations where he is third best on tour in both break points converted and saved.

A key tactic for both players in the match was hitting a forehand as the first shot after the serve, effectively combining the strength of the forehand and serve into one unit to begin the point. Nadal hit a serve and a forehand 86 per cent (45/52) of the time to begin the point while Isner was even more impressive doing it 94 per cent (48/51) of the time.

Once the point got past the first two shots it was the forehand from both players that dominated the back of the court as well. The only backhand winner for the match came on the very first point with Nadal hitting a passing shot down the line and from there on both players would combine for 33 forehand winners (Isner 21/Nadal 12).

Isner also tried coming to the net when possible but could only win 52 percent (10/19) of the points while Nadal was much more successful winning 71 percent (10/14) of his points finishing at the front of the court.

Nadal’s successful campaigns at Roland Garros, where he has won eight times, are built around winning ATP World Tour Masters 1000 events in Monte Carlo, Rome and Madrid. His clay-court confidence especially comes from saving break points so he arrives in Paris feeling like Superman. Nadal has now won successive ATP World Tour Masters 1000 titles in Montreal and Cincinnati and opponents have only managed to convert exactly 4/18 in both events (8/36 total = 22%). There is a certain sense of déjà vu in Nadal’s preparation as he heads to New York searching for his 13th career Grand Slam championship title.

Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... Isner.aspx

[robpal]

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: 29,000 Points Don't Lie
New York, U.S.A.


Andy Murray beat Novak Djokovic in the 2012 US Open final for his first major title.

Spoiler:

As the 2013 US Open begins Monday in New York, an analysis of 29,038 points from men’s matches at last year’s event reveals which weapon – the serve or the return - takes the biggest bite out of the Big Apple. During last year’s Open, IBM collected data in 27 separate serve, return, rally and approach categories and the data show that the return rules supreme at Flushing Meadows.

Some of the analytics directly contradict conventional wisdom as they reveal that:
• Most baseline points are a losing proposition;
• It is actually harmful to make too many first serves if speed is compromised; and
• Approaching the net is a goldmine.

Specifically, only seven players out of 92 (for whom data was collected) had a winning record in baseline points last year, while only seven had a losing record coming forward to the net. Analytics like these help remove the guesswork and opinion from the sport and paint a clearer picture on exactly what tools are needed in today’s game to succeed.

Andy Murray defeated Novak Djokovic in a thrilling five-set final last year and both players consistently performed much better than the rest of the draw in their return and rally categories.

Returns In Play

The engine room of Murray’s first Grand Slam victory was simply getting as many returns back in play as possible, where he was ranked second for the tournament at 79 per cent (635/808). Djokovic was closely behind in fifth place at 77 per cent (475/618) and this key tactic helped both players neutralise their opponent’s serve and begin a baseline battle, where they typically held the advantage. Djokovic (15) and Murray (13) led the tournament with return winners, which added even more pressure to their opponents at the beginning of the point.

Winning Points Against Second Serve Is Key

Djokovic was also ranked third for the tournament for points won against first serves, but this statistical category seemed less critical in the bigger picture as five of the top 10 players ranked in this area all lost in the opening round. On second serve return points Djokovic (59%) and Murray (58%) were both ranked in the top five with quarter-finalists Roger Federer and Tomas Berdych not far behind at 55 per cent.

Total Break Points Matter More Than Conversion Rates

You would think that converting break points would directly equate to playing in the second week of the tournament, but all of the top 10 leading players in this area failed to even reach the third round. What was statistically more important was Return Games Won, where Djokovic finished first at 45 per cent and Murray was third at 37 per cent. The top five in this category won a combined 17 matches for the tournament. The moral of this story: It’s far better to earn 15 break points in a match and convert 33 per cent of them than it is to convert 67 per cent of break point if you only earn a handful of chances.

On Serve, Speed Tops Consistency

Popular opinion says that it’s good to get your first serve in, but six of the top seven in this area didn’t win a match - combining to hit 23 aces and 24 double faults. This data strongly suggests that there is a hidden metric at work where making the most serves means hitting it slower and removing the real strength from the most offensive shot in the game. This viewpoint gains validity when you examine serve speeds and matches won.

The top eight players who hit the fastest serves in the tournament combined to win 24 matches while no player in the bottom 16 of serve speed won a match. Another intriguing element is that six of the top seven players who made the most first serves didn’t win a match while the bottom seven in first serve percentage combined to win six matches. And remember when Rafael Nadal won the US Open in 2010? There was a dramatic increase in his service speed those two weeks.

Michael Llodra, who is drawn to play his opening round against Andy Murray this year, was the standout last year with serving and volleying, employing this aggressive tactic 60 times in his opening round match in 2012 - representing one out of two serve points he played. Llodra won 65 per cent of those points, which was more than double the groundstroke points he won (26%). Thirty-one players won more than 70% of their serve and volley points.

Baseline Play

This is where the data shed new light on match strategy as only seven players had a winning record in points won at the baseline. (Baseline play was defined as play after both a serve and return went into play.) The leaders were Kei Nishikori (57%), Novak Djokovic (54%), David Ferrer (53%), Gilles Simon (52%), Juan Monaco (52%), Alexandr Dolgopolov (51%) and James Blake (51%). Of these players only Monaco failed to reach the third round. This area also featured a notable high grouping of all last year’s eight quarter-finalists in the top 18 with the notable exception of Roger Federer who was tied for 37th in this category, winning only 45 per cent of his baseline rallies.

Approaching

Federer was far more effective with net points won, finishing tied for fourth for the tournament winning 80 per cent (102/127). Only seven players of the 92 recorded in this area failed to at least win half of their approach points. It seems amazing that players don’t venture forward more often to capitalize on the far higher winning percentage approaching offers over baseline play. It must be noted that the data does not reflect the quality of the approach shot hit before continuing to net. Some players may only choose to come to net when their opponent is in an extremely defensive position.

The average winning percentage approaching was 65.9 per cent while the average winning percentage in baseline points was 43.6 – a 51 per cent better option coming forward.

In the era of Big Data, tennis, like many industries, can learn a lot by crunching the numbers.

Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... derer.aspx

[Rroggerr]

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Rafa Is Clutch When It Counts
New York, U.S.A.


Nadal made just 20 unforced errors to Djokovic's 53.

Spoiler:

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Rafa Is Clutch When It Counts
New York, U.S.A.


Nadal made just 20 unforced errors to Djokovic's 53.

Rafael Nadal barely slipped through the clutches of Novak Djokovic’s clever master plan to win an epic four-set final at the US Open on Monday night. Nadal won 6-2, 3-6, 6-4, 6-1 with the turning point being his comeback back from 0-40 on his serve at 4-4 in the third set en route to winning eight of the last nine games of the electrifying final.

Nadal was a breath away from a two-sets-to-one deficit but proved unbreakable in the pivotal nine-and-a-half-minute game to regain the momentum that he had emphatically lost 77 minutes earlier when Djokovic broke him for the first time at 2-3 in the second set with a mind-blowing 54-shot, 78-second rally on break point.

That one magical point produced a standing ovation in Arthur Ashe Stadium and around the world.

It took Nadal well over an hour to recover from losing that point but, as he has done his entire career, he thrived on the adversity and clawed back to beat the No. 1 player in the world.

Djokovic hit almost double the amount of winners (46 to 27) to Nadal with the bold primary tactic of walking into the lion’s den and initially attacking the strength of Nadal’s game – his forehand.

Fast & Furious
From the very first point of the match Djokovic looked to crush his forehand big through the Ad court behind Nadal, catching the Spaniard trying to creep over to turn backhands into forehands in the deuce court. It also opened up a hole in the deuce court to attack Nadal’s backhand later in the point and allowed Djokovic to win the battle of court position and finish more points at the net.

