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Brain Game explains how Novak Djokovic dominated rallies of four shots or less in beating Kei Nishikori
Novak Djokovic is a first-strike master masquerading as an aggressive baseliner. Djokovic defeated Kei Nishikori 6-3, 6-3 in the final of the Miami Open presented by Itau by completely dominating the most abundant rally length in our sport: 0-4 shots.
The world marvels at Djokovic’s shot tolerance, indestructible defence and his ability to outlast opponents. Those are all very commendable qualities, but don’t directly speak to the essence of his global domination nearly as much as his uncanny ability to dismantle opponents before a rally develops.
Nishikori started hot, breaking Djokovic in the opening game, and in the first five games, had won all five rallies that were at least nine shots or longer.
It was inconsequential.
Exactly two of every three points (72/109) in the match developed into a baseline battle, with Djokovic winning an extremely high 63 per cent of them. The majority of these points were shorter, rather than longer, providing a hidden advantage for the World No. 1.
First Four Shots
You would think longer rallies would be a key battleground between these two back-court gladiators, but ultimately only 15 per cent of all points reached nine shots or longer.
In the opening set, Djokovic won a commanding 70 per cent (16/23) of first-strike points. As a comparison, he won just 57 per cent of the 0-4 rally length through seven rounds to win the Australian Open earlier this year.

Power & Court Position
After the first five games in the Miami final, with Nishikori serving at 2-3, the Japanese star was crushing backhands on average of 76mph. That was 10mph faster than Djokovic’s 66mph.
It’s a commendable tactic, but Nishikori ended up with just two backhand winners for the match to the Serb’s six. It’s not how hard you hit it. It’s where you hit it from.
Djokovic weaves his wicked spell early in the point, quickly outmaneuvering opponents with superior depth, and forcing them to miss at an alarming rate. Nishikori’s powerful groundstrokes were effectively nullified in this match by where the Serb forced the Japanese to make contact with the ball.
In the previous rounds leading up to the Miami final, Nishikori hit 26 per cent of his shots inside the baseline, representing aggressive groundstroke court position, plus a healthy amount of points at the net. With Djokovic leading, 6-3, 2-0 in the final, Nishikori’s normally solid court position was nowhere to be seen. The Japanese’s shots inside the baseline had been cut in half by the the Serb - from 26 per cent leading up to the final, to just 13 per cent as he trailed by a set and a break.
This is where the riddle of the World No. 1 is so hard to solve.
Nishikori will admit it was not one of better matches, but it’s always tough to put a finger on exactly why your “A” game didn’t turn up on the big stage. Djokovic has mastered the art of forcing opponents to play a level or two below their best, while at the same time, discreetly dominating the all-important 0-4 shot rally length.
Outlasting Djokovic is not the answer, as he clearly does not beat himself, and there are not enough points played in extended rallies to accumulate enough to win a match. It’s the first line of attack - the first two shots of a rally for each player - that matter the most. If you can’t win the first four shots against the World No. 1, you may as well grab the ball and hit it into stands.

Rafael Nadal defeated Gael Monfils 7-5, 5-7, 6-0 to win a ninth title at the Monte-Carlo Rolex Masters, dominating the shorter exchanges much more than the extended rallies.
Nadal is widely known as the King of Clay, where longer, grueling rallies dominate the European clay court landscape. But his win over Monfils in Monte-Carlo today was much more about attacking first, and accepting the trophy later. Nadal won 57 per cent of rallies in the zero-to-four shot range; 59 per cent in the five-to-nine shot rally length and just 47 per cent of rallies nine shots or longer. Nadal won the battle of zero-to-four shots 45-34, laying the foundation for a ninth title in the Principality.
The best clay court player of the past decade did not dominate the long exchanges. He actually lost the battle of rallies of nine shots or longer, 26-29. That’s just fine for the 2016 Rafael Nadal. Overall, the Spaniard dominated the shot exchanges up to nine shots, where around 90 per cent of points are played, and he was quite OK with Monfils wining the rest.
Court Position
There is an illusion that Nadal plays much deeper in the court than his opponents, regularly making contact with the ball closer to the back fence than the baseline. It’s simply not true.
In the final against Monfils, Nadal felt the magnetism of the baseline better than his French opponent, making contact inside the baseline 18 per cent of the time, compared to nine per cent for Monfils. Nadal hit 53 per cent of his shots within two metres of the baseline, compared to Monfils' 45 per cent, which enabled the Spaniard to open the court better with superior depth and direction.
A major factor in the final was balls hit very deep in the court, effectively forcing the opponent to make contact more than two metres behind the baseline. You would think Nadal would be the player backing up the most, but he made contact closer to the baseline than Monfils. A major factor in matches like this is court position, because the farther you can push your opponent back, the less he can hurt you.
Forehands vs. Backhands
When Rafa was “Rafa” just a few years ago, he was hitting as many forehands as possible to push the opponent back, and then opening the court with better baseline geometry. This final was another example of the inner workings of the Spanish clay-court master. Overall, Nadal hit forehands 57 per cent of the time compared to 51 per cent for Monfils. In a game of inches, these are the metrics that separate good from great.
Nadal’s spin, on both forehands and backhands, was greater than Monfils, helping the Spaniard commit fewer unforced errors (36 to 51) and push the Frenchman back. Data derived from a Hawkeye analysis showed that Nadal’s average forehand topspin rate (rpm) was a massive 3288rpm, considerably more than Monfils’ 2765 rpm. Nadal also put more work on his backhand, averaging 2583rpm to the Frenchman’s 2136rpm. Monfils hit his forehand harder, averaging 127kph to Nadal’s 121kph, but ultimately the Spaniard landed his forehand inside the lines a lot more.
Return Depth
Monfils won the battle of deep returns, hitting 33 per cent of his returns closer to the baseline than the service line, compared to Nadal’s 19 per cent. But it was the strategy and execution that followed that proved to be the difference for the Spaniard.
Avoiding the Middle
Both players were quick to stretch the opponent out wide, avoiding going down the middle of the court against an opponent who was not going to miss. Nadal hit only 5 per cent of his shots down the middle of the court, targeting Monfils’ backhand 66 per cent of the time and forehand 29 per cent of the time. Monfils hit only 10 per cent of his shots down the middle of the court, focusing 51 per cent of his groundstrokes to Nadal’s backhand and 39 per cent to Nadal’s forehand.
Nine Titles
Nadal’s ninth title in Monte-Carlo was built much more on suffocating defense than anything else. He made Wawrinka snap a racquet over his leg after four games. He also dominated Andy Murray and Monfils in deciding sets. If you simply can’t put a ball away, it makes for a very tough day at the office. The king of clay just put his crown back on his head.

Novak Djokovic has come back from 0/40 on serve to hold just 15 per cent of the time this season leading into the Mutua Madrid Open.

Crunch time against Andy Murray in the Madrid final came right at the finish line, with Djokovic impressively escaping a 0/40 hole whilst serving at 5-3 in the third set to claim a record 29th ATP World Tour Masters 1000 title.

Djokovic miraculously saved seven break points in the 13-minute, 40-second game, which spanned six deuces of pulsating action before finally triumphing 6-2, 3-6, 6-3.

Performance on break points was a strength of the Serb all week, as he was only broken once for the tournament in the semi-finals against Kei Nishikori.

Djokovic consistently elevated his game down break point in the earlier rounds, pushing harder in the important moments to pressure critical errors from his opponents.

Through to the final, Djokovic’s average first serve speed for the tournament was 182 km/h (113 mph) , but that ramped up to 191 km/h (119 mph) when down break point. And just for good measure, he made a first serve on all nine of those break points.

That form initially held true against Murray, with Djokovic making a first serve facing his first break point, leading 6-2, 1-2, 30/40. Murray eventually missed a forehand approach long, and then Djokovic’s form guide on big points was thrown out the window.

Djokovic was broken on the next point when he double faulted. The only other time Djokovic was broken for the match, leading 2-0, 30/40 in the third set, he double faulted again.

Set 1: Spreading the Court

Djokovic won a massive 80 per cent (20/25) of the baseline exchanges in the opening set, owning the directional battle wide on both sides of the court. The Serb directed 47 per cent of his shots in the opening set wide through the Ad court, 48 per cent wide in the Deuce court, and only three shots (five per cent) were directed to the the middle third of court.

