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There were nine break points played, and Roger Federer won them all.

Federer dialed in a perfect game plan, especially in the important moments, to defeat Novak Djokovic 6-3, 7-5 in the final of the Dubai Duty Free Tennis Championships.

Federer attacked in all ways possible, keeping points short, and robbing the World No. 1 of the rhythm and stroke-building patterns he thrives on. This was one of those matches that looked even, but every time a point rolled around at a critical juncture, Federer was unstoppable.

Behind his incredibly accurate serve, there was no hole that was unescapable for the Swiss star. Three times in the match he fell behind 15/40 while serving, and three times he held with conviction.

Federer faced seven break points for the match, and because of his formidable serve never had to hit a backhand from the baseline in any of them. This was a critical, hidden aspect of the final, because of the 10 times he started the point with a “Serve + 1” backhand combo, he only won one of them. Federer made five of seven first serves on break points, hit one ace, had three serves unreturned, and found his way as soon as possible to the net on the other three points. The plan was clear and unrelenting. Federer sought short points with no backhands. Djokovic craved longer points with a plethora of backhands.

The Swiss star mixed a high degree of offensive skill with a little lady luck, hitting a forehand volley winner, down 4-5, 15/40, in the second set that skidded right through the back of the baseline. Another inch or two, and this match was going to a third set.

Federer was an offensive juggernaut, which has proven to be a perfect counter-move to cause chaos to the Serb’s baseline lockdown tactics. Federer served and volleyed 16 times for the match, winning 83 per cent (10/12) of first serves, but only 25 per cent (1/4) of second serves - still probably better than trading backhands through the Ad Court.

Federer’s first serve was humming, making 64 per cent, and winning 80 per cent (41/51), mainly targeted at Djokovic’s forehand return. The Serb hit 62 per cent (24/39) forehand returns off first serves for the match, only winning six of them, and fared even worse off his more favored backhand wing, only winning three of 15.

Federer’s favourite spot to serve in the deuce court was a slider out wide to Djokovic’s forehand, where he attempted 20, made 15 and won 12, including a slow 105mph ace at 4-5, deuce, in the second set. To hit a first serve that slow, on such a big point, highlighted the poise and confidence that carried him to victory.

Federer targeted Djokovic’s forehand return in the Ad Court, attempting 22 first serves down the middle, making 14 and winning 10. His secondary pattern was out wide, where he attempted 13, made 10 and won nine. It was the perfect ratio to win the critical guessing game of serve location against the best returner in the world.

Making first serves helped Federer primarily hit a forehand as the first shot after the serve. He won 54 per cent (14/26) with this forehand “Serve + 1” play, but only one of 10 with a backhand.

Federer showed his cards in his opening service game, coming to the net four out of the five points, including three serving and volleying. Yes, it was going to be one of “those days.”

Federer’s goal was to take the baseline rallying out of the equation. The quicker court in Dubai allowed for that, and the extra speed Federer was putting on his groundstrokes made them tough for the Serb to successfully redirect.

Federer crushed an 89mph forehand approach winner at 3-2, 15/15 in the first set and also ripped two consecutive backhand down the line winners at 3-3 in the second set that registered at a bruising 90mph and 86mph. If there was going to be a point, it was typically going to be at full throttle.

But Federer also used a lack of power to perfection as well. With Djokovic serving at 3-4, 30-30 in the opening set, Federer deliberately hit a low, slow, short backhand slice to buy enough time to run around the next shot in the ad court and crush a dominating forehand. Federer hit the same type of backhand slice as a return on the next point that Djokovic sailed long. Federer won both points to break serve.

Coming forward is about making a statement and asking a question. Federer, once again, is the man with all the answers.

Novak Djokovic did his homework.

The Serb made three key adjustments that turned the tables, and secured a 6-3, 6-7(5), 6-2 victory over Roger Federer in the final of the BNP Paribas Open.

Djokovic had lost their last two hardcourt matches in Dubai and Shanghai in straight sets, and had not come up with a successful counter plan until now to Federer’s marauding net play that had reignited the Swiss star’s career.

Djokovic’s clever tactics serving and pummeling more forehands contributed to staying ahead in the guessing game of shot location, which paid dividends when the big points inevitably rolled around.

First Serve Variety

Djokovic started the match winning 19/19 of first serves made, directing 12 at Federer’s backhand and seven at the forehand, including two aces down the middle in the Ad Court. This smart, unbeaten mix lasted to until 0-1, 30-30 in the second set, and helped reduce exposure to his second serve, where he had only won 33 per cent (3/9) to that point.

Being unpredictable with the location saw Federer commit 10 returns errors during this dominant run. Djokovic fell behind 0-30 at 2-2 in the opening set, but made four consecutive first serves to establish early dominance. Serving at 5-3 in the opening set, three of his four first serves were unreturned to clinch a commanding first set.

Djokovic also mixed his serve pace to give Federer something else to think about. Serving at 2-1, 15-40, in the second set, Djokovic made two first serves with very different intent. At 15-40, he hit a 128 mph bomb down the middle that was unreturned. At 30-40, the Serb hit an off-pace 91 mph kicker out wide that enabled a forehand winner on the very next shot. Crisis averted.

Second Serves To the Forehand

One of Federer’s favourite ambush plays against Djokovic is to chip and charge with a backhand off a second serve in the deuce court. Federer won five of six points immediately attacking in this match, but the damage could have been far greater had Djokovic stuck to his predictable locations. In their last meeting in Dubai, which Federer won 6-3, 7-5, Djokovic only hit one second serve out wide to the forehand in the deuce court for the match. It happened on his very first point serving, and Federer netted the return. Amazingly, Djokovic forgot to go there again.

In yesterday’s match, Djokovic wisely served six second serves wide in the deuce court, winning four of them. Federer made all six returns, but he was not able to immediately approach off any of them. Djokovic also served five second serves down the T in the Ad court, winning three. Federer did successfully approach off one, Djokovic hit a sneaky second serve ace, but he also committed a costly double fault leading 5-4 in the second set tiebreaker.

Djokovic hit five double faults for the match, but when he did get his second serve in, he won a staggering 60 per cent (21/35), compared to Federer’s 39 per cent (15/38) when making his second serve. The success can directly be attributed to mix.

Attack the Forehand

Djokovic hit only three forehand groundstroke winners from the baseline in their last match in Dubai that were not passing shots or easy put-aways inside the service box. With Federer expecting Djokovic to be attacking his backhand, Djokovic changed gears and hit nine of his eleven forehand winners back through the deuce court towards Federer’s forehand. Attacking Federer’s forehand was a masterful move, as the Swiss notched up a costly 37 forehand groundstroke errors for the match, as well as 10 forehand return errors.

Pressure Release

Lastly, Djokovic had to weather the inevitable storm that Federer routinely throws at him. When Djokovic lost serve leading 2-0 in the third set, he took it out on his racquet, but in a lot of ways it was a timely release of pressure that had mainly surfaced from hitting three double faults in the second set tiebreaker. Djokovic would run away with the third set soon after, winning 12 of the last 15 points of the match. Emotions that are bottled up can often times be more damaging than releasing them.

Djokovic has now won the last nine ATP World Tour Masters 1000 finals he has played, and this is one of his smartest and sweetest.

Some tennis tactics bear immediate fruit, while others can take a couple of hours to develop before they have an obvious influence on a match.

Novak Djokovic is a master at initially attacking with his potent strokes, while at the same time going to work on the legs and lungs of his opponent.

This was exactly how the Miami Open final played out, with Djokovic finally overcoming a spirited Andy Murray 7-6(3), 4-6, 6-0 in a brutal battle of attrition that has become the ruthless calling card of the World No. 1.

Djokovic and Murray suffered for just over two hours in splitting the first two sets, but while things looked even on the scoreboard, Murray’s gas tank abruptly hit empty. The physical nature of being stretched so wide, so often, quickly took over as the dominant theme, and delivered a decisive victory to the Serb.

Break Down the Backhand

Murray’s backhand started strong, hitting four winners and only making 11 errors in a lengthy first set, which extended to a tie-break. It also stood tall in the second set, making just eight errors in 10 games to be the driving force behind taking the match to three sets. But with an exhausted set of legs to stand on in the third, the Brit committed 13 backhand errors in just six games as the match quickly slipped away. Murray committed a total of 32 backhand errors, which was many more than the 18 he made in defeating Djokovic in three sets in their 2013 Wimbledon final.