We have been used to seeing Djokovic attack Nadal with his backhand down the line but that was reduced to a secondary tactic behind huge forehands from the Serb through the Ad court. Djokovic’s forehand was the most lethal weapon on Arthur Ashe Stadium as he finished with 22 groundstroke winners (16 forehand/6 backhand) to Nadal’s 17 groundstroke winners (11 forehand/6 backhand).

Djokovic’s forehand winners included a lob, dropshot and a simple rally ball down the middle of the court that Nadal slipped and fell over trying to hit back, but it was the eight bruising winners rifled wide through the Ad court that rattled Nadal’s cage the most.

Nadal committed 25 forehand errors, including 20 that came with him standing in the Ad court. Of the 20 Ad court errors, 17 were made standing closer to the alley (or outside it) than the middle of the court as Djokovic relentlessly pushed Nadal wider and wider.

Lesson Learned
Nadal ultimately grew wise to the tactic and with Djokovic serving at break point at 0-1, 30-40 in the fourth set, he set the perfect ambush to break serve and surge to the finish line. It was the third break point of the game and Nadal hit a weak backhand return into the Ad court service box that Djokovic moved forward to hammer back behind him. Nadal had seen the same play develop for almost three hours and he left early, anticipating to his left before Djokovic had hit the ball.

From the middle of the alley Nadal flicked a forehand winner back down the line that proved to be one of the final nails in the coffin for Djokovic.

Nadal took initial control of the match and led 6-2, 2-3 on serve 78 minutes in before all hell broke loose with the 54-shot rally at 30-40 that Djokovic won to break serve for the first time. Djokovic won the previous point at 30-30 with Nadal playing too passively, going from hitting four forehands in a row to hitting four backhands in a row.

Djokovic seized the moment and snuck in on a backhand slice and executed an excellent backspin, backhand drop volley to get to break point.

Point Of The Match
Djokovic dominated the ensuing 54-shot rally, hitting 14 backhands and 13 forehands, forcing Nadal to hit 18 backhands and only nine forehands before Nadal finally netted a half volley backhand standing inside the baseline in the deuce court. Nadal ran 472.5 feet to Djokovic’s 424.7 feet in the point and Djokovic floated on the energy from the crowd for well over an hour. While he got broken in the very next game he would break again for 5-3 after Nadal squandered six game points.

Djokovic took charge of the match when he broke Nadal to love to open the third set - the third service game in a row he broke the Spaniard. Nadal was desperate not to go down two breaks to begin the third set but fell to Ad out at 0-2 before Djokovic missed a backhand long in what was as big a miss as any he would make in the match.

Clutch Time
Nadal broke to get back to 3-3 in the third but it was the drama of the 4-4 game that broke the match wide open. Nadal fell to 0-40 but a half-volley forehand winner from the baseline saved the first break point. Djokovic’s best chance to break came at 15-40 as he made Nadal hit five slice backhands in the rally and had an opportunity to approach, but didn’t. He ended up dumping a forehand in the net chasing his favorite strategy hitting wide in the Ad court to Nadal’s forehand. At 30-40 Nadal hit a 125mph ace right down the middle – his only ace for the entire match. It was clutch time and Nadal went and grabbed the match back as it was perilously close to slipping away.

Nadal’s victory was built around consistency, patience and dominating the important moments as he only committed 20 unforced errors to Djokovic’s 53. As is usually the case, it’s not the player that hits the most winners who is victorious. This match produced 68% errors (150/223) and it was Nadal who found a way to reduce his exposure in this critical area just enough to get over the line.

Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... -Open.aspx

[Advantage]

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Novak Keeps On The Offense
Shanghai, China


Djokovic served 10 aces to del Potro's one.

Spoiler:

Novak Djokovic successfully hunted the short ball by winning the battle of court position to capture his second successive Shanghai Rolex Masters title Sunday.

Djokovic defeated Juan Martin del Potro 6-1, 3-6, 7-6 (3) by aggressively rallying from around the baseline and coming to the net at every opportunity to exploit del Potro's naturally deeper rally location at the back of the court.

Djokovic won 86 per cent (25/29) of all points coming forward and was a perfect 11/11 in the opening set finishing points at the net. Djokovic got off to a fast start racing to 5-0 lead by keeping del Potro pinned far back where he wasn’t able to hurt Djokovic. Del Potro made contact with the ball 33 per cent of the time inside the baseline in his straight sets victory over Rafael Nadal in his semi-final but was only able to manage 11 per cent inside the baseline in the first four games of the final against Djokovic.

With Djokovic prowling the baseline and pouncing on anything short, del Potro was forced into reaction mode, which is never his strongest suit. Djokovic approached 18 times to del Potro’s backhand and 11 times to the forehand side trying to spread the court with his successful offensive strategy. Del Potro only managed one passing shot winner for the match - a forehand-down-the-line winner off a backhand-slice approach to save break point at 4-2, 15/40 in the second set.

Once Djokovic got control of the back of the court with his baseline position, and the front of the court with his approaching, he would always have his nose in front in another great battle between two of the heavyweights of the sport.

Djokovic's trademark backhand down the line was also a highlight of the match as he looked to stretch del Potro deep into his forehand corner. Djokovic had 11 backhand winners and eight of them went straight down the line against the Argentine. Djokovic also mixed in five drop shots (won three) to take advantage of his opponent's deep rally position.

Smart Serving
Djokovic's clever serve patterns helped him hit 10 aces (del Potro hit five) and he only faced four break points for the match. In the deuce court Djokovic attempted 20 serves down the T and made 13 - and won every single one of those points, including five with aces. Djokovic also targeted del Potro's backhand return in the ad court, attempting 23 serves, making 19 and winning 15. Del Potro only won 18 per cent of points starting with a backhand return against Djokovic’s first serve (5/27) and 38 per cent (7/18) against second serves.

Djokovic was only broken once for the match at 0-1 in the second set in a bizarre game where he continually lost his balance on his serve and groundstrokes. Del Potro fell behind 0/40 at 2-4 but won five straight points to maintain his momentum to win the second set. Del Potro saved two break points down 15/40 at 2-3 in the third set and saved another two, which were match points, at 4-5, 15/40 to help push the match to a tie-break.

Djokovic only faced one break point in the third set at 2-2 and served and volleyed at ad out, firing a 126mph ace out wide to get back to deuce. Djokovic also served and volleyed two other times: at 30/15 in the same game, hitting a forehand swinging volley winner and at 4-0, 15/0 in the opening set, where the backhand return didn’t make it back over the net.

Extending A Streak
Djokovic's full-court assault proved to be the difference as he preferred an offensive game style against one of the biggest-hitting baseliners in the sport. Djokovic has now won 20 consecutive matches in China and won back-to-back titles at the China Open in Beijing and the Shanghai Rolex Masters for the second straight year. He's also now won seven titles overall in China, which is the most he has won in any country.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... nghai.aspx

[robpal]

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Federer's Resilience
London, England


Juan Martin del Potro congratulates Roger Federer after their final Group B match on Saturday afternoon.

Spoiler:

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Federer's Resilience
London, England


Juan Martin del Potro congratulates Roger Federer after their final Group B match on Saturday afternoon.

Dismiss Roger Federer at your own peril.

Federer produced another magical performance to remind the world that the king is still alive and kicking in defeating Juan Martin del Potro 4-6, 7-6 (2), 7-5 at the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals on Saturday.

Federer’s resilience was displayed in every set as he clawed back from 1-5 in the first set to narrowly lose it 6-4. Then he came back from 3-1 down in the second set and 3-0 down in the third set to triumph in the winner-take-all battle and advance to Sunday’s blockbuster semi-final against Rafael Nadal.

It was vintage Federer from the back of the court as his forehand dominated with 16 forehand winners (del Potro had while only coughing up 26 errors in the almost two-and-a-half hour encounter.

Federer hit nine forehand winners from the deuce court and seven from Ad court as he constantly hunted the short ball to attack. The even offense was helped by del Potro’s deeper court position allowing Federer to rule the baseline and move the Argentine side-to-side throughout the match.