This enabled Djokovic to notch up five forehand winners and four backhand winners, while Murray failed to register a single groundstroke winner. Once a rally matured past four shots, Djokovic won a staggering 82 per cent (14/17), including 90 per cent (9/10) in the rally length between five and nine shots. Murray was constantly on defense, running 516 metres in the set to Djokovic’s 488 metres.

Set 2: Depth is the Diamond

Murray turned things around early in the second set, winning five of the first six baseline exchanges in the opening two games.

In the first set, Murray was only able to get 22 per cent of his shots to land closer to the baseline than the service line, mainly due to Djokovic's superior court position and placement.

Murray built a 4-1 lead in the second set by improving his depth, making a substantially higher 42 per cent of his shots land closer to the baseline than the service line.

Murray's second serve performance also drastically improved. He only won 17 per cent in this key area in the first set, but greatly elevated that number to 60 per cent in the second set.

Murray's average second serve speed in the 2015 season was only 141 km/h (88 mph), but it was a substantially higher 155 km/h (96mph) this year in Madrid. In the second set, Murray ramped it up even more to average 159 km/h (99 mph).

Rally Length

It’s interesting to note that a classic clay-court battle between two of the world’s best groundstroke maestros still produced more short points than long ones. More than half of all points (52 per cent) were contested in the 0-4 shot range. Twenty nine per cent were in the 5-9 shot range, and just 19 per cent were longer than nine shots.

Our eyes are naturally drawn to the drama of the longer points, but the top two players in the world wrestle far more over points containing a maximum of just two shots each.

Andy Murray finally dropped the hammer on Novak Djokovic.
On a slow clay court under rainy skies in Rome, Murray dialed up more power, improved his court position, and attacked the net in crucial moments to soundly defeat Novak Djokovic 6-3, 6-3 in the final of International BNL d’Italia.
It was a commanding performance from the Brit, displaying a clear change in his defensive tactics that have only yielded one victory in the last 13 matches against the Serb. In the Madrid final last week, Murray totaled 22 winners in 26 games, losing 6-2, 3-6, 6-3 to Djokovic. In Rome, he hit two more winners (24) in eight less games. The offensive switch was clearly flicked to ‘on” for this gladiatorial battle.
Groundstroke Superiority
Murray hit eight forehand groundstroke winners, with six standing inside the baseline, finishing off the point with commanding court position. Djokovic only had four forehand winners for the match, while committing 22 errors (15 groundstroke / 7 return).
In the Madrid final a week ago, which is more conducive to hitting harder in the higher altitude, Murray’s average groundstroke speed was 106km/h (66mph). With Murray leading 6-2, 1-1 in the Rome final, his average groundstroke speed was ramped up to 114km/h (71mph). It’s important to factor in the Rome final was played in a light rain for a significant period, and right at sea level. Murray’s increased power level was pre-meditated - not the result of his surroundings.
In the opening set, Murray’s increased speed from the back of the court powered him to win a substantial 64 per cent (21/33) of the baseline points, owning the world number one’s typical area of expertise.
Finishing at Net
A direct flow-on factor from Murray’s bigger ground game was the ability to extract shorter balls from Djokovic to finish points at net. Murray only won 38 per cent (5/13) at net in the Madrid final last week, but won a very healthy 76 per cent (13/17) in Rome.
The all-court pressure made the wolves howl in Djokovic’s mind, compounding his problems under foot in the heavy conditions. At all levels of the game, when frustration takes over between the points, it’s basically impossible to navigate your way successfully to the finish line during the point.
Drop Shots
There were 17 drop shots hit in 18 games, with Djokovic winning 56 per cent (5/9) and Murray winning 63 per cent (5/8). It was a smart secondary tactic from both players that was typically employed after a deep groundstroke, that then opened up the front of the court to be exploited.
One Crucial Serve & Volley Point
Djokovic did have a shot to get back into the match, earning a break point early in the second set with Murray serving at 1-2, 30/40. Djokovic split-stepped to cover Murray’s favorite sliding serve down the middle T, but Murray was mentally a step ahead, serving wide to Djokovic’s stronger backhand return with his only serve-and-volley play of the match.
On a huge point, on a damp clay court, Murray pulled out exactly the right surprise tactic with the match in the balance. He knocked off an easy forehand volley winner to stop the Serb in his tracks. It was just one point, but the aggression and timing said plenty about how Murray was taking the result into his own hands.
It also showed a keen understanding of avoiding a baseline exchange at that juncture of the match, as the Serb had won 75 per cent (12/16) of baseline points to date in Set 2.
At Ad Out, Murray mixed back down the middle T with a big sliding first serve that Djokovic returned long. A step ahead in the mind games once again.
Stepping Up on 2nd Serve
Djokovic had another small window of opportunity to get back into the match with Murray serving 4-3, 30-30 in Set 2. Murray missed his first serve, and had lost all seven of his second serve points so far in the set. Throughout Murray’s career, he has typically spun his second serve in around the 140km/h mark (86mph), but on this decisive point, he crushed a 170km/h (105mph) second serve, winning the point three shots later as Djokovic sailed a backhand long.
Big moment. Big serve. Fortune favours the brave Scot.

Brain Game explains how Novak Djokovic overcame an early deficit to win the Roland Garros final
How you hit the ball matters. Where you stand to hit it matters more.
Andy Murray got off to a flying start, but Novak Djokovic finally prevailed 3-6, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4 to win the Roland Garros final Sunday. Murray had an opportunity to go up a set and break with Djokovic serving at Ad out in the first game of the second set, but Murray’s strong magnetism for the baseline suddenly lost its attraction.
On break point, the Brit played three defensive shots, finishing the point standing near the back fence as Djokovic dispatched an easy overhead winner at net. Everything to that point in time was primarily controlled by Murray. Almost everything after that was dominated by Djokovic.
“I did a pretty good job of not giving him free points for the first hour or so, and then I started dropping too far behind the baseline, and he was then able to dictate more of the points,” Murray said. “I needed to be a little bit closer to the baseline for more of the match today, and wasn’t able to do it,” he added.
First Set Firepower
Murray won the opening set with power tennis and targeting Djokovic’s forehand wing, where the Serb committed 14 forehand errors, including nine groundstrokes and five on his return of serve. Murray initially broke Djokovic for a 3-1 lead, crushing a 150km/h (93mph) forehand return winner to surge to a 0/30 advantage in that game. Serving at 3-1 30/15, he unleashed with a 159km/h (99mph) forehand winner to clearly send the message that his primary pattern of play was pure aggression from a commanding court position.
With Murray leading 4-1 in the opening set, his average serve speed was 176 km/h (109mph), compared to Djokovic’s 159 km/h (99 mph). The added power helped Murray run less, as he was averaging 16.67 metres moved per point to Djokovic’s 17.39 metres halfway through the opener.
Rally Length
Even on clay, even between these two baseline giants of our game, the shorter 0-4 shot rally length was still where the majority of points were played in this final. Overall, 52 per cent of points ended in the first four shots, 24 per cent ended in the 5-8 shot range, and an identical 24 per cent lasted nine shots or longer.
Amazingly, their Australian Open final in January on hard court and in Madrid on clay last month both produced exactly 52 per cent of total points in the crucial 0-4 shot rally length. In the Roland Garros final, Djokovic did not have a winning record in any rally length in set one, but dominated in almost all of the rally lengths from the second set onward.

Final Rally Length (tabelka na stronie)

Drop Shots
A combined 29 drop shots were hit for the match between the two players, sometimes coming from the back of the court or following another drop shot. Djokovic won 59 per cent (10/17), while Murray was even more successful, winning 67 per cent (8/12). The goal was to often pull the opponent out of their comfort zone at the back of the court and fatigue him for the ensuing points.
Net versus Baseline
Djokovic and Murray are widely regarded as two of the best baseliners in the world, but they combined to venture to the net 57 times in four sets to feast on the higher win percentage that the front of the court offers.
Djokovic won just 51 per cent (68/133) of his baseline points in the final, but an astounding 79 per cent (26/33) at the net. Murray won just 42 per cent (59/142) from the baseline and 54 per cent (13/24) venturing forward to the net.
Modern clay court tennis is very much about holding the baseline, dominating with first strike aggression and finishing at the net - just like the other surfaces. To no one’s surprise, Djokovic does it all just a little bit better than the rest.