Murray made 17 backhand errors standing around the middle of the court, and 15 being pulled out wide around the Ad Court alley. Djokovic also attacked Murray’s forehand out wide as well, where the Brit committed 11 of his 19 forehand errors standing closer to the singles line than the center line.

Murray Attacked Early

In the opening set, Murray displayed a greater commitment to attack Djokovic than normal, twice breaking the Serb at 1-1 and 3-3, only to be broken straight back each time. Djokovic defeated Murray 6-2, 6-3 in the semi-finals of Indian Wells a couple of weeks ago, where Murray played too passively, only making contact with the ball 13 percent inside the baseline for the match. But in the opening set in Miami, Murray more than doubled that to 30 percent, playing up the court as much as possible.

On the second point of the match, Murray immediately approached off a second serve forehand return, and although he lost the point, the signal was sent – Murray was coming after Djokovic this time. A couple of points later at 30-30, the Brit crushed an 85 mph return winner off a second serve and was in full attack mode.

Murray would hit a return approach three more times for the match, winning all three, leaving you wondering how different the match might have been if Murray had been fully committed to the Federer-esque tactic, running it 10-15 times for the match. There is no better way to shorten a return point, preserve leg stamina, and add pressure to an aggressive baseliner than regularly mixing in coming forward off a second-serve return.

Murray Approaching

Murray was swarming the net early in the match, coming forward six times in the opening three games, which helped get the break of serve for 2-1. Leading into the Miami final, Murray was winning 77 percent of his approach points, but could only manage 48 percent (12/25) against Djokovic. Importantly, he only won 20 percent (1/5) in the second set, which he won, showing he was grinding far more at the back of the court, depleting his energy reserves to level the score at a set all.

The position of the sun for the early afternoon final was a real problem for both players, affecting their toss on their serve, particularly in the opening two sets. The sun, pressure, and fatigue also played havoc with overheads in the match, as both players combined for four winners, but committed six costly errors.

Just like this year’s Australian Open final against Murray, Djokovic won the deciding set to love by turning the match into an exhaustive physical encounter.

Novak Djokovic successfully dismantled the world’s best run-around forehand in defeating Rafael Nadal 6-3, 6-3 in the semi-finals of the Monte Carlo Rolex Masters.

Djokovic consistently dominated baseline rallies by attacking Nadal’s forehand wide in the ad court and then making the Spaniard hit as many backhands as possible in the deuce court.

Djokovic is able to manipulate Nadal like no other from the trenches, primarily because of the strength of his own backhand. It’s an offensive cross court weapon, that catches Nadal sneaking to his right, seeking a run-around forehand, and then doubles as a re-direction nightmare down the line, making Nadal have to hit a plethora of neutral backhands in the deuce court.

For those two reasons alone, Djokovic’s backhand is Nadal’s kryptonite.
Attack the Forehand Wide
Nadal’s forehand was the worst-performing groundstroke on the court, hitting seven winners, but racking up 22 errors. Sixteen of the 22 forehand errors were committed standing in the Ad Court, with nine of them standing out wide near the alley or past it. It’s the perfect strategy against an opponent like Nadal, who is always sneaking to his right to try and upgrade a backhand to a forehand.

By initially hitting wide to the forehand, he was cleverly using Nadal’s anticipation against him. Of the seven forehand winners Nadal struck, five had unusual endings around the service box, or a reflex shot from an overhead. Nadal only had two forehand winners for the entire match constructed the way he typically builds points from the back of the court.
Beat Down the Backhand
Djokovic made Nadal hit 42 per cent of total groundstrokes as a backhand, which is a very high number for the Spaniard. The simple fact is that Djokovic’s backhand directs traffic much better from the back of the court than Nadal’s. Three of Nadal’s four backhand winners came from passing shot situations, with his lone baseline winner being a crushing cross court shot at 3-3, 15-0, in the second set. Nadal’s backhand only made nine groundstroke errors, so it’s not that it was too inconsistent – it’s just that it did not make Djokovic uncomfortable with power, direction or depth.

In the opening set, Djokovic made Nadal hit 51 backhands, mainly by redirecting his own backhand down the line. Djokovic hit 56 per cent of his backhands down the line to Nadal’s backhand in set one, after already taking Nadal wide to the ad court to hit a sliding, defensive forehand. Not only did the direction hurt Nadal, but Djokovic hit with excellent depth, landing 40 per cent of his total backhands in the opening set closer to the baseline than the service line.

Djokovic stepped this tactic up even more as the match progressed, making Nadal hit 61 backhands in the second set, compared to only 52 forehands in the ad court. The Serb continually developed a stranglehold on the flow of points from the back of the court, pushing Nadal wider and deeper as patterns of play unfolded.
Remove the Run-Around Forehand
This is the most potent weapon Nadal possesses, and the engine room of his clay-court greatness. But by initially running Nadal wide to his forehand in the ad court, he has now got too far to run to turn the ensuing deuce court ball into a forehand. In the opening set, Nadal only hit 22 (30 per cent) run-around forehands in the deuce court to 51 backhands.

Things were even worse in the second set, where he only managed 20 run-around forehands (25 per cent) to 61 backhands. He ended with two winners and six errors with the run-around forehand strategy, so it’s not hard to figure what needs to drastically improve next time they play.

On match point, Djokovic owned the baseline with one forehand and four bruising backhands, the last a cross-court missile to seal the match. Nadal failed to find an offensive strategy to hurt Djokovic, or play good enough defence to force the Serb to over-hit.

Novak Djokovic wasn’t at his best Sunday in the Monte-Carlo Rolex Masters final, but a lot of that had to do with the improved strategy of the man standing on the other side of the net.

Djokovic prevailed 7-5, 4-6, 6-3 over Tomas Berdych by being a little better at key moments - winning just two more points (106 to 104) over two hours and 42 minutes.

Berdych played smart, using his power baseline game to plough through the Djokovic forehand, and then follow it to the net at every opportunity. It was exactly the right way to upset the Serb. The problem was sustaining the winning patterns for long enough periods of time, and also dealing with Djokovic shaking them off and enforcing his own will.

Rush The Forehand
Berdych’s prolific talent often allows him to do whatever he wants to secure victory, but not against the World No. 1. Berdych’s heavy forehand is an ideal weapon to rush Djokovic’s forehand, and that proved a key tactic to the Czech staying in the match.

In the opening set, Berdych overplayed Djokovic’s impenetrable backhand, hitting 62 per cent of his groundstrokes through the ad court at Djokovic’s more consistent wing. But when he broke Djokovic in the ninth game to level the score at 5-5, he hit 67 per cent of his shots through the deuce court in that game, attacking Djokovic’s forehand.

The exact same dynamic occurred in the second set, with Berdych directing 66 per cent of his groundstrokes through the ad court before the rain delay, to trail 2-3. But the Czech clearly changed gears when play resumed 72 minutes later, hitting 51 per cent to Djokovic’s forehand for the rest of the set, which helped him win four of the next five games to force a decider.

Djokovic had only made four forehand errors in the second set before the rain delay, and made six after it, including sailing a forehand long off his back foot on set point to extend the match to a third set.

Djokovic Mines Berdych’s Forehand
Both players’ backhands essentially cancelled out each other in the match with very similar performances. Berdych hit seven backhand winners to the Serb’s six, including five down the line that were all part of the overall strategy of attacking Djokovic’s forehand.

Just as Berdych went after Djokovic’s forehand, Djokovic attempted to do the same. Berdych’s forehand was wild at times, producing 38 errors (Djokovic 25), including 26 unforced, and an unusually high 16 errors in the net.

Djokovic tried to stretch Berdych as wide as possible in the deuce court, trying to exploit the big man’s movement. Twenty seven of the Czech’s 38 forehand errors occurred in the deuce court, with 15 of them stretched wide near the alley, as Djokovic used direction as his primary weapon. Djokovic ultimately won 79 baseline points to the Czech’s 56, as he feasted on Berdych’s misfiring forehand.