The evenness of Federer’s baseline game was also reflected in his errors as he committed 13 forehand errors standing in the deuce court and 13 in the Ad court.

Federer’s backhand only produced one winner, which was a drop shot at 3-5, 15-0 serving in the opening set, but more importantly it only yielded 18 groundstroke errors in three sets under heavy fire from del Potro. Federer switched tactics with his backhand late in the first set and sliced it a lot more to gain better depth and remove the raw power that his opponent was feeding off.

Federer quickly fell behind 5-1 in the opening set and only hit six slice backhands to that point of the match, representing a third of his total backhands. But he switched tactics and after two sets of play he had hit almost half (49%) of his total backhands as a slice, directing it deep to del Potro’s backhand where it would stay low out of the strike zone and not deliver the pure speed that could be used back against him. It was a masterful switch of tactics that helped him be more consistent and go deeper in a lot more rallies.

Federer’s superior court position around the baseline also allowed him to dominate the front of the court as well where he won 72% (26/36) of all points coming forward to the net. Federer also hit eight drop shots, winning five, as he aimed to keep del Potro off balance and guessing with his varied shot selection.

Federer also mixed his first serve location well, directing 23 at del Potro’s forehand and 29 at his backhand to stop the Argentine getting the upper hand at the start of the rally. But on second serves he directed 28 to del Potro’s backhand and only five to his forehand to avoid the bigger forehand return of serve.

Federer hit 66% forehands with his “Serve + 1” tactic, winning 62% (25/40) when starting with a serve and a forehand and only 35% (7/20) when starting the point with a serve and a backhand.

Del Potro really went after Federer’s backhand when serving, but Federer counted well with deep, slow slices to neutralise his opponent’s power. Del Potro directed only 11 first serves to Federer’s forehand but a massive 41 towards his backhand. Federer hit 35% (14/40) second serves as forehands but could but could only manage to win 21% (3/14) with his more favoured wing.

The confidence from coming from behind and pulling out such a big win will be just the tonic he needs as he takes on the No. 1 in the Emirates ATP Rankings, Nadal, in today’s semi-final. Federer will be primed to once again to show the world he has still got what it takes to get the job done on the world’s biggest stage.

Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game. Read more at www.braingametennis.com.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... Potro.aspx

[Nadalito]

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Nadal's Relentless Attack
London, England


Rafael Nadal advanced to his second title match at the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals, overpowering Roger Federer in straight sets.

Spoiler:

It’s the simple things in life that always seem to work the best.

That straight-forward philosophy worked yet again for Rafael Nadal as he defeated Roger Federer 7-5, 6-3 in the semi-finals of the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals in London on Sunday.

Nadal’s simple yet ruthlessly efficient strategy of relentlessly attacking Federer’s backhand started way back in 2004 at their first meeting in Miami, which he won 6-3, 6-3, and is still the dominant theme a decade later with Nadal now owning a 22-10 winning head-to-head record.

Nadal’s nasty lefty serve and heavy forehand are the two primary weapons that are the devastating difference-makers in this elite match-up at the pinnacle of our sport.

Nothing could paint a clearer picture of Nadal’s obsession with breaking down Federer’s backhand than his first serve direction in Sunday’s semi-final.

Nadal made Federer hit a whopping 87% (36/41) backhands from his first serve for the match including 100% (14/14) in the second set. Federer struggled mightily with this tactic, only able to win 19% (7/36) of points beginning with a backhand return from a first serve. On the flip side, Federer won 80% (4/5) when he was able to return Nadal’s first serve with a forehand, illustrating the dramatic difference in success for Federer with the two tactics.

Nadal was equally as persistent with the tactic on second serves, making Federer hit 76% (10/13) backhands to completely handcuff him to begin the point. Federer won 3/10 starting with a backhand return and 1/3 beginning with a forehand return as Nadal won a very high 69% of points on his second serve for the match.

Even though Federer knew exactly where it was going he still had serious trouble handling the heavy lefty slice, committing 11 backhand return errors off first serves and two from second serves over two sets.

The problem for Federer in this match-up is that he is always the one having to adjust to Nadal – not the other way around. It must make for a monumental headache trying to figure out how to diffuse the Spaniard’s strategy that never seems to change and always seems to work.

Nadal’s simple yet efficient strategy also lends itself to him getting a forehand as the first shot after the serve and this match was no exception. Nadal hit a “Serve + 1” forehand 71% (27/38) of the time, winning a very high 70% (19/27) of those points. Nadal’s layers of strategy feed on each other and help him constrict the point as it develops until Federer is backed into a corner – the corner deep in the Ad court to be exact.

Federer got pinned deep in the Ad court again and again by Nadal’s heavy forehand, committing 14 backhand errors for the match (Nadal had 10). Federer loves nothing more than to turn backhands into forehands in the Ad court but Nadal does everything possible to shut this down and remove the oxygen from Federer’s baseline play. In the opening set Federer hit 47 backhands in the Ad court and was only able to run-around 14 backhands and turn them into Ad court forehands which completely suffocates his primary baseline tactics.

Federer hit 31 backhands in the second set and still only hit 14 run-around forehands – the exact same number as the opening set. Overall Federer hit 78 backhands and 85 forehands for the match which is basically even which is a death sentence for Federer against Nadal.

Once Nadal has got Federer’s backhand in a choke hold he then develops his cunning secondary tactic of running Federer hard to the deuce court to try and extract Forehand on-the-run errors. Federer made 20 forehand errors for the match, with 12 of them coming standing in the deuce court.

Federer’s answer to Nadal’s master plan was to limit the amount of baseline rallies in the match. Federer came to the net nine times in the two sets but could only win two of those points. It’s hard for Federer to gain any traction when he does not own the back or the front of the court. He did serve-and-volley seven times, winning five, but it’s not enough to sustain any type of pressure on the Spaniard.

Novak Djokovic proved in 2011 through the Australian Open in 2012 that he could successfully make a strategy adjustment to dominate Nadal, winning seven straight times. For Federer it’s more complex having to match up his one-handed backhand up against the game’s heaviest forehand but evolution stops for nobody. He is yet to display a successful counter-move to Nadal’s persistent Ad court attack and time is running out to see if Federer can develop the right tools to get the better of his lefty nemesis. One thing is for sure – the world is madly in love with their magnificent rivalry and 2014 can’t come soon enough to see these two giants of the game once again look at each other from opposite sides of the net.

Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game. Read more at www.braingametennis.com.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... Nadal.aspx

[Rroggerr]

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: The Backhand Effect
London, England


Novak Djokovic's backhand proved decisive against Rafael Nadal.

Spoiler:

Novak Djokovic’s backhand is an extremely disruptive force.

Djokovic defeated Rafael Nadal 6-3, 6-4 to win his third Barclays ATP World Tour Finals in London Monday night and has now won 22 straight matches since losing to Nadal in the final of the US Open in New York two months ago.

Djokovic’s backhand was a wrecking ball for Nadal’s primary lefty patterns and was the dominant shot from the back of the court in the final. Djokovic hit five backhand winners which were more than any other groundstroke on either side of the net and his backhand forced many more errors from Nadal who first tried to break it down then played away from it with limited success.

Nadal only managed two forehand and two backhand winners as Djokovic shrunk the court with amazing defense and mesmerising athletic ability that make you certain his entire body is made out of rubber.

What is amazing is that the best forehand in the game (Nadal’s) was beat up by the best backhand in the game (Djokovic’s). That’s not supposed to happen.

Djokovic hit 89 backhands in the Ad court and 87 forehands in the deuce court and took his backhand both cross court and down the line at will to force his patterns of play onto Nadal. Djokovic also added 30 run-around forehands in the Ad court, but still had roughly a 3-1 ratio of backhands to forehands in the Ad court, which is bad strategy for most players, but just what the doctor ordered for Djokovic.