Discover how Andy Murray got the better of Milos Raonic in the Wimbledon final
The return of serve is the least practised shot in our sport. Andy Murray showed the world just how wrong that is, powering to a second Wimbledon title on the back of a masterful return performance against one of the biggest servers in the game.
Murray defeated Milos Raonic 6-4, 7-6(3), 7-6(2), putting return after return back in play to ramp up pressure all over the court. It subsequently forced Raonic to press just a little too much in attempting to end the point early on his terms.
To the final, Raonic enjoyed not having to hit another shot after a serve more than having to hit one, with 51 per cent of all serves unreturned. In the final, against the suffocating defence of Murray, that number was basically chopped in half down to 26 per cent.
Free points dried up in the Sunday London sun, and rallies stretched out far longer than Raonic was comfortable with. The pressure of making returns created the amazing statistic that Raonic’s average rally length on serve actually ended up longer than Murray’s.
On Raonic’s service games to the final, his average rally length was around 2.5 shots, but that blew out to four shots in the final against Murray. The simple yet powerful effect of one more ball in play eventually took its toll.
Murray enjoyed shorter rallies than the Canadian when serving, at only 3.7 shots per point, which was also much shorter than his tournament average of 4.4 shots.
Murray seemed to thrive against the power of the Raonic serve in the final, winning a higher percentage of points against Raonic’s first serve at 33 per cent, than against the second at only 29 per cent.
Raonic’s favourite first serve patterns in both the Deuce and Ad courts was to serve out wide to open holes on the other side of the court to immediately attack.
In the Deuce court, Raonic made 17 first serves out wide, four at the body, and 15 down the middle T. In the Ad court, Raonic made 21 out wide, four at the body, and just 12 down the middle T.
Raonic made 64 per cent of his first serves in the final, which was one per cent higher than the entire tournament average of 63 per cent, but it also equalled his lowest total for the tournament.
Raonic did win a massive 71 per cent of his second serve points, which was tied equal-best with his quarter-final performance against Sam Querrey.
Raonic Serve & Volley
Raonic serve and volleyed on 45 per cent of his first serves, which was much higher the 30 per cent he employed to the final. Clearly, Raonic felt the pressure to end the point early at the front of the court much more than trying to go toe-to-toe with Murray from the back of the court. The other advantage of serve and volley was to capitalise on the constant flow of returns Murray was making, instantly attacking anything that was floating high back to his side of the court.
Raonic won 64 per cent (21/33) of his serve and volley points in the final, which was well below the 76 per cent he had won on the road to the final.
Second Fastest Serve in Tournament History
Raonic hit a 147 miles per hour bomb serving at 4-4, 30/30 in the second set - a point that Murray ultimately won. That delivery tied for the second-fastest serve hit in Wimbledon history, behind Taylor Dent’s 148 m.p.h. serve against Novak Djokovic in the 2010 second round. Raonic aimed the missile at the backhand jam location of Murray. Just like most serves, it came back in play. Raonic then hit a forehand approach to Murray’s backhand, but as Murray had done all day long, he rolled a delicate backhand passing shot cross-court for a winner, setting up break point.
Murray Baseline Control
Murray won 49 per cent (61/125) of his baseline points in the final, while Raonic struggled mightily from the back of the court, only winning 32 per cent (23/73). Too often, Raonic could not hurt Murray with his backhand slice or penetrate the Scot's defence well enough with his run-around forehand.
To illustrate just how tough it is to gain an advantage from the back of the court, Murray finished the tournament only winning 52 per cent (394/764) of his baseline points, while Raonic was a distant 63rd in this strategic category, winning just 44 per cent.
Andy Murray’s second Wimbledon title is a lesson for every junior and aspiring professional around the world. Our sport is going through a cycle where great returning trumps great serving, and if you get good enough at it, Wimbledon glory beckons.

Brain Game explains how Djokovic got the better of Nishikori in the Toronto final
Novak Djokovic owned the start of the point and the back of the court to defeat Kei Nishikori 6-3, 7-5 in the the final of the Rogers Cup in Toronto on Sunday.
Djokovic is a master at figuring out where the key areas of separation exist in a match, and there were numerous battles against Nishikori that finished even, or ones that he lost.
Nishikori won more of the extended rallies of 10+ shots (9-8), hit more overall winners (14-13), and performed better on second serves, winning 56 per cent (9/16) to Djokovic’s 43 per cent (6/14).
But those were secondary elements of this final. You can’t win all the skirmishes around the court, and Djokovic focused his strengths on attacking early, pressuring with direction, and taking time away in the preparation phase of Nishikori’s lethal groundstrokes.
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First Strike Tennis
The length of a point matters a lot in our sport. On hard courts, around 70 per cent of points are played in the 0-4 shot rally length, 20 per cent in the 5-9 shot rally length, and only 10 per cent of points make it 10 shots or longer.
Players that win the 0-4 shot rally length typically win the match more than 90 per cent of the time. Surprisingly, players that win the extended rallies of 10 shots or more (the rallies that look so much like the practice court) have a much lower correlation of winning the match - less than 60 per cent of the time.
True to form, Djokovic won the short rallies up to four shots 36-26, and lost the really long rallies 8-9. Fifty four per cent of total rallies existed in the 0-4 shot range, 31 per cent in the 5-9 shot range, and only 15 per cent of total points went 10 shots or longer.
Djokovic simply reigned supreme in by far the biggest pool of points a tennis match offers (0-4 shots), which is the same at every level of the game.
Baseline Control
Once the point developed into a baseline duel, Djokovic dominated 35-28. The writing was on the wall early, with Djokovic winning baseline points by an 18-10 margin in the opening set. With Djokovic up a set and a break, 6-3, 2-1, he had directed 48 per cent of his forehands to Nishikori’s forehand, 47 per cent to his backhand, and only two rally forehands had landed in the middle third of the court.
Djokovic did not particularly care where he attacked from the back of the court, as long as his court position was superior and he was making Nishikori lean off the ball. This forced Nishikori to “press” with his groundstrokes, often going for a little too much when it wasn’t quite there.
Nishikori narrowly missed time and time again, trying to play offence when Djokovic was dictating that he needed to play defence. Overall, Nishikori committed 17 forehand and 17 backhand errors for the match, a testament to Djokovic’s attacking so evenly with his forehand.
Serve + 1 Forehands
Djokovic’s backhand normally gets all the attention, but right from the start of this match he was looking to upgrade to a forehand as much as possible with his first shot after the serve, sometimes running into the Ad court to do it. Djokovic won 69 per cent (11/16) when he started the point with a serve and a forehand, including eight of ten in the opening set. He only won 50 per cent (9/18) when he started with a serve and a backhand, including just 33 per cent (3/9) in the second set.
Djokovic picks and chooses his battles wisely, and his leverage is not immediately picked up by the naked eye. But a stats sheet lays bare where the World No. 1 creates his separation.