Finishing At Net
Berdych complimented his aggressive baseline strategy with timely advances to the net, winning an impressive 69 per cent (22/32) of all points coming forward. It is a masterly addition to his game, as he typically does not show that kind of commitment to finish at the net. Djokovic, on the other hand, seemed to lose his way forward, winning four of six points at the net. Berdych finished with five forehand volley winners, a backhand volley winner, and six overhead winners. This is an obvious area of domination for him, as his size, wingspan, and heavy approach shot make him so tough to pass.

Djokovic Drop Shots
Djokovic extensively went to the drop shot in his last two matches, primarily hitting a backhand up the line, as it offers excellent last-minute disguise, as he gets to change the angle of the racket behind his back. He won 46 per cent (6/13) against Berdych, and 55 per cent (5/9) against Nadal in the semi-final. It’s not often you see a player hit 22 drop shots in two matches, and with only winning exactly 50 per cent of them, it will be interesting to see if he persists with this classic surprise strategy for the rest of the clay court season.

Positives
Both Djokovic and Berdych will walk away from this match focused on what went well for them. For Djokovic, it was the ability to play less than his best, and still figure out a way to get over the finish line. For Berdych, it was all about figuring out the right strategy, and seeing it work for extended periods against the best player in the world.

In the important moments that decide matches and create legends, the ability to make your opponent uncomfortable reigns supreme.

Novak Djokovic defeated Roger Federer 6-4, 6-3 in the Internazionali BNL d’Italia final by mauling Federer’s slice backhand at the most pivotal moment of the match - 4-4 in the opening set.

Federer’s solitary break point opportunity came at 4-4, Ad Out, where he committed a slice backhand error down the line at the end of a 20-shot rally. Back at deuce, Federer hit two short slice backhands and Djokovic dispatched a routine forehand winner. On game point, Federer committed another slice backhand return error off a first serve.

With the match squarely in the balance, Federer’s last eight shots of the game, spanning three points, were all backhands. Federer hit seven of the eight as a defensive slice, and two of them crucially missed their mark.

It was the pressure of Djokovic’s smothering baseline game that was the dominant factor more than anything Federer did technically or tactically wrong. Saving the break point enabled the Serb to squarely grasp the momentum, and break Federer in the next game to secure the opening set.

While winners and unforced errors are always calculated on a stat sheet, it’s the forced errors that matters the most, offering a repeatable pathway to secure victory at all levels of the game.

Baseline Control
A key factor in Djokovic’s dominance this year is his relentless control of the baseline. At 3-3 in the opening set, Djokovic had won 14 of the first 20 baseline points, providing Federer very little opportunity from the back of the court. At 6-4, 3-0, Djokovic had won a staggering 30 baseline points to only 12 for the Swiss.

The depth of Djokovic’s groundstrokes was a key factor, with a healthy 39 per cent of his shots landing closer to the baseline than the service line in the opening set. Djokovic was clearly directing traffic to Federer’s backhand in the first set, hitting 69 per cent of all balls to the backhand that landed past the service line.

With Djokovic controlling the directional flow of rallies from the baseline, he only committed 10 unforced errors for the match, giving Federer no hope to extract easy points. With Federer defending with so many backhands, Djokovic’s forehand reaped the benefit with 10 forehand winners, to Federer’s six.

Djokovic also mixed in five drop shots, winning four of them, keeping Federer off balance by pushing him back with deep groundstrokes, and then throwing in perfectly disguised drop shots at key moments.

Djokovic Serve Placement
Djokovic clearly won the guessing game of first serve placement, constantly mixing it up to keep Federer from gaining a first strike advantage. Djokovic served 17 first serves to Federer’s forehand, with the Swiss only managing to win two. Djokovic also directed 15 first serves at Federer’s backhand wing, where he could only win three.

On second serves, Djokovic hit almost three out of four (11/15) to Federer’s backhand return, winning an extremely high 66 per cent of second serve points. Djokovic hit a forehand as his first shot after the serve 12 times, winning nine, and a backhand as the first shot 18 times, winning 12.

First Strike Dominance
Federer correctly tried to keep points as short as possible, with 65 per cent of points consisting of four shots or less, 30 per cent between five and nine shots, and only eight per cent making it to at least 10 shots.

Today’s clay court tactics feature far less grinding, and a lot more attacking than the past. Djokovic had a winning advantage in all three rally lengths, winning the short points 41-34, medium 22-13, and rallies over 10 shots, seven to two. Federer won 67 per cent (8/12) serving and volleying and 65 per cent (13/20) approaching, but losing so many of the baseline exchanges proved too big of a hurdle to overcome.

Djokovic now has his sights squarely set on adding Roland Garros silverware to his collection. By winning Monte-Carlo, and now Rome, his clay court game is perfectly tuned to achieve ultimate glory in Paris.

Novak Djokovic has defeated Rafael Nadal 7-5, 6-3, 6-1 in one of the most highly anticipated quarter-finals in Grand Slam history.

Djokovic is fighting to complete the career Grand Slam with a Roland Garros crown, while Nadal was looking to claim an unprecedented 10th trophy on the Parisian clay. The Serb registered his first victory over Nadal in seven encounters in Paris.

Novak vs. Rafa: The Rivalry

Djokovic and Nadal have met a record 44 times in their FedEx ATP Head2Head rivalry, so once again there were no secrets. It was their first battle in a quarter-final since the 2007 Internazionali BNL d'Italia.

The patterns were evident for both players. For Nadal, maintaining a high first serve percentage to take pressure off his second serve and prevent Djokovic from establishing a rhythm on return is essential. He was looking to hurt Djokovic in rallies by attacking cross-court with his forehand, while the Belgrade native was hoping to neutralise Nadal's trademark heavy topspin shot with his superior backhand. It's a game of cat and mouse between two of the game's biggest superstars.

With a berth in the semi-finals on the line opposite Andy Murray or David Ferrer, here is how the clash of titans unfolded:

SET 1 - Djokovic 7-5
Djokovic got off to a roaring start on a beautiful Wednesday afternoon in Paris, capturing eight of the first nine points to snag an early break of serve. In their most recent meeting in Rome, Djokovic dominated baseline rallies by pummeling Nadal's forehand with backhand approaches. The Spaniard is uncomfortable defending with his forehand and his Serbian opponent would consistently force errors from that wing with his great depth and pace in hitting to the ad court.

The World No. 1 would extend his lead with a second break for 4-0, but Nadal refused to let him run away with the set, grabbing a break back in the next game. A sublime running backhand pass down the line at 30/30 gave the nine-time champ his first break point, which he converted.

The great champions of the ATP World Tour adapt to conditions and find ways to alter their opponent's momentum. In a sudden turn, Nadal would do just that, countering Djokovic's backhand power with hammering backhands of his own. Another strong return game saw him pull level for 3-4 on his fourth break chance.

The margins were razor thin with both players fighting to control every inch of the baseline. Serving down 4-5, Nadal would save a first set point with a deep first serve and a second with a drop shot that caught Djokovic off guard. He'd stave off a third set point with another perfectly-timed drop shot after a gripping baseline exchange.

Nadal saw off another pair of set points two games later, as an overhead smash skipped over the tape and a service winner denied a fifth opportunity. But Djokovic would capitalise on his sixth chance, taking the opener after 67 minutes.

SET 2 - Djokovic 6-3
The winner of the first set has gone on to claim 11 of the last 13 meetings and Djokovic was looking to build on 77 per cent first serve points won and 19 total winners.

Both players were cruising through their service games until the eighth game when the top seed used his agility to create favourable angles for his forehand and suddenly snatched a break for 5-3. Nadal is 14-2 against Djokovic when winning at least 50 per cent of second serve points, but the Spaniard was victimised by 43 per cent won.

Djokovic was dominant on his own serve in the second set, claiming 16 of 18 straight service points, before eventually taking a two-set lead. A sublime half volley drop shot off a rifled Nadal return would give the Serb a fourth set point and he would take it, putting his Spanish opponent in a two-set hole for the first time on clay in his career.

SET 3 - Djokovic 6-1
Two significant streaks were in play on Wednesday. Nadal was bidding to extend his winning run at Roland Garros to 40 straight and Djokovic was hoping to improve his overall streak in 2015 to 27 in a row.