Djokovic did commit 13 backhand errors (Nadal had 14) for the match but the pressure his backhand brought to baseline points more than made up for those limited errors. A clear example of the pressure that Djokovic’s backhand brings to Nadal was the amount and location of forehand errors from Nadal. Nadal only had two forehand winners, but had 22 forehand errors, which are extremely different numbers than we are used to seeing from Nadal against other opponents during the tournament.

What’s most interesting is that 17 of the 22 forehand errors were made going to Djokovic’s forehand side in the deuce court. These numbers illustrate the change of strategy he had to make and the respect that Djokovic’s backhand commands.

Djokovic got off to a flying start breaking Nadal in the second game and led 3-0 on the strength of his rock-solid backhand. In the opening three games, Djokovic hit 20 backhands and only 17 forehands and yielded only two backhand errors in winning 12 of the first 16 points. Djokovic hit five winners during this period to signal his aggressive intentions.

Nadal saved a break point that could have seen him down 0-4 and then broke back in the next game and the set was soon even at 3-3. Djokovic broke back to lead 5-3 after winning the point of the match that started with a serve and volley point from Nadal and followed with a Djokovic forehand lob on the dead run and then a quick volley exchange with both players at the net before Djokovic hit a forehand volley winner.

Djokovic then hit two backhand winners leading 5-3, including a lucky half-volley net cord winner at 15-30 that greatly helped him get out of that game.

While Nadal hit 87 per cent of his first serves to Roger Federer’s backhand in his semi-final victory yesterday, Nadal only directed 46 per cent to Djokovic’s backhand in the final. Nadal must modify against Djokovic while he gets to play Federer on his terms.

Djokovic’s backhand stood tall in the last few games at the end of the match as Nadal had one last push to get himself back into the contest. Djokovic only made two errors and hit two winners with his last 23 backhands stretching from the 3-1 game in the second set.

This is the second victory over Nadal in a row for Djokovic (finals of Beijing) after losing the previous three stretching back to the Roland Garros semi-finals. Djokovic’s backhand can take a lot of the credit for winning his seventh title of the season, which is the second highest total of his career.

Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game. Read more at www.braingametennis.com.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... Nadal.aspx

[Advantage]

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Stan's Tactics Revealed
Melbourne, Australia


Stanislas Wawrinka combined a smart gameplan
and outstanding execution to take the Australian
Open final away from Rafael Nadal.

Stanislas Wawrinka played the best set of tennis of his life to set up a stunning victory over Rafael Nadal in the final of the Australian Open in Melbourne. Wawrinka had to overcome nerves and an injured Nadal to close out the match but a smart game plan and outstanding execution early on set up the victory.

Wawrinka described his opening set as the “perfect start” for good reason. He won 11/11 first serve points including 3/3 serve and volley points and was 5/5 at the net. “I was moving well, feeling really aggressive, and I played my best set for sure by far,” he said.

Wawrinka’s domination over the World No. 1 to lead 6-3, 2-0 was built around strategic primary patterns (used 7 or 8 times out of 10) when the score was close and then employ secondary patterns (2 or 3 times out of 10) when he was ahead and the scoreboard didn’t apply extra pressure to the riskier tactic. The key was making Nadal unsure what was coming by getting the mix right to disguise the master plan.

Primary - Attack the Forehand
Wawrinka built his set-and-a-break lead with the clever tactic of going after Nadal’s forehand wide in the Ad court. Nadal is always looking to gravitate to his right to turn a backhand into a forehand in the deuce court, so Wawrinka often went wide in the Ad court early in the point to take advantage of this subtle movement. Nadal committed five forehand errors during this period, all in the Ad court, and four of them were sliding defensively as wide as the alley. Wawrinka wasted no time attacking this area, winning the opening point of the match by twice pressuring Nadal deep and wide, forcing a forehand error long down the line.

Primary - The Backhand Cage
Wawrinka constantly put Nadal on defense by hitting to his backhand out wide behind the alley in deuce court exchanges, which had three main benefits for Wawrinka: Nadal had no backhand winners in the first 11 games, it made it tough to hit his favorite run-around forehand in the deuce court and it created a lower percentage, wider angle to go down the line to neutralize the point to Wawrinka’s backhand. Wawrinka’s curling, cross-court forehand essentially put Nadal’s backhand in a cage. Wawrinka broke Nadal for the first time at 1-1, 15/40 with one of these excessively wide rally balls that Nadal could only manage to slice back, bouncing before the net.

Secondary - Backhand Down-The-Line
This was a masterful tactic from Wawrinka that was a crushing blow to Nadal every time it landed. Wawrinka hit the down-the-line backhand winner for the first time at 1-1, 40/15 off a low backhand slice down the line from Nadal. It won Wawrinka the game with a huge exclamation point. He hit it like a rocket as a passing shot in the following game. Nadal could not handle it, leading to the first break of serve of the match. The next time The Swiss used it was with Nadal serving at 1-4, 30/15. Wawrinka crushed three consecutive backhands cross court then pulled the trigger down the line for a spectacular winner. Just the threat of having such a huge weapon without always using it creates doubt and uncertainty in Nadal’s baseline movement and shot selection.

Secondary - Serve and Volley
The scoreboard dictated this clever surprise tactic as Wawrinka did it six times in building his set-and-a-break lead – never when he was behind in the point score; once with the point score tied and five times when he was ahead in the point score, including twice at 40/0 where the pressure was minimised. Wawrinka won five of six and what was interesting was the way he went about it – a sprint to the net with no split step, which enabled him to get well inside the service line when he had to hit a volley.

Nadal’s back injury early in the second set ended Wawrinka’s spectacular play as he now encountered a new opponent who served softer, took more risks and used less patterns. While it seems logical that an injured opponent should be easier to play, quite often it’s the complete opposite as Wawrinka’s brilliant tactics no longer applied. Clarity was replaced with nerves, and as is often the case, Wawrinka hoped Nadal would miss.

Wawrinka battled himself during the third set, which he lost, and for most of the fourth until he got the final break of serve to go ahead 5-3 and then served it out for an incredible, rollercoaster victory. The best set of his life laid the perfect foundation for the best win of his life and the fulfillment of a dream to become a Grand Slam champion.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... rinka.aspx

[filip.g]

BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Federer's Aggressive Gamble Pays Off
Dubai, U.A.E.


Roger Federer's aggression turned the match around against Novak Djokovic.

Spoiler:

Roger Federer hunts the short ball as well as anyone on the planet.

The Swiss came within a point of being down a set and a break then roared back to defeat Novak Djokovic 3-6, 6-3, 6-2 in the semi-finals of the Dubai Duty Free Tennis Championships on Saturday.

Federer’s stunning comeback was built around attacking the net in multiple ways and taking Djokovic out of his comfort zone of trading blows from the back of the court. The match was played in two halves, with Djokovic dominating the opening stanza and then Federer taking control to claim his first victory over the Serb in 18 months.

Federer got off to a slow start, dropping his opening service game with three backhand errors and a forehand error and unraveled losing 12 of the opening 14 points to fall behind 3-0. He failed to convert the only break point opportunity of the opening set he saw at 3-1, Ad out, when Djokovic hit three big forehands and approached to Federer’s backhand, but the slice passing shot floated just wide.

The most important point of the match occurred in the second set with Federer serving at 2-2, 30-40, where he somehow willed himself to win a point he absolutely should have lost. Federer hit a second serve to Djokovic’s forehand and was behind in the rally from the beginning. Federer’s second forehand of the rally hit hard into the net tape and could have gone anywhere but significantly changed directions from heading to the deuce court singles sideline to floating high and deep in the middle of the court. Djokovic approached two shots later and Federer ended up hitting a miraculous backhand half-volley passing shot up the line standing in no-man’s-land. It was as spectacular as it was bizarre.

Now it was Djokovic’s turn to unravel. From deuce, Djokovic made four consecutive forehand errors to be down 0-30 in the following game and then had to wait through a five minute and 25 second rain delay before finally losing serve with a forehand error from a huge backhand down the line for Federer. The train was leaving the station.