Brain Game explores how Marin Cilic defeated Andy Murray for the Cincinnati title
Marin knew. Andy knew. The crowd even knew, but there was nothing anybody could do to stop Marin Cilic’s wide sliding serve in the deuce court from carving up Andy Murray in the final of the Western and Southern Open on Sunday.
Cilic won 6-4, 7-5, overwhelming Murray with precision serves, power forehands, and a tenacity to keep points short and sweet against the most in-form player on the planet.
Tennis is a game of primary and secondary patterns that are mixed based on the scoreboard and the guessing game of shot location constantly going on inside players’ minds. Primary patterns are the prime movers, run seven or eight times out of ten, while secondary patterns are surprise guerrilla tactics used to confuse the opponent when they get a scent of what’s really happening to them.
Cilic Deuce Court Wide Slider
There was no pattern of play more important for Cilic against Murray than his wide sliding serve in the deuce court. It stretched Murray way off the court to begin the point, creating a huge positioning hole for Cilic to immediately exploit with his forehand.
Murray regularly made contact with his forehand return 6.6 metres (22 feet) from the center of the court, creating an instant hole for Cilic to attack Murray in the vacant ad court, and also behind Murray in the deuce court as the Brit sprinted back hard after the defensive return to stay alive in the point.
Overall, Cilic directed 80 per cent (24/30) of first serves in the deuce court out wide, dining there again and again whenever he needed a point. Of the 24 first serves he hit out wide, he made 15 and won 12.
Of the 12 he won, he served and volleyed four times, highlighting the confidence he had in this specific serve to immediately follow it to the net. Of the other eight points, Murray committed three return errors and Cilic was 5/5 in hitting a forehand as the all-important “Serve +1” groundstroke immediately following the serve. Of those 12, Cilic only played one rally that lasted more than seven shots, showing how much he was able to immediately dictate behind the fearsome delivery. Of the three points Cilic lost behind his wide deuce slider, Murray was on full defence, slicing six of eight shots to barely stay afloat in the point.
At 6-4, 3-3, Murray’s average return speed against Cilic’s first serve was a lowly 48mph. The wide slider in the deuce court had a lot to do with that. Cilic, by comparison, was averaging 64mph with his first serve returns.
Cilic Serve +1 Forehands
Hitting a forehand as the first shot after the serve was also a key tactic for Cilic, completing it 61 per cent (22/36) of the time to stay on top of Murray as the point unfolded. Cilic won 73 per cent (16/22) of his points beginning with a Serve +1 forehand and only 43 per cent (6/14) beginning with a Serve +1 backhand strategy.
With Cilic leading 6-4, 3-4 on serve, his forehand had done a masterful job of pushing Murray further back behind the baseline than the Brit was comfortable with. When Murray defeated Milos Raonic in the semi-finals, Murray made contact with only 16 per cent of his groundstrokes more than two metres behind the baseline, but that more than doubled that to 35 per cent against Cilic after a set and a half of play.
First Four Shots
Cilic imposed his will all over the court, especially when it came to the key metric of rally length. Sixty percent of points in the match were a maximum of four shots. Cilic won this vital battleground 39-34, won the 5-8 shot rallies 22-19 and lost the long rallies of 10 shots or more 5-4.
Dominating the shorter rallies is proven to be a much better indicator of who will win the match than winning the longer rallies. At the 2015 US Open, the match winner won 90 per cent of the 0-4 shot rallies, 66 per cent of the 5-8 shot rallies, and just 56 per cent of the longer rallies that reached double digits.
Cilic looks in ominous form heading into this year’s US Open - a title he won in 2014. When the 6’6” Croatian is in this vein of form, his game is so big and so powerful that he can blow right through opponents with his massive serve and forehand combination.

After slow start, Wawrinka puts on his running shoes to turn the baseline edge in his favour
Stan Wawrinka outhit the best baseliner in the game to capture the 2016 US Open singles title in New York Sunday evening.
Wawrinka backed himself from the back of the court to defeat Novak Djokovic 6-7(1), 6-4, 7-5, 6-3, crushing 17 forehand and 14 backhand winners along the way to capture Grand Slam silverware for the third time in his career.
Coming into the final, Wawrinka actually had a losing record from the baseline, only winning 48 per cent (401/835), while Djokovic was flying high as a tournament leader in this critical category, winning 58 per cent (240/413).
But in the physical final, the Swiss turned Djokovic’s vaunted baseline game into a losing proposition, lowering its success rate by 10 percentage points to a lowly 46.8 per cent. Wawrinka stayed right around his average, winning 47.8 per cent from the back of the court.
To achieve the unlikely advantage from the trenches, Wawrinka had to run more, but that was a small price to pay to ultimately hold the coveted US Open trophy.
Wawrinka ran 4339 metres in the four sets, while Djokovic was only at 4067 metres. Wawrinka averaged running 15.17 metres per point, while Djokovic was slightly lower at 14.22 metres.
It took Wawrinka a while to figure out the best way to attack Djokovic in the constant baseline battles. The Swiss started Set 1 with very deep court position, which didn’t allow him to make Djokovic uncomfortable as his ball landed short, allowing Djokovic to consistently play off the front foot.
Wawrinka only won 35 per cent (16/46) of his baseline points in the opening set, but that improved to 53 per cent (20/38) in Set 2, 51 per cent in Set 3, and a very healthy 54 per cent (20/37) in the fourth and final set.
Wawrinka wore down Djokovic in the longer rallies of 9+ shots in the first three sets, winning them 28-19. This created doubt in Djokovic’s mind that he could go toe-to-toe with the Swiss as the end of the match rushed fast at both players.
In the deciding fourth set, Wawrinka upped the ante in the shorter rallies, winning the 0-4 rally length 18-13, and the 5-8 shot rally length 12-7. It was a masterful strategic adjustment to put Djokovic away earlier in the point before he could find a way back from a two sets to one deficit.
Serve Patterns
Wawrinka served considerably better in the Ad court throughout the match, making 65 per cent (39/52) of his first serves there, compared to only 48 per cent (26/40) in the Deuce court. In keeping with form, he won 75 per cent of his first serve points in the Ad, and only 65 per cent in the Deuce.
Things flipped with second serve performance, as the Swiss won 57 per cent of his second serve points in the Deuce court, and only 43 per cent in the Ad court.
Break Points
Wawrinka saved a critical 14/17 break points for the match, including coming back from 0-40 leading 3-1 in the second set. He also saved three break points in the opening game of the third set. In the fourth set, with Djokovic threatening a comeback from a 3-1 hole, Wawrinka again saved three break points to hold serve.
On break point, Wawrinka made 10-17 first serves, and saved 5/7 behind his second serve.
Summary
Wawrinka’s comeback victory showed tremendous belief to execute a physically demanding strategy, going head on with Djokovic’s favorite baseline game style. The net was a distant secondary tactic for Wawrinka, only winning 11 points on 20 forays forward.
At the end of the night, Wawrinka won just one more point (144-143) than Djokovic, but he ultimately owned the baseline, stood tall on break points, and kept his head clear when a raucous New York crowd primarily showed their support for the World No. 1.
Beating an opponent on the world’s biggest stage at what they do best takes guts, conviction and outstanding execution over almost four hours of tennis. Wawrinka walked into the lions’ den and not only survived, but stole the show.

The relationship between forehands and backhands is very much like a sword and a shield. Generally, you attack with the forehand (sword) and defend with the backhand (shield), all the time looking to battle from more superior court positioning than your opponent.
Andy Murray defeated Roberto Bautista Agut 7-6(1), 6-1 in the final of the Shanghai Rolex Masters by showcasing one of the most impenetrable shields in the sport. Bautista Agut constantly tested the Murray backhand with his own run-around forehand, but time and time again it was not a big enough weapon to inflict any damage.
Bautista Agut’s Spanish style of play relies heavily on run-around forehands in the Ad Court, rifling them back cross court to his right-handed opponent’s backhand, and then looking to open a hole in the vacant deuce court later in the point.
The problem for Bautista Agut is that strategy will work just fine against almost everyone else in the world except Murray, because of the quality of his shield.
With the first set even at 5-5, Murray would win 19 of the next 21 points to dominate the tie-break and surge to a 2-0 lead in the second set. During that period, Bautista Agut hammered away at the Murray backhand, making the Brit hit 37 backhands, and just 28 forehands.
The problem for Bautista Agut is that Murray made 35 backhands in a row before finally committing an error, which contributed to the World No. 2 being broken for 2-1. From 5-5 in the first set to the end of the match, Murray hit 63 backhands, and only committed three errors. Quite simply, the Bautista Agut strategy was constantly faced with the proverbial brick wall when trying to enforce his favourite patterns of play that got him to his first ATP World Tour Masters 1000 final.

Murray hit 60 per cent backhand groundstrokes (excluding returns and volleys), and 40 per cent forehands for the match, which was forced upon him by the Spaniard’s preferred baseline strategy. His backhands committed only 12 errors in 86 shots - or around an error every seven backhands. Murray’s forehand groundstroke, meanwhile, committed 10 errors form 65 shots, which is an error every six-and-a-half forehands.
In the first set, a part of Murray’s strategy was to counter Bautista Agut’s run-around forehand with run-around forehands of his own. In that opening frame, Murray hit 42 per cent of his forehands as a run-around in the Ad court (27 from the Ad Court / 38 from the Deuce Court), but from 5-5, Murray altered his strategy to only hit three run-around forehands in the last two games and the tie-break, while hitting 20 backhands. In the second set, Murray hit 76 per cent of his forehands (31) in the Deuce court, with just 10 being run-around. Basically, the Brit kept it simple, and relied on his trusty shield a lot more.
While the match had many bruising baseline exchanges, Murray created the majority of his separation in the shorter points. He won the rallies in the 0-4 shot range by 14 points (37-23), created a nine-point advantage in the 5-9 shot range (20-11), and narrowly edged the Spaniard in the longer rallies of 9+ shots, 13-12.
Overall, Murray ran less (1623m to 1779m), committed less unforced errors (19-25), and converted every break point he created (4/4). As he ran away with the match in the second set, he made 41 of 44 backhands, offering no point of attack for Bautista Agut’s probing Ad Court baseline tactics.
The main problem for Bautista Agut is that he was having to adapt and modify his style against Murray, rather than the other way around. That’s a hidden benefit for the World No. 2 in having one of the best shields in our game.