As the third set commenced, the top-ranked Serb flipped the switch to cruise control. A break of serve in the opening game would give him added momentum and a second break would give Djokovic a stranglehold on the set and the match. He would grab a 4-0 lead when a forehand clipped the tape and dropped onto Nadal's side of the court.

Djokovic would secure victory in two hours and 26 minutes after Nadal struck a double fault on his first match point. He hit 31 winners, converted on 4 of 11 break points and won 70 per cent of net points.

Eighth seed Stan Wawrinka beat Jo-Wilfried Tsonga 6-3, 6-7(1), 7-6(3), 6-4 to reach his second Grand Slam final at Roland Garros in blistering conditions on Friday in Paris.

With temperatures on court reaching 100 degrees Fahrenheit, Wawrinka overcame home favourite Tsonga in three hours and 46 minutes on Court Philippe Chatrier, saving 16 of the 17 break points that he faced.

The Swiss will face either World No. 1 Novak Djokovic or Andy Murray in Sunday’s final as he bids to win his second major title, adding to victory at the 2014 Australian Open (d. Nadal).

Read: Wawrinka Ousts Tsonga

Read how the match unfolded:

Set 1
It was Tsonga who made the better start as he came out firing on Court Philippe Chatrier, but the Frenchman could not convert any of his three break points in the opening game and was ultimately made to rue his missed opportunities. Having led 40/0 in the fourth game, Tsonga was pegged back by Wawrinka and lost his serve on the Swiss’ second break point as Wawrinka nailed a pinpoint accurate backhand down the line.

Brilliance from Tsonga on a forehand return in the seventh game inspired him to reel off three straight points from 30/0 on Wawrinka’s serve to earn a break back point. But the Swiss afforded Tsonga no opportunity to take it with a rifling inside-out forehand winner. It would be Tsonga’s last chance as Wawrinka went on to seal the opener in 35 minutes.

Set 2
Tsonga had won just 29 per cent of his second serve points in the first set and found himself once again under pressure from Wawrinka at the start of the second set. The Frenchman fended off two break points, but after a telling second-serve return from Wawrinka on the third chance, he buried a forehand in the net to drop his serve in the opening game.

Tsonga did not let his head go down though. After pushing Wawrinka in the sixth game – the Swiss holding from 0/30 – Tsonga got his breakthrough in the eighth game. Two double faults put Wawrinka in trouble at 30/40 and the Swiss went wide with a forehand as Tsonga levelled at 4-4.

Wawrinka almost recouped the break in the 11th game, but Tsonga called on all his resources to save five break points and ultimately force a tie-break. Somewhat dispirited at not getting the breakthrough, Wawrinka’s level dropped in the tie-break and Tsonga pounced, winning it 7-1 to level the match after 63 minutes.

Set 3
It was Tsonga who had all the chances in the third set, but Wawrinka who ultimately won the big points. The Frenchman was denied on six break points in total, two in the first game, two in the third game and two in the ninth game as Wawrinka fought to hold on, while also requiring medical attention for blisters on his right hand.

After forcing a tie-break, Wawrinka took charge. The Lausanne native reeled off four straight points from 3-3, wreaking havoc with his famed backhand to claim the clutch third set in 72 minutes.

Set 4
With Tsonga hungover from the disappointment of the third set, Wawrinka pounced at the start of the fourth set, capitalising on a lacklustre game from the Frenchman to break to love.

Tsonga threw everything he had at Wawrinka in the fourth game in a bid to break back, but was denied on four break points as the Swiss hung on to his advantage. Tsonga fended off four break points himself in the seventh game to stay alive in the contest, but the partisan crowd could not lift the home favourite to another comeback and Wawrinka served out the match with a hold to 15 in the 10th game. The Swiss hit 60 winners to 48 unforced errors.

Brain Game breaks down how Novak Djokovic defeated Roger Federer in the Wimbledon final, with insight from coach Boris Becker
One more ball.
That was the foundation on which Novak Djokovic, and coach, Boris Becker, built a masterful game plan to win the Serb’s third Wimbledon title Sunday.
Djokovic defeated Roger Federer 7-6(1), 6-7(10), 6-4, 6-3, primarily by extending rallies, and making Federer bend to his own baseline intentions, much more than the opposite way.
There were several moments in time where the match could have swung either way, but the overall body of work was far more controlled by the Serb, and that greatly helped when push came to shove.
Federer played more baseline points in the final (126) than any other match, averaging 32 per set - six more per set than against Andy Murray in the semi-finals.
It was exactly the plan that super-coach, Boris Becker, had put into place.
“Obviously we knew that Roger is going to go all power, he is not going to wait, and go for slow baseline rallies,” Becker said post-match. “He started the way he finished with Murray, very aggressive, not giving Novak any time, any rhythm.”
“There was not much between them in the first two sets, but as the match went on I had a good feeling. I felt that eventually Novak would get hold of Roger’s serve, get him into baseline rallies, take advantage of his younger legs, and that was the difference.”
Federer averaged winning 52 per cent of his baseline points going into this year’s final, but that number was hammered down to 40 per cent by Djokovic’s superior baseline arsenal. Ironically, those were the exact same losing numbers for Federer at the 2014 Championships. It was simply a matter of hitting copy / paste 12 months later for the Serb.
While Federer’s groundstrokes had sparkled against Murray, they mainly misfired against Djokovic.
In the final, Djokovic won the battle of short rallies of 0-4 shots long 103-94, lost the medium length rallies of 5-9 shots 27-34, and dominated extended rallies of nine shots or more 18-10. Federer didn’t play that many extended rallies in his first three rounds combined.
Djokovic Forehand
Djokovic’s forehand was extremely impressive in the final, hitting 17 winners to Federer’s 15, while only committing seven (Federer 17) unforced errors. Djokovic hit it harder and flatter than normal against Federer’s primary baseline weapon.
“There was no option,” Becker said. “If you don’t hit it you lose anyway. Go through the ball, be aggressive, go head-to-head with Roger, or you are going to lose.”
“At the French Open he (Novak) played too tentative, he wanted Stan (Wawrinka) to miss the balls, but you are not going to win a Grand Slam final by waiting for the other guy to miss.”
“Novak was ready to go five hours, and I think it showed,” Becker added.
Second Serves
The other key battle ground that Djokovic dominated in similar fashion to their 2014 final was second serves. In successive finals, Djokovic’s second serve winning per centage remained a strength, while Federer’s got significantly worse.
Djokovic won 60 per cent of his second serves in today’s final and 65 per cent last year at SW19 against Federer. The Swiss, seven-time champion had won 66 per cent of his second serve points the past two weeks, but could only muster 49 per cent in the final. Last year, those numbers also massively dropped from 62 per cent to 44 per cent.
Becker scouted Federer’s impressive semi-final victory over Murray from the Royal Box on Centre Court, and saw specific areas for Djokovic to attack in the final.
“Wimbledon finals are not won in the semi-final,” Becker knowingly pointed out.
“Roger peaked in the semi-final. He could not have played better, but I have seen Andy Murray play better as well. Of course, you get carried away with the legend, Roger has won it seven times, but I felt if Novak could get hold of the return, get Roger involved in the baseline rallies, just the extra point all the time, eventually he was going to wear him down.”
Federer Attacking
Federer served and volleyed on 22 per cent (21/94) of his first serve points, and 25 per cent (11/44) on seconds serves, overall winning a healthy 72 per cent (23/32). He was also solid with net points won, winning 73 per cent (42/58) at the front of the court. But it should have happened even more, as Djokovic was able to get Federer into 126 baseline exchanges, that made Federer’s pathway forward less clear, and blunted his overall aggression.
What Federer needed was more attacking than normal against Djokovic, but he was not unwavering with the tactic.
Overall, Djokovic served magnificently, returned hard and deep, and took advantage of the small windows of opportunity that presented themselves better than Federer.
Djokovic knew Federer was not going to miss on the first couple of shots in a rally, but he a made a point of repeatedly asking the question on the third shot, or the fifth, or the seventh.
One more ball created one more opportunity to miss, and delivered one more title on the world’s biggest stage.