It was all Federer from this point on as he rolled through the rest of the second set and broke in the opening game of the third set to surge to the finish line. As Federer’s confidence grew from saving the break point, so did his commitment to bring the battle to the front of the court. Federer jumped on any short ball in six significant ways to make Djokovic as uncomfortable as possible, repeatedly having to hit passing shots to stay in the match.

1. Serve and Volley First Serve – won 81% (9/11)
Federer was extremely effective with this first strike tactic, doing it nine times in the deuce court and only twice in the Ad court. He did it four times out wide in the deuce court, winning three of four, and five times down the middle where he also only lost one point. Winning the guessing game of “will he or won’t he” serve and volley, as well as a mix of locations, made Federer very unpredictable and therefore much more dangerous.

2. Serve and Volley Second Serve – won 66% (2/3)
Federer first used this ultimate surprise tactic at 1-1, 40-0 in the second set which was a very safe score to practise the lower percentage tactic. He lost that point but it was a perfect dress rehearsal for the 4-2 game in the second set where he successfully did it at 15-0 and 40-30 to Djokovic’s backhand to really send the message that the rest of the match was going to be played on his terms.

3. Return & Approach – won 25% (1/4)
As weird as it sounds, this tactic is less about winning the point as it is about rattling the cage and extracting double faults at a later stage. It’s an audacious play that shocks the server and lets them know they are under full attack without a word being said. This was crystal clear at the start of the third set when Federer approached on the first two points of the set, winning the first and losing the second. The pressure metre instantly skyrocketed for Djokovic and the plan worked perfectly for Federer as he got handed the game with a double fault at 30-40. Federer could not have drawn it up any better.

4. Drop Shot & Approach – won 0% (0/3)
Federer did not win any of his three drop shot points but still was able to build pressure on Djokovic at the same time. Federer followed all three drop shots to the net, moving the battle away from the back of the court to the front, creating uncertainty in Djokovic’s mind and court position.

5. Approaching – won 77% (10/13)
These points represent the traditional way to come forward after developing the rally from the back of the court and jumping on a short ball to finish at the net. Federer’s primary way to come forward was behind a big forehand to Djokovic’s backhand but he also was eager to sneak in with a backhand slice given the right opportunity.

6. Climbing the Ladder
This last area represents Federer’s improved court position, particularly in baseline play. In the opening set Federer hit 80 per cent of his shots from the baseline and only 20 per cent inside. In the second set and half way through the third he had improved forward, or “climbed the ladder” to hit only 67 per cent from behind the baseline and 33 per cent inside it.

Federer scored one of his biggest wins in recent times by attacking the net with several disruptive strategies that will also serve him well in Sunday’s final against Tomas Berdych.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... kovic.aspx

[Jacuszyn]

BRAIN GAME: DJOKOVIC FORCES FEDERER BACK


Novak Djokovic forced Roger Federer back as he turned the match around against the Swiss.

Spoiler:

Novak Djokovic’s thrilling victory over Roger Federer in the final of the BNP Paribas Open Sunday afternoon focused on the key strategy of keeping the Swiss star back behind the baseline as much as possible as the match unfolded.

Djokovic won 3-6, 6-3, 7-6(3) and nothing contributed more to his narrow victory than his ability to turn the match into a grinding backcourt battle after Federer had attacked at will in the opening set.

Djokovic won only one more point than Federer (99 to 98) for the match and it wasn’t until he broke serve for the first time to go ahead 5-3 in the second set that the Serb really was able to sink his teeth into the match. Federer had remarkably held serve 33 straight times in the tournament until then.

Federer came out hot and swarmed the net early in the match, racing to a 3-0 and 4-1 lead before winning the opening set 6-3 without facing a break point on serve. It was vintage Federer, hitting 12 crushing winners including four forehand and two backhand winners and he attacked the net at every opportunity. An aggressive chip and charge backhand return off a second serve at deuce in the second game led to the first break of serve for the match for the Swiss maestro.

But everything from serving and volleying, approaching and playing right on the baseline became less prolific as the match progressed, as Djokovic slowly but surely improved with hitting deeper, making more first serves and extending rallies which suited his grinding mentality from the baseline.

Court position is something that is controlled by both players - the determination of Federer to move forward, even an inch, and also the depth of shot that Djokovic was presenting him with. In the opening set, Djokovic was only able to get 24 per cent of his groundstrokes to land closer to the baseline than the service line, which let Federer successfully hunt the short ball. But as Djokovic slowly but surely improved his strategy and execution, he was able to increase his depth to 35 per cent of shots landing closer to the baseline in the second set. This significantly slowed the Federer blitz down.

Djokovic’s depth definitely played a factor in keeping Federer from getting to the net as the match progressed.
Federer Attacking the Net (approaching + serve and volley).

Sets Attacking The Net Won Average Per Game
Set 1 13 6 1.4 times/game
Set 2 6 3 0.66 times/game
Set 3 12 7 0.92 times/game
(note – 3rd set tiebreaker counted as one game).

The ability to keep Federer off the net in the second set, with less than half the approaches he achieved in the first set, was an important strategy for Djokovic to get back in the match. To keep him back around 65 per cent as much in the third set as he averaged per game in the first set was another key factor in such a tight finish.

Baseline Points
Federer’s efficiency at the baseline also declined as Djokovic figured out how to attack Federer deep to his backhand corner (20 backhand errors) and also run him hard wide in the deuce court attacking his forehand (29 forehand errors).

Baseline Points (89) – Points ending with both players at the baseline.

Baseline Points Won Djokovic Won Point Federer Won Point
Set 1 7 10
Set 2 17 13
Set 3 23 19
Total 47 42
Climbing The Ladder
Hawk-Eye visualisation confirmed that the more Federer stays up around and inside the baseline, the better chance he has of winning the point. When the pair last played in semi-finals of Dubai less than a month ago, Federer lost the opening set with relatively poor court position – making contact with the ball 80 per cent behind the baseline and 20 per cent inside. But in the next two sets that he won he moved forward considerably and averaged 67 per cent behind the baseline and 33 per cent inside.

In the first set of the Indian Wells final yesterday, Federer had his most aggressive set of all, making contact 62 per cent behind the baseline and 38 per cent inside. But the second set and up to around half way through the third saw Djokovic pushing him back again, forcing the Swiss to hit 73 per cent behind the baseline and only 27 per cent inside.

Djokovic’s ability to arm-wrestle how the points are constructed to favour his style of play was the key element in deciding which of these two titans of the game would ultimately triumph in such a prestigious event.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... kovic.aspx

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BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
BRAIN GAME: DJOKOVIC BREAKS DOWN NADAL FOREHAND
Miami, U.S.A.


Novak Djokovic attacked Nadal’s forehand return with both first and second serves.

Spoiler:

Novak Djokovic launched a full-blooded attack at Rafael Nadal’s forehand to win the Sony Open Tennis final, executing with near perfection.

Djokovic won 6-3, 6-3 with a brilliant game plan aimed at breaking down Nadal’s strength by pounding it where it is most vulnerable – returning serve and extremely wide in the Ad court.

It took Djokovic a few games to settle in as he first had to navigate saving a break point in the opening game of the match and Nadal’s early good form, which saw the Spaniard hit five winners to Djokovic’s one with the score tied at 2-2.

From then on it was showtime for the Serb as he won 14 of the next 18 points and 21 of 30 to lead 6-3, 1-0 with a break.

Serving
Right from the start of the match Djokovic attacked Nadal’s forehand return with both first and second serves. Overall Nadal hit 22 forehand returns and remarkably only won three of those points. Nadal committed seven return errors off the forehand (four Ad court / three deuce court) as Djokovic stayed ahead in the guessing game of serve location.

The clever tactic had three benefits. Firstly, Nadal’s backhand return motion is compact and easier to block the serve back while the forehand backswing is larger and more likely to be pressured for time - especially on hard courts. Secondly, it was a disruptive, surprise tactic to attack the strength and keep Nadal guessing. Lastly, it was extremely effective to catch Nadal running around his backhand return, particularly on second serves in the Ad court.