Don’t be seduced by the long rallies.
Our eyes are naturally drawn to the drama of matches, the running, the sliding and the spectacular. Andy Murray defeated Kei Nishikori 6-7(9), 6-4, 6-4 in a grueling three hour and twenty minute slug-fest. There were plenty of twists and turns before the World No. 1 finally held serve to love to put the result to bed.
An examination of typical match metrics would have you firmly believing that it was Nishikori who took the honours. Here’s 13 areas where the Japanese star fared better, although some are linked more to stroke performance than match outcome.
Nishikori’s Advantage
1. Hit more overall winners (37-31).
2. Won more points at net (21-15).
3. Made more first serves (64% to 54%).
4. Averaged hitting his forehand harder (75mph to 70mph).
5. Averaged hitting his backhand harder (69mph to 63mph).
6. Hit more forehand winners (23-11).
7. Hit more backhand winners (8-6).
8. Hit more spin on his forehand (2673rpm to 2344rpm).
9. Hit more spin on his backhand (1827rpm to 1625rpm).
10. Ran less (3034m to 3428m).
11. Created more break point opportunities (11-7).
12. Won the 5-9 shot rally length 43-42.
13. Won the 9+ shot rally length 20-12.
Murray's Advantage
1. The 0-4 shot rally length 76-58 (by 18 points).

This is a new metric in our sport that is more directly tied to winning than basically anything else. It was not the only advantage Murray had, but it was the most important. Even though there were a lot of long rallies in the match, and Murray often was forced to dig out impossible shots from a defensive position, the final breakdown of rally length was:
0-4 shot rallies: 54%
5-9 shot rallies: 33%
10+ shot rallies:13%

In all four Grand Slams this year, the 0-4 shot rally length was approximately 70 per cent of rallies. It’s important to note that the Murray-Nishikori match was well below that average at 54 per cent, but it was still the most dominant rally length in the match.
Murray won the bigger pool of points and lost everything else. And that's just fine for the World No. 1.
It’s fast becoming a front-line metric in our sport, with 2016 Grand Slam match winners correspondingly winning more than 90 per cent of the 0-4 shot rallies, but basically breaking even with the players they defeated in the long rallies of 10+ shots.
Murray overwhelmingly won the battle of serves and returns, while Nishikori won the battle of forehands and backhands, including speed, spin and winners. Murray won the front end, while Nishikori won the back end. The front end is simply a bigger pool to swim in.
Murray’s first serve location against Nishikori was very much in alignment with his normal patterns. In the deuce court, he hit 65 per cent of serves out wide, went down the middle T 30 per cent, and hit just two serves (five per cent) at the body. In the ad court, he went 78 per cent down the middle, 19 per cent out wide, and again hit just two serves (three per cent) at the body.
Murray won 48 per cent (30/62) of his second serve points. It doesn’t sound impressive, but it’s a good day at the office any time you can basically break even in this key metric, Nishikori could only manage to win 40 per cent of points (18/44) on second serves, including just 33 per cent (5/15) in the deciding third set.
The numbers illuminate Murray’s focus to dominate the larger pool of short points, while Nishikori’s game shone brightest in the smaller pool or longer points. Simple math will help guide you to who ultimately was the winner.
Evaluating player performance by rally length is new for us all, but it’s something that is clearly tied to winning and helps us make sense of close matches like this one.

The power of a shot does not always equal power over an opponent, as Andy Murray clearly illustrated in his 6-4, 6-2 victory over Stan Wawrinka at the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals on Friday.
Murray won 16 more points (67-51) than his Swiss rival, but when you examine the velocity of the groundstrokes, it appears to be in direct conflict with the final score.
Murray and Wawrinka were not shy trading forehands and backhands from the back of the court, but the more powerful groundstrokes in this encounter were clearly struck by the player who won’t end up playing this weekend.
Wawrinka’s average forehand speed was 77 mph, well ahead of Murray’s 73 mph, with the Swiss hitting 16 forehand winners to just five for the World No. 1. It’s tough to comprehend that the match loser consistently hit the ball harder and crushed more than three times as many forehand winners but only won a third of the games played.
On the backhand side, Wawrinka averaged 68 mph to Murray’s 64 mph, but that jumped to 75 mph to 71 mph once backhand slices were taken out of the data set. Both players managed to hit five backhand winners for the match, showing the evenness of the one-hander versus the two-hander. Wawrinka overall rallied from superior court position, making contact with the ball 22 percent of the time inside the baseline, compared to Murray’s 17 per cent.
So if Murray did not hit the ball as hard or hit as many groundstroke winners or play closer to the baseline, how did he win the match?
He won the new metrics of our sport, not the old ones. Below is a breakdown of where Murray found his superiority, including the “Serve +1” strategy of hitting a forehand as the first shot after his serve. Murray hit a serve and a groundstroke 17 times, with 16 of the groundstrokes being a forehand. He won 15/16 of those points, and the only time he started the point behind a first serve with a backhand, he lost the point.
Murray First Serves
94% “Serve +1” Forehands (won 94%)
6% “Serve +1” Backhands (won 0%)
Murray Second Serves
76% “Serve +1” Forehands (won 62%)
24% “Serve +1” Backhands (won 50%)
Wawrinka also adopted the tactic of looking for a forehand immediately after his serve, and he also had a superior winning percentage when he was able to execute the strategy.
Wawrinka First Serves
77% “Serve +1” Forehands (won 64%)
23% “Serve +1” Backhands (won 43%)
Wawrinka Second Serves
64% “Serve +1” Forehands (won 56%)
36% “Serve +1” Backhands (won 40%)
We are all in awe of Wawrinka’s raking one-handed backhand, but that shot was exactly where Murray attacked first with his return of serve. Murray returned 46 per cent of all returns to the outer third of the ad court, directly at Wawrinka’s backhand wing; 40 per cent right back down the middle; and just 14 per cent to Wawrinka’s more potent forehand wing in the outer third of the deuce court.
Murray dominated rallies that lasted between zero and four shots, winning 56 per cent of them (30/54). He also won more mid-length rallies (between five and nine shots) and extended rallies (10 shots or longer) than Wawrinka.
Murray now moves through to the semi-finals at The O2, where he will play Milos Raonic. The Canadian will hit the ball harder than Murray, but the Scot will put more balls in play. Both will have a thirst for a forehand after a serve. A point here. A point there. Greatness chased everywhere.

Andy Murray moved through to the final of the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals with a scintillating 5-7, 7-6(5), 7-6(9) victory at The O2 on Saturday, and a snapshot of just one point from the third-set tie-break provides an overview of how a broad strategic plan plays out at a critical moment in time.
Third Set Tie-Break 5/5: Murray Serving
For the match, Murray served 72 per cent out wide in the deuce court, 23 per cent down the middle T, and just five per cent at the body. On this huge deuce court point, the Brit stuck with his favorite slice location out wide, even though it was to Raonic’s more potent forehand wing.
The serve offered Murray an excellent chance to follow up the initial blow with a “Serve +1” forehand, which he did. For the match, Murray hit 77 per cent forehands as his first shot after a first serve, and 66 per cent behind a second serve. The serve followed by a forehand is one of our sport’s most influential tactics.
As to script, Murray served out wide and immediately got a forehand after a solid return from Raonic. Murray hit six forehands and two backhands in total for the point, all focused on moving Raonic side to side and keeping him back. Murray constantly tried to keep the tall Canadian as off balance as possible, preventing Raonic from getting squarely set behind the ball and crushing it.