Learn how Andy Murray broke an eight-match losing streak against Novak Djokovic to capture the Rogers Cup title in Montreal.
The Scot was defiant. Andy Murray faced nine break points against Novak Djokovic in the deciding third set of their Rogers Cup final, and brilliantly saved six with unreturned serves, and three with courageous forays to the net. Djokovic never had a sniff.
Murray defeated Djokovic 6-4, 4-6, 6-3 to win a third Canadian title, with one the best tactical matches of his career. He hit the ball harder, held the baseline, came forward in key moments, and served brilliantly in the clutch to snap an eight-match losing streak against the World No. 1.
It was a strategic upgrade all around. Murray evolved out of his typically neutralising comfort zone to reap the benefits of attacking first, and especially shortening the point.
Bigger Groundstrokes
Murray got off to a brilliant start to lead 4-1 in the opening set, by thumping heavy groundstrokes, particularly cross court off his backhand wing. Murray’s average groundstroke speed for the tournament was 64 miles per hour (mph) coming into the Montreal final, but that was ramped up to 69mph in the opening five games.
Djokovic was repeatedly pushed onto his back foot by the early power, hitting 23 per cent of his groundstrokes at least six feet behind the baseline in the first five games, compared to nine per cent in next four games. That’s exactly the desired effect of Murray’s improved power and depth.
By 4-2 in the opening set, Murray had won 20 baseline points to the Serb’s 10, cracking five backhand winners in the opening set to Djokovic’s two.
The average rally length in the opening two sets was only five shots long, which was night and day compared to the opening two sets of their 2015 Australian Open final. In Melbourne, the first two sets produced 57 extended rallies of 10-plus shots. In the first two sets in Montreal, there were only 15. Murray’s shift in tactics was definitely the root cause of that.
Plan B = the Net
With Djokovic losing the back court battle, the Serb countered by coming forward much more than we are used to seeing from him. Surprisingly, he ended the point standing at the net 25 times in the opening set, only winning 12 of them.
Murray had successfully pushed the world’s best baseliner off the baseline.
Djokovic ended up winning 56 per cent (27/48) of all points coming forward for the match, while Murray was far more efficient, winning 68 per cent (21/31) at the net. Murray used the front of the court to finish points, while Djokovic used it more to escape the barrage from the back.
Set 3 Aggression
Murray saved his first break point in his opening service game of the third set with an unreturned first serve out wide in the Ad Court. Murray had lost the first eight points of the second set, and it would have spelt disaster to fall behind an early break in the third.
Then he simply took charge.
Returning at 0-1, Deuce, Murray hit a brilliant forehand return approach off a second serve right down the middle of the court, giving Djokovic no angle to pass with. Approaching down the middle of the court is highly underrated, and the passing shot went wide into the alley, chasing direction that really doesn’t exist.
On the next point at Ad Out, Murray crushed a trademark backhand cross court and followed it to the net for an easy volley winner for the break.
He wasn’t waiting for the finish line to come and find him this time around.
The 3-1 game in the third set was the most important hold of the match for Murray, with the game lasting 10 deuces and almost 18 minutes long. He saved five break points in that crucial game, four with unreturned serves and one with a backhand volley winner.
Murray’s masterful tactics were orchestrated by Jonas Bjorkman, who was court-side, and fellow-coach Amelie Mauresmo, who had given birth to a baby boy, just a few hours earlier. “This one’s for her,” Murray said post-match.
It was an inspiring victory all around – one Murray should consistently analyze to cement in his mind that the key ingredients of power, court-position and finishing forward are all critical for him to be holding hardware on any given Sunday.
Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game. Read more at www.braingametennis.com.

Discover the tactics that led to Roger Federer's title-clinching victory in the Cincinnati final
The return approach is making a dazzling return to prominence.
Roger Federer defeated Novak Djokovic 7-6(1), 6-3 in the final of the Western & Southern Open, with this rarely used tactic being the centerpiece of Federer’s audacious, swarming game plan.
Federer approached directly off a second serve 11 times for the match, winning seven, with some coming as ultra-aggressive half-volleys that required a global double-take. Just when you thought you had seen it all, Federer irreverently wrote a new chapter of what’s possible when returning serve.
Some return approaches were so extreme, it seemed like the ball had barely bounced in the service box before the Swiss star had charged forward to take it as early as possible on the rise. Federer said he recently practised the half-volley returns as a joke, but saw that it worked and tested it throughout the tournament with eye-raising success. The quicker courts in Cincinnati were the perfect place for Federer to reinvent himself once again.
Federer primarily used the tactic in the opening set, coming forward eight times, and winning five. A hidden benefit of the aggressive return tactic is that it completely robs the server of time to prepare for the first shot after the serve. There is no better time in tennis to rush a groundstroke than right after a serve, as there is a lot more organisation required of the hands and feet following a service motion to then hit a groundstroke.
In Djokovic’s first five service games of the opening set, Federer hit 14 returns standing within approximately six feet of the service line. That’s simply unheard of. The ball had barely bounced and Federer was pouncing on it, rebounding it quickly back to Djokovic to avoid a baseline exchange, and showcase his net prowess.
Of the seven return approaches Federer won, he only had to hit a volley one time. Djokovic netted four passing shots, sailed one long, and also double faulted from the pressure of Federer’s forward movement. Of the four points Federer lost with the tactic, he only missed the return once, put a forehand volley in the net, was passed once, and was successfully lobbed – a spectacular, deft shot that Djokovic had to hit perfectly to win the point.
At 3-3 in the opening set, Federer really dialed in with the tactic, hitting a return approach four straight times, winning three of them. He didn’t break, but the pressure had just found a whole new level. When serving, Federer can typically control the flow of traffic in the point, and easily find his way to the net to finish. But with this new commitment to the return approach, he has effectively created a whole new way to get to the net in the much tougher scenario when the opponent is serving.
Short points make for long careers. Djokovic won 11 of the first 16 baseline points of the match, so immediately coming forward off a return replaced a losing percentage from the back of the court, with a winning one from the front.
The accumulated pressure of the eight return approaches in the opening set paid huge dividends at the beginning of the second set in the Serb’s opening service game. After serving an ace to lead 15/0, Djokovic had to hit four consecutive second serves - and double faulted on three of them - to hand Federer the only break in the entire match. Federer won 13 of the first 15 points of the second set, frustrating Djokovic as a stream of quick points flowed in his favor.
Federer’s marauding net play constantly unsettled the Serb, as the Swiss won 74 per cent (20/27) of all approach points coming forward, and 80 per cent (4/5) when serve-and-volleying. Federer did not have his serve broken once all tournament and did not face a break point in the final against the World No. 1.
With Federer leading 7-6, 4-1, his offensive court position was amazing - hitting 48 per cent of shots for the tournament to date standing inside the baseline and 52 per cent behind it. Only eight per cent of Federer’s shots for the entire week were hit standing more than two metres (6.5 feet) behind the baseline.
Federer has once again evolved to deliver the perfect counter to Djokovic’s suffocating baseline tactics that so successfully shrink the court. The net may seem old school, but it’s the new black at the pinnacle of our sport.
Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game.

What you want to do, and what you can do against Novak Djokovic are two completely different things.

Djokovic defeated Roger Federer 6-4, 5-7, 6-4, 6-4 to capture his second US Open title, only winning two more points in the match (147 to 145), but winning almost all the critical moments.

Djokovic saved a colossal 19 of 23 break points, constantly repelling Federer when both players were desperately trying to put their hands on the trophy.

Federer’s 23 break points came in 11 service games, and importantly included 11 on Djokovic’s second serve. Federer only converted one of 11 on Djokovic’s second serve, which just happened to be the only time Federer finished at the net on one of these crucial moments - at 2-5, 30/40 in the fourth set, finishing with a touch backhand volley winner.

Those second serve break point opportunities were where the match ultimately turned, and history was made. Normally throughout Federer’s career, this is where he created his legacy, but not on this rain-delayed evening in New York City.

Overall on second serve break points, Federer missed three returns, hit 29 backhands and only 20 forehands, and only ended at the net once. They were the perfect moments for the SABR (Sneaky Attack By Roger) strategy, where Federer has recently hit a half-volley return and immediately approached, but the conviction to attack was not forthcoming. Djokovic started with second serves, but finished by forcing nine errors, hitting one winner, and Federer hitting just the solitary winner at net.