Nadal's Forehand Returns Total Returned Total Points Won
1st Serves Deuce Court 9 1
1st Serves Ad Court 6 1
2nd Serves Deuce Court 1 0
2nd Serves Ad Court 6 1
Rallies
Djokovic constantly seemed to be ahead in the rallies as Nadal looked a step slower than normal. Nadal committed 18 forehand groundstroke errors to Djokovic’s seven and it was where those errors were made that helps understand the inner workings of the Serb’s master plan.

Nadal Forehand Errors Deuce Court Ad Court Middle Ad Court Wide
1st Set 1 2 5
2nd Set 1 4 5
Sixteen of the 18 forehand errors from Nadal occurred standing in the Ad court, where Djokovic attacked with his backhand cross court and forehand down the line. Of the 16, 10 occurred very wide around the Ad court alley and sometimes outside it as Djokovic kept yanking Nadal out of his comfort zone.

The location of Djokovic’s winners also helps paint a clearer picture of how commanding this tactic really was. Djokovic is renowned for his backhand down the line, but every single one of his backhand winners were cross court in the direction of Nadal’s forehand.

Djokovic Winners To The Deuce Court To The Ad Court
Backhand 0 5
Forehand 4 4
Both players won 14 points each in baseline rallies in the opening set, but Djokovic clearly took the honours in the second set, winning 65 per cent (24 to 13) from the back of the court.

A pivotal game was Nadal serving at 2-3 in the opening set as Djokovic broke for the first time. Djokovic finished at the net with a forehand volley winner on the first point after crushing a second serve return down the line to Nadal’s forehand. At 0-15, Djokovic again went after the forehand, hitting a short angle backhand cross court winner. Nadal won the next point with a good first serve that was unreturned and at 15-30 Djokovic hit a huge forehand down the line, attacking Nadal’s forehand, then backed it up with a cross court winner. At 15-40 Djokovic used the secondary pattern of attacking Nadal’s backhand, which forced an error long for the break.

Djokovic was also lights out coming to the net, winning seven of eight points to take command of all areas of the court. Leading 3-2, 30-0 in the second set, Djokovic was feeling it so much he nailed an old-school slice backhand approach deep to Nadal’s forehand, which the Spaniard missed down the line. Once Djokovic’s primary patterns were humming, he would mix it up occasionally to Nadal’s backhand to completely confuse him.

Nadal had a very disappointing day serving, only winning 59 per cent of first serves and 46 per cent of second serves. Djokovic constantly began the point returning down the middle with a deep missile to push Nadal back and instantly getting control of both court position and the directional flow of the point. In the first set, Djokovic averaged landing his return 11.4 feet from the baseline against first serves and that improved to only 5.8 feet from the baseline against second serves to really push Nadal back on his heels.

Djokovic said in his post-match interview that “everything went perfectly for me.” Some days, you can do no wrong.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... Nadal.aspx

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BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
Brain Game: Stan's Bruising Backhand Stops Federer
Monte-Carlo, Monaco


Wawrinka's average backhand speed was 14 percent faster than Federer's.

Spoiler:

The hottest shot from the best player on tour this year is – wait for it – a one-handed backhand.

In an era of dominant forehands, crushing serves and impenetrable two-handed backhands, Stanislas Wawrinka’s raking one-handed backhand is a huge reason he is the most successful player on tour this season and leads the Emirates ATP Race to London standings, which reflect 2014 form.

Wawrinka defeated Roger Federer 4-6, 7-6 (5), 6-2 in the final of the Monte-Carlo Rolex Masters and his backhand once again stood tall as the best shot on the court.

Wawrinka had eight backhand winners and seven forehand winners for the match while Federer had six forehand and four backhand winners from the back of the court. Wawrinka’s backhand wreaks havoc in multiple ways and essentially means he only has to cover half the court (the Ad court), which reduces his running and shrinks the court to his advantage.

Bruising Backhands
Everything flows from the strength of the Swiss star. He is so strong, particularly in his forearm, that his backhand is both a defensive stronghold and an offensive weapon. In the middle of the third set Wawrinka’s average backhand speed was measured at 74mph to Federer’s 65mph. That’s almost 14% harder, making the weight of his ball all that much tougher to deal with. It repeatedly forced Federer onto the back foot, stopped him hurting Stan down the line and delivered shorter balls back, allowing for improved court position and better geometry for the next shot.

Ad-Court Domination
Federer wrote the book on this tactic but Wawrinka’s stronger backhand means he now gets to enjoy the benefits of only respecting half a court. Wawrinka got the better of the inevitable Ad court rallies, making it tough for Federer to go down the line with authority to hurt Wawrinka’s forehand. This enabled Wawrinka to camp out in the Ad court, where he hit 80% (12/15) of his groundstroke winners. Only twice for the match was Federer able to force a Wawrinka forehand error with a backhand groundstroke down the line.

Primary Cross Court
Wawrinka’s primary role with his backhand was to take it cross court to put Federer in the “backhand cage,” where he could not hurt him to gain control of the baseline rallies. At the start of the third set Wawrinka had hit 81% of his backhands cross court, forcing Federer into 18 backhand errors.

Wawrinka constantly rolled his backhand wide and shorter around the service line, stretching Federer into a defensive position. In the first two sets Federer’s lone backhand winner with both players standing at the back of the court was a shooter off the baseline tape in the opening game of the second set.

Secondary Down The Line
Just the threat of dropping this hammer is a game-changer for Wawrinka. Only two of the eight winners were down the line but the power of this shot and Wawrinka’s ability to crush it from everywhere automatically expanded the area that Federer had to cover. Up to the final, Wawrinka’s backhand down the line was proven by Hawk-Eye to be more superior than Federer’s.

Wawrinka’s backhand down the line on average landed 8.5 feet from the baseline while Federer’s was almost three feet worse at 11.4 feet from the baseline. In a game where inches matter, that’s some valuable real estate. Wawrinka also got it closer to the sideline, averaging 3.6 feet from the sideline to Federer’s 6.5 feet.

This was a tough loss for Federer as he was only three points away from winning the match in the second set tie-break at 5/6 and then quickly unravelled to go down 0-4 in the third set.

Wawrinka also won a key battleground on first serves as Federer only won one of 16 points starting with a forehand return off a first serve. Federer was always looking to keep the points short, jumping on any short balls to attack the net. Federer won 76% (23/30) of his net points and 77% (7/9) of serve-and-volley points.

Wawrinka’s dominance from the back of the court meant that Federer tried to keep points as short as possible. Federer had a slight edge (56 to 53) of points ending in five shots or less, but he lost control in points lasting five to nine shots (32 to 37) and was only half as good as Wawrinka in points lasting more than nine shots (six to 12). This all added up to Federer running slightly more than Wawrinka (2232m to 2139m) for the match.

Wawrinka’s magnificent one-handed backhand speaks loudly to all those numbers and can take a sizeable amount of credit for his first Masters 1000 title.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... derer.aspx

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BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS 2014
BRAIN GAME: KEI’S GAME PLAN RATTLES RAFA
Madrid, Spain


Kei Nishikori used his favourite shot effectively against Rafael Nadal in the Madrid final.

Spoiler:

Kei Nishikori stunned the tennis world in the Madrid final building a 6-2, 4-2 lead against the King of Clay in his own backyard before a back injury stopped him in his tracks. Rafael Nadal went on to win the final 2-6, 6-4, 3-0 ret. but the real focus was just how dominant Nishikori was against Nadal on clay in the Spanish capital.

We have grown accustomed to watching Nadal pound opponents in the Ad court on his favourite surface but it was Nishikori who completely owned this directional battle with laser backhands and lethal run-around forehands.

Ad Court Dominance
Nishikori hit six forehand winners building his set and a break lead and every one of them was a run-around forehand standing in the Ad court. What is even more surprising is that all six went back through the Ad court behind Nadal, wrong-footing the Spaniard. Nishikori ran all the way to the Ad court alley to hit three of the winners in a clear indication that he was going to be the one controlling the critical Ad court exchanges – not the World No. 1.