Tennis is very much a cross-court sport, but Murray atypically hit his forehand more down the line in this match than cross-court – 53 per cent down the line, 47 per cent cross-court. Murray wanted to move Raonic, where less balance equals less power, and the errors can flow more freely.
Raonic’s average forehand speed for the match was 75 mph, substantially faster than Murray’s 70 mph. There is a saying in tennis that big shots go to big targets, and Raonic followed that rule well, hitting his forehand 58 per cent of the time cross-court, where the landing area is greater, and 42 per cent down the line.
The average rally length for the match was five shots, with Murray’s main goal to keep Raonic going left and right much as much as possible. Raonic did all he could to counter Murray’s tactics by steadfastly committing to the net, coming in a massive 61 times and winning 67 per cent of those points (41/61).
Raonic made contact with the ball 30 per cent of the time from inside the baseline (Murray, 25 per cent), but 25 per cent of the time, Raonic was deeper than two metres behind the baseline, which was slightly more than Murray’s 23 per cent.
Murray took the honours with the battle of the backhands, but Raonic's backhand was serviceable with a variety of deft slices, driving through the ball and also blocking well on return of serve. Murray’s average backhand speed was 62 mph, slightly ahead of Raonic’s 59 mph. Both players hit 57 per cent of their backhands cross-court and 43 per cent down the line.
A metric that clearly shows Raonic’s improvement from the back of the court was his superiority in the extended rallies of 10 shots or longer, where he held a 16-14 advantage.
At 5/5 in the tie-break, Raonic missed his last forehand down the line, and he missed a similar forehand on match point to lose the match. Both shots were born of smart strategy of matching up a forehand approach against a backhand pass. They just needed slightly better execution.

Scot was relentless in attacking Djokovic's backhand side in London

Andy Murray broke the unbreakable.
Murray defeated Novak Djokovic 6-3, 6-4 in the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals title match to become the year-end No. 1 player in the Emirates ATP Rankings by attacking the Serbian’s normally impenetrable backhand.
All discussions after the semi-finals focused on possible exhaustion for the Brit after his marathon victory over Milos Raonic and Djokovic’s impressive demolition of Kei Nishikori. It took just a handful of minutes on Sunday night to clearly see both of those results would have no bearing on the final.
This match was Murray’s from the beginning. He looked sharper, hungrier, and more willing to reach out and grab his destiny rather than hope it was going to be given to him. “There was no serious chance for me to win today’s match,” Djokovic said post-match. “From the very beginning we could see that. He was just better all in all.”
With Murray returning leading 4-3 on serve in the opening set, Djokovic committed a routine backhand error at 15/0 that seemed very uncharacteristic from the former World No. 1. The Serbian was off balance, falling backwards, which immediately started the alarm bells ringing, signaling a critical break of serve was imminent. At 15/15, Djokovic started the rally with two forehands, but Murray then made him hit three consecutive backhands, with Djokovic sailing the third one long.
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At deuce, Djokovic put a neutral rally backhand groundstroke into the net. On break point, Murray double downed on attacking the vulnerable Djokovic wing, making the Serbian hit eight consecutive backhands, with the last one finding its way into the net as Murray approached with an aggressive forehand. Break. The Scottish horse was bolting.
With Murray serving at 5-3, 40/15 in the opening set, it was once again a Djokovic backhand that found the net to end the point, and end the set. Overall for the match, Djokovic’s backhand contributed just three winners, while committing 17 unforced errors. Murray hit 54 per cent of his shots to Djokovic’s backhand side, relentlessly trying to break it down.
Murray’s quality groundstrokes also forced Djokovic more onto his back foot in the final than the World No. 2 is used to. In round-robin play, and in the semi-final against Nishikori, Djokovic made contact with 78 per cent of his backhands behind the baseline. That margin slightly deteriorated against Murray, with 82 per cent of Djokovic's backhands hit from behind the baseline.
“I just played very poorly, made a lot of unforced errors from the backhand side,” Djokovic said post-match. “It just wasn’t my day.”
The average rally length in Murray’s semi-final victory against Raonic was just five shots, but that was extended to seven shots against Djokovic in the final. Unfortunately for the Belgrade native, those longer rallies all too often ended in a backhand error.
Leading into the final, Djokovic averaged just seven backhand unforced errors in each match, but that skyrocketed to 17 against Murray. Once Murray found a crack in Djokovic’s armour, he turned it into a crevice.
Overall in the final, Murray played better than we have seen this week, and Djokovic played worse. You have got to give credit to the Brit for both ends of that equation.

The length of a rally tells you a lot about the personality and mindset of the player controlling it.
Roger Federer defeated Stan Wawrinka 6-4, 7-5 in the final of the BNP Paribas Open on Sunday by owning a very important slice of the match that most resembles the moves and countermoves of playing chess – the mid-length rallies of five to nine shots.
Shorter rallies are all about striking first with the serve and return. Long rallies are all about patience and wearing your opponent down, both physically and mentally. Mid-length rallies are a thinking man’s game. This is where shot combinations come into play, and where Federer clearly gained the ascendancy in the match.
2017 Indian Wells Final - Rally Length Points Won
0-4 Shots
• Wawrinka 38
• Federer 37
5-9 Shots
• Wawrinka 16
• Federer 30
10+ Shots
• Wawrinka 2
• Federer 4
Federer was a step ahead in the final when rallies required just three, four or sometimes a fifth shot hit by either player. These points are dominated by combinations, like a chess player making a move for the sole reason of forcing their opponent to counter with a move that is slightly less advantageous.
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Federer dominated the mid-length rallies 30-16, often times playing deep first to extract a short ball, and then manoeuvring to the net to finish with a precision volley. In the opening set, Federer finally broke Wawrinka leading 5-4, converting the only break point seen by either player.
The scoreboard appeared close early on, but Federer’s dominant 12-4 first-set advantage in the mid-length rallies gave him the hidden advantage of momentum.
Federer Serve +1 Forehands
The beginning of Federer's mid-length dominance was often set up with a serve that was immediately followed by a forehand. Overall, Federer hit a serve +1 forehand 67 per cent (24/33) of the time in the final, winning a higher percentage with this strategy than starting with a backhand as his first shot after the serve.
Serve +1 Winning Percentage
• Serve +1 Forehand = 16/24 (67%)
• Serve +1 Backhand = 5/9 (56%)
When Federer landed his first serve, he hit 82 per cent (14/17) serve +1 forehands, winning 57 per cent (8/14) of them. He won two of three starting with a backhand. When Federer started the point with a second serve, he won an extremely high 80 per cent (8/10) beginning the point with a serve +1 forehand, and broke even on the backhand wing, winning three of six.
Attacking The Net
Overall, Federer came to the net 22 times in the match, winning a very healthy 82 per cent. It was vintage Federer swarming forward, finishing with six backhand volley winners, three forehand volley winners, and two overhead winners.
Points Won At Net
• Approach & Volley = 13/15 (87%)
• Serve + Volley = 5/7 (71%)
The net was quite often the finishing point for Federer's mid-length rally points, building with a serve +1 forehand combination, and then ending with a spectacular volley, or forcing a passing shot error from Wawrinka.
Baseline
Federer's backhand stole the show at Indian Wells in the second week with impressive victories over Steve Johnson, Rafael Nadal and Jack Sock, and it was once again a strong performer in the final with eight winners, and only eight unforced errors.
But it was Federer's forehand, with 12 winners and just six unforced errors, that paved the way to victory against Wawrinka. Wawrinka averaged hitting his groundstrokes harder in the final, averaging 120km/h to Federer's 108km/h, but Federer ultimately proved superior building the point.
This is the first time Federer has won Indian Wells without dropping a set. Amazingly, he may never have hit his backhand as well as he did in the desert this week. Federer is not simply regaining his previous best form. At 35 years old, he is blazing a trail to a completely new level.