Federer’s Forehand Misfired
Federer’s forehand predictably had the most winners from the back of the court with 18 (Djokovic 15), but it amassed 56 total errors to only 37 from Djokovic. The Serb constantly stayed patient, extending the rally, where he had a dominant 27-12 winning advantage in rallies of nine shots or more. Djokovic’s superb defensive skills kept shrinking the court, making Federer’s forehand seek smaller targets, only to over-hit.

Djokovic Owned The Baseline
Djokovic was happy to settle into baseline exchanges, not really getting hurt by Federer’s groundstrokes. Djokovic’s main goal was to keep the ball deep to stop Federer attacking the net, and to target the Federer backhand, which committed 41 total errors. Overall Djokovic won 52 per cent (88/170) of baseline points, which was considerably lower than his tournament average of 57 per cent leading into the final. But as usual, he made his opponent perform a lot worse on the other side of the net. Federer had won 56 per cent of his baseline points through the first six rounds, but that was reduced to a lowly 38 per cent of points won in the final.

Djokovic’s Superior Serve
Djokovic targeted Federer’s backhand with first serves, making the Swiss hit 36 backhand returns and 27 forehand returns in the deuce court, and 35 backhands and 21 forehands in the Ad court. Djokovic’s serve performed better in the Deuce, making 67 per cent of first serves to 57 per cent in the Ad court. Djokovic won 60 per cent of first serves in the deuce court and 72 per cent in the Ad court.

In the fourth set, Djokovic served bigger and bolder to close out the match. His fastest average first serve speed in the fourth set was 116 miles per hour (m.p.h.), the fastest of any set, while he averaged 91 m.p.h. on second serves. In the deciding set, Djokovic had 26 per cent of his serves unreturned, which was around 10 percentage points better than the second and third sets.

Djokovic once again was able to bring a superior level while making his opponent bend to his own game style.
Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game. Read more at www.braingametennis.com.

Is it more important to hit the ball where you want to hit it, or more important to hit it where your opponent does not want it?

That was the puzzle Andy Murray could not solve, as Novak Djokovic rolled to a 6-2, 6-4 victory in the final of the BNP Paribas Masters. What works so well for Murray against everyone else in the world is controlling the ad court with his rock-solid backhand, and then opening up angles to attack.

But not against Djokovic. Not even close.

Murray is the second best baseliner in the world in today’s game, but the gap between Djokovic and the rest of the field only seems to be getting wider. In the opening set, Djokovic completely controlled the back of the court, winning 69 per cent (27/39) of baseline points. Overall, the Serb won 67 per cent (47/70) of baseline points for the match, which is a massive advantage that allows the rest of his game to flow freely.

Djokovic’s real advantage came in mid-length rallies of five to nine shots where he stole the show, winning 68 per cent (28/41) of points, as both players tried to force their baseline patterns on the opponent. Murray actually won the longer rallies over nine shots (10-8), but with so few rallies getting this far, it simply wasn’t enough to make an impact on the final outcome.

The real key to Djokovic’s dominance was the backhand-to-backhand arm wrestle in the ad court. Murray made 25 backhand errors to Djokovic’s 11, shutting down the Brit’s strength, and making him bend to his own intentions. The quality of Murray’s backhand errors also speaks to the pressure Djokovic was putting him under in their baseline exchanges.

The number one backhand error by far from Murray was into the net with 13. Djokovic was often making contact standing closer to the baseline, which enabled better depth, and took time away from Murray’s preparation, hence the high number of net errors. Murray also made eight backhand errors long, three wide cross-court, and only one wide down the line. Murray did go to “Plan B” by coming forward to the net, winning 79 per cent (11/14) approaching, and two of three serving and volleying. The problem here for Murray is sheer volume, as dominating 17 points at the net does not come close to negating the 70 points Djokovic controlled from the back of the court.

Djokovic also applied pressure with his deep returns right down the middle, giving no angle for Murray to initially hurt him with. Murray won only 35 per cent (11/31) of his second serve points, as he often had to get out of the way of a deep Djokovic return hit right at him. The deep middle return is a hidden gem in Djokovic’s suffocating game plan. Leading into the Paris final, he had hit 49 per cent of his returns to the middle area of the court, 38 per cent wide in the ad court, and only 13 per cent wide in the deuce court. The middle of the court is a great way for Djokovic to begin the point, enabling him to then dictate from the middle of the court with his first shot after the return.

Djokovic’s forehand produced four winners, but more importantly only made eight groundstroke errors to Murray’s 19. A key pattern of play for Djokovic was to attack Murray’s forehand on the run in the deuce court, forcing Murray to make 15 of his 19 errors standing in the deuce, including seven running hard out wide near the deuce court alley. In the opening set, Murray hit 56 per cent of his forehands down the line, but 95 per cent (18/21) of those were down the line to Djokovic’s impenetrable backhand wing.

Djokovic hit 51 per cent of his forehands down the line in the opening set, and his seven inside-in forehands to Murray’s forehand primarily landed deep and close to the line in the deuce court. Beating an in-form Djokovic is a complex jigsaw puzzle of playing more to his forehand and getting to the net more than feels comfortable.

Simply hitting more winners clearly doesn’t work, as Murray hit 20 winners to the Serb’s 10 for the match, while Murray committed 34 unforced errors to Djokovic’s 12.

Djokovic makes everyone on the planet bend to his rules of engagement, and unless you have got several plans of attack mixed at exactly the right time, the Serb’s reign as the world’s best player is only getting stronger.

Missing your first serve against Roger Federer in London is the beginning of the end.

Federer started slow, then rolled 6-4, 6-2 over Tomas Berdych at the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals on Sunday night, with the key dynamic of second serve returns being completely dominated by the Swiss star.

Returning first serves is almost always a defensive play, but the switch immediately flips to offence for Federer once the opponent’s first serve misses the mark.

Berdych heavily contributed to his own demise in the opening round match, only making 44 per cent (23/52) first serves, including a lowly 36 per cent (10/28) in the crucial opening set.

Federer cleverly mixed up his second serve return position, as Berdych predictably served at Federer’s body-backhand location.

There was a massive 8.2 metre (27 feet) difference from the contact point of Federer's deepest return way back behind the baseline, and the closest SABR (sneaky attack by Roger) half-volley return Federer employed twice near the end of the match.

The different second serve return tactics were simply an act of discovery for Federer, figuring out the best way to wrestle ownership of Berdych's second serve delivery on the slower indoor surface at The O2.

Federer's deepest second serve return contact point was out wide in the ad court, 3.6 metres (11.8 feet) behind the baseline, letting Berdych's high kicking delivery drop enough to attack in his backhand strike zone.

Federer only made contact with four of 18 second serve returns behind the baseline, but it was enough to create confusion in Berdych's mind as to what "first strike" tactic Federer was going to use.

Federer also employed the SABR twice, leading 6-4, 5-1, with the contact point of the first attempt a mere 70 centimetres (2.3 feet) behind the service line, and the second one 1.2 metres (3.9 feet) back.

Federer said post-match he was “in the process to find out exactly” if it is better to half-volley the SABR return, or let it rise a little higher for better timing.

“The thing is what I don’t know is how long they are going to serve,” said Federer. “You have a tendency to know which players serve it deeper into the box, and which ones serve it shorter. So, I prefer to be closer than too far, I guess, at the end.”

Berdych needed to mix more on the second serve location, hitting all 12 second serves in his opening three games of the match at Federer’s backhand wing. Federer quickly dialed in, ripping deep returns right down the middle of the court, rushing his opponent.

Federer won nine points (9/18) on his second serve for the match, but double that against Berdych’s second serve, with 18 (18/29).

Infosys ATP Insights uncovered Berdych has increased his second serve speed from 94 miles per hour (m.p.h.) to 100 m.p.h. over the past five years at the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals, but on the slower indoor surface, variety of location in the service box may be a more effective weapon for the Czech.

In the 2015 season, Federer has been ruthless once breaking serve, successfully holding 93.4 per cent of the time to consolidate the break.

Serve + 1

A key metric for Federer in holding serve, which played out heavily against Berdych, is his potent “Serve + 1” tactic, where he combines the strength of the serve immediately followed by an attacking forehand.