If Nishikori wasn’t hitting a winner in the Ad court battles then there was a good chance he was forcing an error. Nadal’s normally dominant forehand was a non-factor during this period of the match, notching up only two winners and committing 14 errors. Ten of the Spaniard’s 14 errors were all out wide in the Ad court, often times in extreme locations very deep or outside the doubles alley.

Secondary Tactic
Once Nishikori established dominance in the Ad court he also cleverly mixed down the line to Nadal’s backhand with great success. Nadal made eight backhand errors to be down a set and 2-4 and six of them came from a Nishikori groundstroke hit down the line from the Ad court. This strategy is straight out of the Djokovic playbook and identical to the tactics the Serb used to defeat Nadal 6-3, 6-3 in the Miami Masters final at the end of March.

Climbing the Ladder
A key factor of Nishikori’s baseline dominance was his constant rally position up around and inside the baseline. This provided better geometry of the court to attack Nadal, improved depth on his shots, and gave Nadal less time to get prepared. It also allowed Nishikori to deliver a more powerful shot to the other side of the court. With Nishikori serving at 3-2 in the second set, his average forehand speed for the match was 80 mph, while Nadal was nowhere close at only 71mph - highlighting just how dominant Nishikori was in outthinking and outhitting his opponent. Nadal was not able to find a single tactic in the match where he possessed an edge.

Nishikori’s Backhand
Nadal thrives on breaking down an opponent’s backhand but Nishikori’s favourite shot delivered four winners and only seven errors during the opening 14 games. With Nishikori leading a set and up a break 1-0 in the second he had directed 59 percent of his backhands down the line to Nadal’s backhand, often times very deep to the corner, making Nadal have to slice his own backhand to try to stay in the point. Nishikori directed 41 percent cross court with most landing shorter and wider with the intention of pulling Nadal off the court as much as possible.

Serve + 1 Forehand
A key strategy for both players was looking for a forehand as the first shot after the serve to keep control of the point. Nishikori hit a serve then a forehand as the first shot after the serve 90 percent (27/30) of the time, winning 59 percent of those points. Nadal hit a Serve + 1 forehand 89 percent (24/27) but could only manage to win 46 percent of those points. It is extremely rare to see Nadal not have a winning percentage with his number one serving strategy.

By reaching the final Nishikori became the first Japanese player to break into the Top 10 of the Emirates ATP Rankings. Coupled with his recent victory in Barcelona, Nishikori is shaping as a real threat to go all the way at Roland Garros in a couple of weeks.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... Nadal.aspx

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BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
BRAIN GAME: HOW NOVAK TAMED RAFA
Rome, Italy


Novak Djokovic won 66 per cent (18/27) of all points when he came forward to the net.

Spoiler:

Novak Djokovic has evolved once again.

Djokovic defeated Rafael Nadal 4-6, 6-3, 6-3 in the final of Internazionali BNL d'Italia in a dominant display, hitting more than three times the winners in owning the baseline against the King of Clay.

Djokovic’s brilliant backhand typically steals the show but this time his forehand was the preeminent shot that was most responsible for the thrilling victory.

Djokovic crushed 46 winners to only 15 for Nadal, with 22 of those coming from the improved Djokovic forehand wing. The Serb hit it harder and flatter than we are used to seeing from him in a clear adaptation of strategy to keep points shorter, which helped win the battle of court position and gain the initial advantage over the eventual arm wrestle of baseline control.

Djokovic unloaded with his forehand from all over the court, hitting equally nine groundstroke winners from the deuce and ad courts. The other four forehand winners were all returns that shared the same subtle strategy element – directed to Nadal’s forehand. With Nadal expecting Djokovic to return to his backhand, Djokovic hit two forehand return winners from both the deuce and ad courts in a smart surprise strategy that caught Nadal backing away towards the deuce court. Nadal is always looking to initially step to his right to hit a forehand with the first shot after the serve, so this clever strategy worked perfectly for the Serb.

Baseline Domination
We are not used to seeing anyone dominate the baseline on clay against Nadal but Djokovic owned this key battleground in the last two sets. Nadal edged Djokovic 19-16 in the opening set in baseline play but Djokovic won 19-15 in the second set and started the third set with a stunning 8-0 run from the back of the court, including winning 13 of 14 points to end the second set and start the third. Djokovic also started the second set strongly, winning 11 of the opening 13 points. It was a match of momentum swings and Djokovic was ultimately more focused and clearer with his game plan.

Nadal Second Serves
Another key battleground that the Serb won was Nadal’s second serve points. The Spaniard only managed to win 43 per cent for the match, which has a snowball effect of pressure on the rest of his game. Nadal protected his second serve well in the opening set, winning 75 per cent (6/8) of those points but Djokovic climbed all over it for the rest of the match as Nadal only won 28 per cent (2/7) in the second set and only 25 per cent (2/8) in the deciding set. Djokovic was only able to get one second return to land closer to the baseline than the service line in the opening set but hit three very deep 2nd serve returns in the second set to establish immediate control as the returner.

First Strike Strategy
Djokovic attacked Nadal early and often, which stopped Nadal finding rhythm and gaining time to develop control from the back of the court. In a very un-clay like statistic, 45 per cent (74/165) of total points didn’t reach five shots, which suited Djokovic just fine against Nadal’s grinding game style. Djokovic won almost double (49 to 25) the amount of short points as he served better, was more aggressive with his returns and was always prowling the baseline looking to come forward. He artificially turned a potential grinding clay court duel into a battle where these statistics are typically seen on a faster hard court. Nadal marginally got the better of the mid-length rallies, winning 34 points to 25 points that lasted between five and nine shots but Djokovic again asserted his superiority once the point got beyond nine shots, winning 19 points to 14. That’s a very troublesome stat for Nadal that eats away at the heart of his grinding mentality and his aura of invincibility on clay.

Finishing at the Net
Djokovic was always hunting the short ball and trying to manufacture a rally where at least one of the two players finished the point at the net. Djokovic won 66 per cent (18/27) of all points when he came forward to the net, never letting Nadal find his baseline rhythm. The Serb also hit nine drop shots to drag Nadal out of his trench deep behind the baseline, winning five of those points. The drop shots had the added effect of keeping Nadal off balance, guessing as to whether Djokovic would attack with his missile-like forehand or drag him to the net out of his comfort zone. Nadal was being yanked all over the court.

This was an important match for Djokovic to explore what tactics currently work best against Nadal on clay and will no doubt give him supreme confidence heading into Roland Garros in a week’s time.

Brain GameCraig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game. Read more at http://www.braingametennis.com.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... Nadal.aspx

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BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
BRAIN GAME: RAFA'S NEW TACTICS FELL NOVAK
Paris, France

Spoiler:

Rafael Nadal’s masterful counter-tactic of bombarding Novak Djokovic’s forehand took time to develop but ultimately carried him to a historic ninth Roland Garros title on Sunday.

Nadal won 3-6, 7-5, 6-2, 6-4 by switching gears from previous matches and relentlessly attacking Djokovic’s forehand, particularly with many more forehands down the line in what was the 42nd meeting between these two giants of the game. Nadal’s forehand was by far the biggest weapon in the final, crushing 27 winners to Djokovic’s 17 as the strategic change in directing traffic away from Djokovic’s stronger backhand delivered more and more baseline control as the final developed.

Nadal’s clever maneuver yielded a staggering 85 per cent (23/27) of his forehand winners directed towards Djokovic’s forehand. Nadal’s primary forehand winner was amazingly redirecting down the line with pin-point accuracy for 13 bruising blows. Nadal preferred to play high and heavy to Djokovic’s backhand, getting the ball up out of his strike zone, but he hit it as hard as he could when attacking the forehand wing.