Never compromise what makes you great.
Roger Federer defeated Rafael Nadal 6-3, 6-4 in a close Miami Open presented by Itau final, with Federer's forehand serving as the difference maker. Nadal's forehand, on the other hand, failed to have its usual impact in the match, primarily because he was not as committed to hitting it as much as he normally is – especially as the first shot after the serve.
With Federer winning their past three matches, it's understandable that Nadal was looking for variations and creases to his normal strategy. It’s smart to look for counter moves, offer different looks and to try to rattle the cage in Federer's mind. But ultimately, Nadal adjusted too far and strategically lost his way. His forehand got lost in the shuffle.
Nadal normally hits a forehand around 80 per cent of the time after his serve and wins approximately 65 per cent of those points. It's without question the engine room.
But in this final, Nadal hit forehands as his first shot after the serve exactly 50 per cent (22/44) of the time, drastically down from his career average. It may be as low as he has ever been in this strategic area on such a big stage.
Nadal Serve +1
• Serve +1 forehands = 50% (22/44)
• Serve +1 forehand win percentage = 55% (12/22)
• Serve +1 backhand win percentage = 41% (9/22)
As you would expect, Nadal won a higher percentage of Serve +1 forehands (55 per cent to 41 per cent). The last time Nadal defeated Federer was in the semi-final of the 2014 Australian Open. In that match, Nadal hit 73 per cent (45/62) Serve +1 forehands, winning a dominant 69 per cent (31/45) of those points. It’s that important, and then some.
Nadal is normally locked onto hitting Serve +1 forehands. For example, when he defeated Stan Wawrinka 6-3, 6-2 in the 2015 ATP Finals, Nadal hit a Serve +1 forehand 89 per cent of the time (33/37).
The Spaniard normally loves to blast forehands through Federer's backhand. But the 2017 version of Federer's backhand is like nothing Nadal has ever seen, and in the process of adjusting to it, other parts of Nadal's game have suffered. Federer, on the other hand, dictated throughout the Miami final with his Serve +1 strategy, hitting a forehand after the serve 82 per cent of the time.

Federer Serve +1
• Serve +1 forehands = 82% (32/39)
• Serve + 1 forehand win percentage = 63% (20/32)
• Serve +1 backhand win percentage = 71% (5/7)
Federer got to play in his comfort zone, racking up 19 forehand winners to Nadal's eight.
Serve Location
Nadal also went with secondary serve patterns much more than usual. It used to feel like Nadal directed 100 per cent of his serves at Federer's backhand, but in this match Federer actually hit more forehand returns (34) than backhands (26).
Of the 26 backhand returns Federer hit, he came over 24 of them, only slicing two because of the quality of Nadal's delivery. Federer's backhand return found Nadal's Serve +1 backhand eight times, while 14 went to the forehand, and four were return errors. Federer's new and improved backhand return is clearly wrecking havoc with Nadal's Serve +1 forehand intentions.
Federer stuck with his typical serve patterns, making Nadal hit 68 per cent (38/56) backhand returns for the match. In the deuce court, Nadal typically serves down the middle against Federer, but the Spaniard landed only five serves there, winning two of those points. By comparison, Nadal made 12 first serves out wide to Federer's forehand, winning just 50 per cent (6/12).
In the ad court, Nadal won a healthy 80 per cent (8/10) of his first serves out wide. The left-hander won 53 per cent (9/17) serving at the body in the deuce court and 67 per cent (8/12) in the ad court.
With Nadal serving at 3-4, 30/40 in the second set, with the match squarely on the line, he hit an 89 mph second serve at Federer's backhand. The Swiss stepped into the court and hit a backhand return down the line to Nadal's backhand. Nadal missed four Serve +1 backhands for the match, including this one, and Federer would serve the match out in the following game.
Nadal will ultimately look back at the four break points he didn't convert in the opening set as key moments that could have led to victory. One thing is for certain. Nadal must get back to doing what makes him so great against Federer. Nadal's forehand has more to do with the lopsided 23-14 scoreline he owns in their FedEx ATP Head2Head rivalry than basically everything else combined.

All he does is win.
Rafael Nadal defeated Dominic Thiem 7-6(8), 6-4 in the Mutua Madrid Open final, moving to 15-0 on clay this season, with every aspect of his game operating like a well-oiled machine. Nadal's dominance was felt all over the court, but the following five areas were where he specifically created his separation.
Long Rallies
Overall, Nadal won nine more points than Thiem for the match (88 to 79). The Spaniard more than accounted for that margin just in the longer rallies of 10 shots or more, winning 12 more points (20-8) than Thiem in this specific area.
The long rallies also served the purpose of fatiguing Thiem both physically and mentally, especially after such a grueling opening set that included 96 points. Fifty six per cent of total points for the match were played in the “First Strike” zero-to-four rally length, with Thiem having the slight edge, 46-44.
Thiem also won the mid-length rally length of five to nine shots, 22-21, but it was the 17 per cent of total points in the “Extended Rallies” of greater than nine shots where Nadal crafted his edge.
Backhand
Nadal's backhand typically takes on the role of a defensive shield from the back of the court, yielding as few mistakes as possible, while his forehand dictates much more. But against Thiem, Nadal hit eight backhand winners, often times from spectacular defensive positions.
At 6/6 in the first set tie-break, Nadal ignited the Spanish crowd with an almost impossible short angle backhand winner from deep outside the doubles alley that landed in the cross-court service box.

Serve & Volley
Nadal served and volleyed three times in the match, winning all three points at critical stages. All of them were out wide first serves in the Ad court, catching Thiem standing way back in his comfort zone, very deep behind the baseline to return. Serving and volleying on clay, against a returner who sets up extremely deep, is a very clever play to instantly change the dynamic of the point.
Nadal did it first at 4-4, 30/15 in the opening set, with Thiem's backhand return not making it over the net. The next time was at 0-1, 30/15 in the second set, with another backhand return error made from deep behind the baseline.
The final time was in the last game of the match, with Nadal serving down break point at 5-4, 30/40. The return floated wide, and Nadal safely moved back to deuce. Thiem also served and volleyed five times in the match, winning three.
Drop Shots
Nadal hit nine drop shots for the match, winning six of them. He primarily used the drop shot when he saw Thiem camped out well behind the baseline, taking advantage of the Austrian's deep court position by suddenly going short. Five of the six points Nadal won with the drop shot were clean winners, all struck from either right on the baseline or slightly inside.
Drop shots are very much a secondary pattern of play. But for Nadal, they cleverly complement his deep, heavy groundstrokes by providing another part of the court the opponent has to respect.
Serve +1 Forehands
Both players were fervently looking to hit a forehand as the first shot after the serve, maintaining as much offense as possible to begin the point.
Total Serve +1 Forehands
• Nadal 74% (45/61)
• Thiem 87% (48/55)
Nadal won 58 per cent (26/45) when he started the point with a Serve +1 forehand, and 69 per cent (11/16) when he started the point with a Serve +1 backhand combination. Thiem won 54 per cent (26/48) of the points that started with a Serve +1 forehand, and 57 per cent (4/7) beginning with a Serve +1 backhand.
The three big advantages of hitting a forehand over a backhand as the first shot after the serve: 1) upgrade to a more powerful groundstroke; 2) be better able to attack all parts of the court; and 3) to disguise the shot better with the open stance, robbing the opponent of precious tenths of seconds to anticipate where the ball is going.
Thiem started the match more aggressively and led 3-2 with a break, mainly due to his pounding forehand. After the first five games, Thiem's average forehand speed was faster than Nadal's (137kmh to 124kmh), and he even had more spin on the ball as well (3507rpm to 3417rpm). The average forehand speed slowed as the match progressed, with Thiem averaging 126kmh to 114kmh for Nadal.
Nadal’s game ticked every possible box today at the Magic Box.

Alexander Zverev's serve and forehand steal the limelight, but don't be fooled: It's his backhand that carries more of the workload, and is relied upon the most to elevate him up the Emirates ATP Rankings.
Twenty-year-old Zverev defeated Novak Djokovic 6-4, 6-3 in the final of the Internazionali BNL d’Italia on Sunday, shaking up the pecking order in the tennis world and surging into the Top 10 along the way.
Zverev's serve was impressive in the final. He hit seven aces, winning 84 per cent (27/32) of first serve points and 69 per cent (9/13) of second serve points. He didn't face a single break point for the match. The German's forehand was also strong with five winners, including a 161kmh (100mph) inside-out winner with Djokovic serving at 2-4, 15/0, in the first set. It was a scorcher and a clear show of strength from the back of the court.
And then there was his backhand. For most players, this specific shot is typically a defensive weapon (like Rafael Nadal's), or a consistent stroke that rarely misses (like Andy Murray).
Consider Zverev's backhand numbers from the final:
Backhand Winners
• Zverev 3
• Djokovic 1
Backhand Errors
• Zverev 7
• Djokovic 21
Zverev's backhand was basically three times as good as Djokovic's when you compare winners and errors. Zverev's backhand is stunningly simple, loading the racquet head above the wrists early in the backswing, and then rotating quickly into contact with a clean, circular motion that generates extreme power.
In the head-to-head backhand battle, Zverev's backhand owned the day over Djokovic's on Campo Centrale. An analysis of what shot forced Djokovic's 21 backhand errors gives further weight to the dominance of Zverev on this side.
Djokovic's 21 Backhand Errors
• 14 came from a Zverev backhand
• 7 came from a Zverev forehand
Zverev's backhand is so good that, certainly from an analytical standpoint, it could easily be mistaken for another forehand in disguise. Leading into the Rome final, Zverev averaged hitting his topspin forehand at 125 kmh (78mph). His backhand was almost identical, at 123 kmh (76mph). Normally there is around a 13kmh (8mph) difference in forehand and backhand speed among the Top 10 players, but not so with Zverev.
Djokovic said post-match that he wasn't able to get any rhythm on his returns, which was certainly seen in Zverev's return speeds coming in much faster than his opponent’s.
Average Return Speeds
1st Serve Return Speed
• Zverev 121kmh (75mph)
• Djokovic 95kmh (59mph)
2nd Serve Return Speed
• Zverev 133kmh (83mph)
• Djokovic 112kmh (70mph)
The power, depth and direction of Zverev's returns and groundstrokes constantly had Djokovic on defense in the rally. Zverev has been widely discussed as a star of the future, but the future, evidently, is today.