Federer hit 73 per cent of forehands (19/26) as the first shot after the serve on Sunday night, immediately putting Berdych on the back foot, chasing down balls out on the edge of the court.

Federer pounces on the short return, making contact with 15 of the 19 forehands inside the baseline, immediately improving his geometry to attack his tall opponent out wide.

Federer is also a master at running around returns directed at his backhand, as almost half (9/19) of the Serve+1 forehands were hit standing in the ad court.

Ultimately, Federer strategically was able to overcame “one of the worst starts I’ve had in years”, when he fell behind 0-2 with back-to-back double faults in his opening service game.

Federer’s domination with Serve+1 forehands, and swarming Berdych’s second serve from a variety of locations, can take full credit.

Overall, Federer hit six forehand winners and only two forehand unforced errors, while Berdych hit four forehand winners, but committed nine forehand unforced errors.

Federer’s masterful first strike serve and return tactics are exactly the tonic he will be seeking in his second round-robin match later this week against World No. 1 Novak Djokovic.

Craig O'Shannessy uses extensive tagging, metrics and formulas to uncover the patterns and percentages behind the game. Read more at www.braingametennis.com.

Discover how Roger Federer battled past Kei Nishikori on Thursday
Escaping the “backhand cage” is something Roger Federer has had a lot of practice doing over his illustrious career.
Federer defeated Kei Nishikori 7-5, 4-6, 6-4 at the Barclays World Tour Finals on Thursday afternoon, only winning three more points (96 to 93) over the two-hour and 10-minute battle.
Making Roger Federer hit as many backhands as possible in a row is what the backhand cage strategy focuses on. Federer may make his first couple of backhands, but can he make four or five in a row?
At the start of the match, Federer looked like he had all the time in the world to hit backhands, but Nishikori gradually improved his court position and groundstroke velocity to really target the Federer backhand side.
Nishikori was the first opponent to win a set from Federer this year in London, and also the first opponent to make him hit more backhands than forehands from the back of the court.
Federer hit 54 per cent backhands and 46 per cent forehands from the baseline against Nishikori, committing 13 backhand unforced errors, while hitting eight backhand winners.
Federer hit 55 per cent forehands in defeating Tomas Berdych, and went 50/50 beating Novak Djokovic - both of those in straight sets.
Federer is now totaling 49 per cent forehands and 51 per cent backhands combined over his first three matches at The O2.
Federer’s forehand is a much more potent weapon from the back of the court, and also helps set up countless attacks to the net.
Federer’s average backhand speed against Nishikori was 63 miles per hour (Nishikori 69 mph), with his topspin backhand averaging 71 mph (Nishikori 74 mph).
Nishikori definitely held the edge in backhand-to-backhand exchanges, constantly trying to make Federer hit one more shot in search of one more error, and also playing behind him with great success. Nishikori won 63 baseline points to Federer’s 49, with the backhand cage being the primary pattern.
Overall, Federer hit 72 per cent of his backhands with topspin against his Japanese opponent, mixing in 28 per cent slice to try and keep the ball low, and not give Nishikori any power to work with.
Nishikori hit 80 per cent topspin off his backhand, and 20 per cent slice, looking to hit the ball harder and deeper, leaning on the Federer backhand to commit errors.
Nishikori hit 79 per cent of his backhands cross court in a clear attempt to keep Federer in the dreaded “backhand cage”.
Nishikori also hit his backhand deeper, hitting 85 per cent past the service like, compared to only 76 per cent from Federer.
Nishikori Returning
Federer did not serve well, only making 54 per cent (51/94) of his first serves, but won a very high 84 per cent (43/51) when he did get it in.
Of note was how well Federer performed serving in the Ad court, only losing two points for the entire match. He won 12/13 serving out wide, and 9/10 down the T.
An interesting dynamic was how Federer was constantly kicking the ball up high to his 5'11" opponent’s backhand in the Ad court, with the Japanese star moving forward to stop it climbing out of his strike zone.
Nishikori averaged making contact 1.43 metres (4.7 feet) with his backhand return wide in the Ad court, but only 1.27 metres (4.2 feet) hitting forehand returns out wide in the deuce court.
That 16 centimetre (6.3 inches) difference is all about using spin and height to force a weaker return from Nishikori’s backhand wing.
Key Moments
Federer led 4-1 in the second and lost it 6-4, and also led 4-1 in the third set before Nishikori raced back to level at 4-4. A critical moment for Federer was escaping a 0/40 hole at 1-1 in the third set, winning five straight points to get out of the jam. In the 2015 season, Federer is amazingly holding 37 per cent of the time when trailing 0/40.
Nishikori also contributed an untimely double fault serving at 4-5, 40/30, in the final set, and the match was quickly over two points later.
Nishikori got close with the right strategy, but his good play was too often tied to the scoreboard.
When he was trailing Federer, he played very aggressively with his court position and velocity of shot, but that needed to turn up more when he was ahead in the score.
It was the perfect hit-out for Federer, being pushed to the limit, and relying more on his backhand than his traditional strengths to get over the finish line.

Dig into the stats to learn why Roger Federer beat Stan Wawrinka on Saturday night

Roger Federer is our sport’s most colourful chameleon. His adaptive skills were on full display Saturday night in his 7-5, 6-3 victory over Stan Wawrinka, to move through to the final of the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals in London.

Federer is a master of every tactical maneuver, equally adept at staying back, coming forward, altering spin and power, managing time, and possessing the uncanny ability to “feel” what the court, the ball, the conditions and the opponent provide him.

Federer only came to the net nine times (winning six) against World No. 1, Novak Djokovic, earlier in the week, simply because he calculated that heavy groundstrokes were the best pathway to secure victory in that moment, on that night.

Last night against Wawrinka, he strategically changed his colours, swarming the net in an effort to blunt his opponent’s thumping groundstroke speed.

Federer came forward to the net 32 times against Wawrinka, playing only one extra game against his Swiss opponent than Djokovic.

Federer won an extremely high 75 per cent (24/32) at the net, pressuring Wawrinka with his court position, and rushing Wawrinka’s groundstroke preparation. Wawrinka only managed to get to the net three times for the whole match, highlighting just how dominant Federer was at owning the front of the court.

Infosys Match Insights uncovered a hidden strength of Federer’s forward movement - getting closer to the net to create more angle for the volley, and visually shrinking the court for the opponent’s passing shot.

Federer hit 27 volleys for match, mixing in serve and volley and approach plays, and amazingly only hit two volleys standing behind the service line. That’s a remarkable discovery, and you can only imagine how difficult he is to pass from such perfect court position.

Federer’s serve is a great enabler of his forward movement, as it continually elicits short balls for him to devour.

Federer hit 100 shots as the first shot after his serve, with 66 of them being struck inside the baseline, 33 within two metres behind the baseline, and just a lonely one further back than two metres behind the baseline.

When returning, it was a tougher ask to immediately move forward, as he had to initially negate the strength of Wawrinka’s powerful serve, and thumping first groundstroke. Federer made contact with the ball 22 times inside the baseline with his first shot after the return, 51 times within two metres of the baseline, and 27 times more than two metres back.

Once a rally was established, Federer hit 53 per cent forehands for the match and 47 per cent backhands, better than Wawrinka’s even 50/50 ratio.

But a deeper look at Wawrinka’s forehand performance uncovered that he only hit 11 run-around forehands standing in the Ad court for the match, which is normally a primary baseline strategy.

Wawrinka Return Location

The pressure of Federer’s constant forays forward forced Wawrinka to drastically alter his return location, but all it did was simply take him out of his comfort zone.

Federer won 76 per cent (31/41) of his first serve points, and an extremely high 65 per cent (15/23) of second serve points.

Against Rafael Nadal in the round robin draw, Wawrinka averaged standing 2.95 metres (9.7 feet) behind the baseline to return second serves, but he was only 27 centimetres (0.9 feet) behind the baseline against Federer.

Wawrinka was forced to move forward and take the second serve return earlier to try and immediately get the ball down to Federer’s feet, or rebound it deep near the baseline with the threat of an imminent net attack.