Nadal Forehand Winners

RN’s Court Position
To ND’s Forehand
To ND’s Backhand
Run Around
In Deuce Court
10
4
Ad Court
13
0
TOTAL
23
4
Things started slowly for Nadal with only four forehand winners in the opening set as Djokovic controlled the flow of play much more, especially with his backhand. Nadal lost serve at 3-4 in the opening set as three big run-around forehands from the Deuce court all missed their mark wide, going cross-court towards Djokovic’s forehand. The big weapon was not yet dialed in.

Overall, Nadal committed 66 per cent (24/36) of his forehand errors for the match towards Djokovic’s forehand, with 18 missing their mark down the line, illustrating just how committed he was to the pattern of play.

Nadal Forehand Errors

RN’s Court Position
To ND’s Forehand
To ND’s Backhand
Run Around
In Deuce Court
6
4
Normal Ad Court
18
8
TOTAL
24
12

Nadal’s first break of serve for the match came at 3-2, Ad Out in the second set, when he hit a forehand return off a second serve out wide in the Ad court alley. He ran all the way to the Deuce court alley to defiantly hit another huge run around forehand at Djokovic’s forehand. Djokovic netted his shot to provide the break, which established the first real momentum shift for Nadal in the match. The Spaniard would get broken back immediately, but the pattern of attacking the Serb’s forehand was really starting to pay dividends as Nadal hit eight of his nine forehand winners for the set to Djokovic’s forehand wing.

Nadal would break Djokovic again with the Serb serving at 5-6 with two more heavy forehand winners directed at Djokovic’s forehand. When the big moments arrived, Nadal consistently stuck with this pattern. Djokovic only won five points in five games from 5-all in the second set to being down 0-3 in the third in the real turning point of the match.

Djokovic Return Errors
Another major element of the final was the unusual amount of return errors from the player widely thought of as the best returner in the game. Djokovic committed an unusually high 24 return errors (Nadal made 10), including 17 off his normally rock-solid backhand wing. Remarkably, five of these were off second serves, stopping any momentum in its tracks he was desperately trying to build. Nadal directed 80 per cent of his first serves at Djokovic’s backhand return but was close to 50-50 on second serves, hitting a lot of successful jam serves right at the body.

Djokovic Return Stroke

Djokovic Returns
Total
Won
Winning %
1st Serve Return – Backhand
65
17
26.1%
1st Serve Return – Forehand
16
6
37.5%
2nd Serve Return – Backhand
17
9
52.9%
2nd Serve Return – Forehand
15
5
25.0%

Nadal’s Returns
Djokovic’s tactics were to mix much more against Nadal to keep him guessing; the Spaniard hit 36 backhand returns and 35 forehand returns off first serves. Nadal’s obsession with hitting forehand returns off second serves helped him hit 70 per cent (29/41) forehand returns where he won a very high 65.5 per cent (19/29), compared to 50 per cent (6/12) off his backhand wing.

Nadal Serve + 1
Nadal was always looking to crush a forehand as the first shot after the serve, especially to get a quick strike out wide to Djokovic’s forehand. Nadal hit 84 per cent (74/88) first shots after the serve as a forehand to maintain his initial control of the points.

1st Shot After Serve
Total
Won
Winning %
Serve + 1 Forehand
74
45
60.8%
Serve + 1 Backhand
14
7
50.0%
It took Nadal almost two full sets to sink his teeth into the match, but once he gained conviction in his forehand tactic there was nothing a tiring Djokovic could do to stop it. Nadal now pulls equal with Pete Sampras as second on the Grand Slam title-leaders list with 14 – only three behind Roger Federer, who has 17. This will be one of his sweetest victories at Roland Garros, having to overcome a less than ideal clay court preparation season to once again reign supreme as the King of Clay in Paris.

http://www.atpworldtour.com/News/Tennis ... Final.aspx

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BRAIN GAME ANALYSIS
BRAIN GAME: MURRAY’S BRICK-WALL BACKHAND
Wimbledon, Great Britain


Andy Murray locked down the baseline against David Goffin.

Spoiler:

Brain Game author Craig O’Shannessy will break down the big matches each day during The Championships, beginning today with opening-round victories for defending champion Andy Murray and top seed Novak Djokovic.

Andy Murray’s Wimbledon defense got off a flying start today as he locked down the baseline against David Goffin for a 6-1, 6-4, 7-5 victory.

Murray won 69% (53/77) of points with both players trading groundstrokes at the back of the court, with his backhand in particular standing tall in the first Centre Court match of The Championships. Murray constantly switched between a heavy slice backhand that stayed low on the fresh grass and a driving groundstroke aimed to rush Goffin in their regular Ad court exchanges.

Murray hit four backhand winners for the match but more importantly only committed four unforced errors in three sets, giving Goffin no breathing room to construct points and find a crack in Murray’s defense. Murray hit 196 backhands for the match compared to 179 forehands, meaning he committed a winner and an unforced error about every 45 backhands. There are not too many players on the planet that can hang with that kind of consistency.

Murray won 60% of points lasting between 1-4 shots, 61% of rallies between 5-8 shots and 60% of rallies lasting longer than nine shots. The ball just kept coming back for Goffin as he committed 36 forehand and 30 backhand errors trying to go for something a little bit too special against the reigning Wimbledon champion.

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Goffin could only manage 12 groundstroke winners (six forehand and backhand) and wisely turned to the front of the court to try and stay alive in the match. While Murray only approached 15 times, (won nine), Goffin cleverly snuck in to the net 34 times, winning a respectable 65% (22), mainly with sharp, angled volleys. But Goffin always had the pressure of playing from behind and could only manage to see two break points for the match and was not able to convert either one.

In an ominous sign for the rest of the field, Murray also served particularly well, making 71% of first serves - only dropping eight points on his first serve for the entire match. Murray served 62% down the centre T, 35% out wide and only 2% at the body for the match. That’s a fairly normal mix on grass as a quality serve down the center is enhanced by the speed of the court. Murray’s second serve was typically quite slow, averaging only 83 mph compared to Goffin’s 94 mph, but Murray still managed to win a very healthy 61% of those points to Goffin’s 48%.

Novak Djokovic defeated Andrey Golubev 6-0, 6-1, 6-4

The No. 1 seed at one stage led 6-0, 5-0 in a very dominant display and didn’t face a break point for the entire match, while converting 6/15 of his break point opportunities. Djokovic served particularly well with a staggering 40% (25/62) of his serves unreturned for the match. The Serb only dropped six points in 12 service games on his second serve as Golubev, like Goffin, was constantly pressing to go for something a little too special to get ahead in the point, only to barely miss.

In a clearly defined pattern of play, Djokovic would almost always go crosscourt when he was caught on defense while Golubev would try and squeeze a shot down the line that invariably drifted wide. It was in these moments that the level of play and expectations for the tournament were illuminated.

Even though it felt like Golubev was always chasing the winner, Djokovic actually hit more than double the winners of his opponent with 34 to 15. It goes to show that pulling the trigger too much can be extremely counter-productive. Djokovic won 64% (69/108) of rallies lasting 1-4 shots, which represented a massive 72% of total points played. Only 10 points for the match developed past nine shots, which amazingly Golubev held the edge seven to three.

Fabio Fognini defeated Alex Kuznetsov 2-6, 1-6, 6-4, 6-1, 9-7

FogniniNo. 16 seed, Fabio Fognini came back from two sets down and a break in the fifth set to pull out a dramatic victory 9-7 in the deciding set. In almost every area of the match Kuznetsov won the small battles but failed to close out the flamboyant Italian. Fognini won eight points less for the match, hit 19 less winners (62 to 43), won one less baseline point (70 to 69) and two less net points (22 to 20) but employed figured out a way to reach the finish line.

Fognini’s main area of advantage was limiting unforced errors, where he only made 27 (20 forehand/7 backhand) to Kuznetsov’s 43 (23 forehand/20 backhand). Committing just seven unforced backhand errors in five sets kept the Italian alive more than anything else he did in the match.

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