It was 22 minutes of mayhem.
The match lasted two hours and five minutes, but the torturous time the ball was in play was just 21 minutes and 59 seconds. It must have felt like an eternity for Stan Wawrinka.
Rafael Nadal defeated Wawrinka 6-2, 6-3, 6-1 on Sunday afternoon at Roland Garros. From 2-2 in the first set, it was basically game over.
Overall, Nadal won 94 points to 57 (62%). The average point duration for the match was just eight seconds. Eight seconds of side-to-side, lactic acid domination. Eight seconds of Nadal running Wawrinka to whatever arrondissement of Paris he wanted him to go.
Wawrinka is so dangerous when he gets to step into a ball, but he spent the majority of the 22 minutes out wide on the edges of the court, playing defense against the best clay courter of all time.
Has Nadal ever played a better match than he did this afternoon in Paris? Maybe. Maybe not.
More: Nadal Reflects On 'Perfect' Roland Garros
Forehands
The most influential shot on the court was Nadal’s forehand. He only hit 14 forehand winners, but that was three more than Wawrinka’s 11. When Wawrinka defeated Novak Djokovic to win the Roland Garros title in 2015, Wawrinka crushed 60 total winners. Today he could not even manage a third of that (19). Wawrinka hit 26 forehand winners against Djokovic, but just 11 against Nadal.
The flow of rallies constantly saw Nadal hitting deep, aggressive forehands, while Wawrinka was on defense out wide on the edges of the court. Wawrinka made 20 forced errors on his forehand side and 17 unforced. Wawrinka essentially played the entire match on his back foot.
Backhands
The Nadal backhand was rock solid. He hit five backhand winners, but committed only 14 total backhand errors. Both of those metrics trumped Wawrinka, who managed just three winners on the backhand wing while committing a substantial 28 backhand errors. The Spaniard measured incredible range off the backhand wing, consistently going cross-court to make Wawrinka have to hit defensive forehands on the run.
Serving
When serving in the Deuce court, Nadal won a mind-blowing 91 per cent (20/22) of his first-serve points. On second serve, he won 67 per cent (8/12). That never happens.
Nadal faced only one break point for the match, at 1-1, 30/40 in the first set. As expected, Nadal served out wide in the Ad court, but Wawrinka missed a backhand return wide and long. Nadal then hit a 189kmh ace out wide in the Deuce court, and won the following point off a Wawrinka missed forehand return.
Overall for the tournament, Nadal won 72 per cent of his first-serve points, and a mind-blowing 74 per cent of his second-serve points. The Spaniard won 65 per cent (15-23) of his second serve points against Wawrinka.
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Baseline
Nadal won an impressive 60 per cent (370/618) of his baseline points for the tournament, and a lights-out 65 per cent (58/89) against Wawrinka in the final. The primary tactic was to force Wawrinka to hit defensive backhands in Ad court exchanges. Nadal then made the Swiss star hit defensive forehands out wide.
Wawrinka hardly stepped into a ball all afternoon. You’ve got to give Nadal all the credit for creating that dynamic.
Summary
Nadal was +19 in the 0-4 shot rally length, +12 in the 5-8 shot rally length, and just +6 in the 9+ shot rally length. Nadal owned the short points, and won a ridiculously high 90 per cent (18/20) of his points at net. He also never served a double fault.
This is the new version of Rafael Nadal that had the fingerprints of new coach, Carlos Moya, all over it. Rafa didn’t grind. He didn’t wait. He was always on the front foot and always looking to make Wawrinka uncomfortable.
This match was also vintage Toni Nadal. You don’t win 10 Roland Garros titles without an extremely knowledgeable mentor. When it was all said and done, it was Uncle Toni who handed Rafa the trophy. Perfect symmetry for La Decima.

Alexander Zverev put the writing on the wall early. Then he blew the wall over.
Zverev powered to a 6-3, 6-4 victory against Roger Federer in the final of the Coupe Rogers in Montreal Sunday with a stunning display of power tennis that constantly had the Swiss star under immense baseline pressure.
Zverev hit through Federer on the quicker Canadian court, upping his power level right from the beginning of the match to force forehand and backhand errors and capture the all-important first break of serve. When Zverev broke for 3-1 in the opening set, it proved to be a pivotal moment that Federer never recovered from.
Zverev's forehand was the battering ram. He was averaging hitting his topspin, driving weapon at 119km/h (68mph) coming into the final, but he ramped it up an extra 12 per cent to 133km/h (83mph) through the first 23 points of the match. He came out guns blazing.
Federer was trailing 1-2, 15/30, on serve at the time, and got back to 30/30 with an ace down the middle in the Ad court. At 30/30, Zverev crushed two consecutive backhands to force a forehand error from Federer out wide, with the Swiss simply unable to match the power level of his younger opponent. Zverev averaged hitting his topspin backhand at 121 km/h (75mph) before the final, but was already at 124 km/h (77mph) before he cracked those two gems.

Federer missed his first serve at 30/40, and Zverev unloaded with a huge forehand in the middle of the rally before finally forcing a Federer backhand passing shot wide for the break. Zverev quickly held to 15, and his 4-1 lead proved ominous, and indeed, insurmountable.
Zverev's relentless forehand power continued through the first set, crushing six of his 10 winners from that wing. The match produced several one-sided stats, but none more than the average groundstroke speed in the opening set.
Set 1 - Average Groundstroke Speed
• Zverev 118km/h (73mph)
• Federer 100km/h (62mph)
Zverev averaged hitting his groundstrokes a significant 18 per cent harder than Federer, making the Swiss have to often half-volley, slice, and stretch out wide to stay in the point. Zverev's average groundstroke speed dropped a touch by the end of the match, but Federer was never able to up his power level to pressure the 20-year-old German.
Full Match - Average Groundstroke Speed
• Zverev 115km/h (72mph)
• Federer (100km/h (62mph)
All of that firepower helped Zverev finish with 20 total winners, including nine from the forehand side, and five from the backhand. As Zverev has made his impressive run to the Top 10 of the Emirates ATP Rankings, his backhand has been the more reliable shot, while his big forehand has taken a little more time to consistently find the court. That box can well and truly be checked now.
Rally Length
The beginning of the point in the final was a fertile time for Zverev to ramp up the power with his serve and the ensuing Serve +1 bruising groundstrokes. Overall, almost three out of four points (74 per cent) in the final saw both player hit just two shots in the court, with only five rallies reaching double figures.
Length Of Rally
• 0-4 shots = 74% (83)
• 5-9 shots = 21% (24)
• 10+ shots = 5% (5)
Zverev's game style is built around crushing the ball first, and seeing where the dust settles later on. What's interesting is that while Zverev played most of the match on the front foot, both players ran almost exactly the same distance. Zverev ran 867 metres, while Federer ran just two more at 869 metres.
The small holes in Zverev's game are rapidly closing. He did miss several short, low, awkward balls when Federer pulled him forward in the court, and was sometimes too ambitious on defence playing down the line with offence.
Those outliers will soon be dismissed from his game, leaving opponents with a well groomed 6'6” power baseliner to wrestle with. The coming of Alexander Zverev is now in full force.