Federer averaged standing 1.4 metres (4.6 feet) inside the baseline returning Wawrinka’s serve, successfully pressuring Wawrinka into only winning a lowly 42 per cent (10/24) in this key tactical arm wrestle.

Federer will now play Djokovic in this afternoon’s final, and the tactics that worked earlier in the week may have to be drastically altered to defeat the World No. 1 on Sunday. Fortunately, Federer is ready to change colours in the blink of an eye.

At any level of the game, a stratospheric winning percentage on second serves will give you a winning edge
How do you play a match at any level of the game and only lose three points on your second serve? That’s exactly what Novak Djokovic managed to pull off in his 6-3, 6-4 victory over Roger Federer in the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals in London on Sunday night.
Second-serve performance is typically a key component in deciding victory from the back courts of Lahore to the centre court in London. Djokovic managed to win a mind-blowing 84 per cent (16/19) of his second-serve points against one of the most in-form players on the planet.
Many positive things flowed from this surprise advantage, including Djokovic only facing two break points in two sets against an opponent he lost to in straight sets earlier in the week, when he lost serve four times. In the deuce court, Djokovic amazingly won 88 per cent (7/8) of second serves directed at Federer’s backhand down the T, and all three surprise serves to the forehand wing.
History shows us that Federer’s backhand return is always heavily targeted, but he was not sitting on this preferred location, ripping returns like the scouting report dictates.
In the ad court, Djokovic mixed it up much more, winning 50 per cent (2/4) to Federer’s backhand return on second serves, and 100 per cent (4/4) sneaking second serves right down the T to keep Federer off balance.
Second-serve performance is always a key component of victory, as it’s typically too difficult for the returner to succeed against far more powerful first serves. Federer averaged standing 1.3 metres (4.3 feet) inside the baseline to return Djokovic’s second serves, but quite often lacked the commitment to immediately attack.
On the first point of the 1-1 game in the second set, Federer looked to chip and charge off a second-serve return, second-guessed himself, and missed a routine return. That’s a moment in time when thinking really hurts you.
Federer’s magnificent short-ball-hunter instincts should have taken over, and his chance of winning the point at the net would have dramatically increased. Djokovic won 42 baseline points to Federer’s 23, so why stay back? While Djokovic soared, winning 84 per cent of his second-serve points, Federer struggled mightily, winning only 42 per cent (9/21) against the world’s best returner.
Federer’s game was spotty right from the beginning, committing 31 unforced errors to the Serb’s 14. With everything else being equal, that sinks the boat right there.
Federer hit more winners (19-13) than Djokovic, but as usual, it was the player who made fewer unforced errors than more winners who was smiling at the net shaking hands when the dust settled.
Federer’s backhand proved problematic throughout. He hit six winners off that wing but too often wildly missed the mark with 13 unforced errors, stopping his sporadic good play in its tracks.
Djokovic targeted Federer’s backhand from start to finish, hitting 70 per cent of his backhands cross court, and then on the right ball, attacking 30 per cent down the line to pressure Federer’s forehand on the run.
Federer hit 61 per cent of his backhands cross court and 39 per cent down the line, but should have directed a lot more down the middle of the court to Djokovic’s forehand, to rebound the ball back down the middle to his own forehand.
Federer used a lot more slice than Djokovic off his backhand wing, hitting 69 per cent topspin and 31 per cent slice, trying to disrupt the Serb’s dominant rhythm. Djokovic was content to just keep ploughing away at the comparatively weaker Federer backhand wing, hitting 97 per cent of his backhands with topspin, and only 3 per cent with slice.
Overall, Djokovic hit 23 per cent of his shots standing inside the baseline, 56 per cent within two metres behind the baseline, and 21 per cent further back than two metres.
Djokovic capped off a magnificent year with a dominant performance against a fierce rival. It’s the first time in the history of our sport that a player has won four consecutive year-end championships in a row.
It’s now time to put a glorious season to bed. Let’s respect Djokovic’s amazing process, and give thanks to him for taking us to a place on the mountain where nobody before has ventured.

Discover how Novak Djokovic got the better of Andy Murray in the Australian Open final
You can’t run through Novak Djokovic. You can’t even run around him.
Djokovic defeated Andy Murray 6-1, 7-5, 7-6(3) to win the Australian Open for a sixth time with a dominant all-court game built on “first strike” mastery. He was at his baseline best, winning 56 per cent (83/149) of his own points from the back of the court to Murray’s 36 per cent (47/129). It does not matter what else is happening – those numbers are omnipotent.
There were a lot of other serve, return and approach battles that waged for almost three hours on Rod Laver Arena, but Murray was never going to seriously challenge the Serb unless he could do damage from the trenches. Djokovic hit fewer winners than Murray (31-40) for the match, which would seem like a negative statistic, but since winners are only around 30 per cent of the sport, it doesn’t matter nearly as much as you would think.
The key for Djokovic was to make fewer errors, and take the honours in the much higher 70 per cent area of points that totally dominate the bottom line. Overall, Djokovic committed 18 forced errors and 41 unforced errors (59 total), to Murray’s 27 forced errors and 65 unforced errors (93 total).
It was a tough ask for Murray to beat Djokovic to begin with. Once you layer almost 100 errors over three sets into the mix, it made the possibility of victory basically unattainable for the Scot.
Djokovic is widely recognised as the best returner in the world, but his prowess serving is constantly improving. He dominated much more with his first serves in the deuce court, winning 81 per cent (29/36), to only 68 per cent (25/37) in the ad court.
Djokovic mixed his serve locations very well to both courts, trying to keep Murray from correctly guessing the right location. In the deuce court, he served 16 first serves wide, five at the body, and 15 down the middle. In the ad court, the Serb hit the majority (16) of his first serves down the middle, with eight at the body, and 13 out wide. Overall, Djokovic made an extremely high 66 per cent of his first serves, winning 74 per cent.
Second serves were also a serious area of influence for the World No. 1. The tournament average for second serve points won at the 2016 Australian Open was 51 per cent, and Djokovic won 60 per cent for the tournament - tied for ninth best.
In the final against Murray, it was knocked down to 53 per cent points won - but it’s very important to remember anything above 50 per cent is a keeper. Murray could not come close to the same winning numbers in this important battleground. The Scot only won 35 per cent (14/40) of points on his second serve, which was by far his poorest performance in this key area during the fortnight.
It was a very tough night for Murray all around. Djokovic won all three rally lengths, giving Murray no place to build a winning strategy. The Serb claimed the short 0-4 rally length 65-54, the mid-length rally length of 5-8 shots 25-22, and extended rallies of nine shots or more 33-23.
If you can’t find a foothold under the bright lights, the match can slip away very quickly.
Djokovic once again asserted his superiority on the world’s biggest stage. In total, he won 123 points to Murray’s 99. It felt like a much greater separation. He did not come to the net as much as Murray, but then again, he didn’t have to. The Serb won 79 per cent (11/14) at the front of the court, with Murray winning 65 per cent (22/34).
As he he done for quite some time, Djokovic asserted his influence here, there, and absolutely everywhere.

Brain Game reveals how Novak Djokovic’s serving tactics play a key role in his win over Rafael Nadal in the BNP Paribas Open semi-finals.
A lot went wrong for Novak Djokovic in the opening set against Rafael Nadal in their semi-final at the BNP Paribas Open Saturday, but one key strategy managed to flourish, and ultimately carry the World No. 1 to a 7-6(5) 6-2 victory.
The first set counted for everything in this match, as it has proven to be in their storied rivalry, with Djokovic owning a 20-3 record when winning the opening set, and Nadal almost identical at 20-4.
But Djokovic was floundering in the opening stanza, committing a head-turning 21 unforced errors to Nadal’s 16, along with 10 forehand return errors, and nine backhand return errors. The court temporarily not big enough for the World No. 1.
Djokovic immediately fell behind 0-2 courtesy of back-to-back double faults, and Nadal looked a real threat. But there was one ray of light, one very specific strategy that was instrumental in ultimately winning the opening set - outstanding success serving to the Spaniard’s backhand.
Overall in Set 1, Djokovic won 75 per cent (12/16) of first serves to Nadal’s backhand, and 80 per cent (4/5) on second serves. It was the perfect rescue plan when the rest of his game was out to sea.
Deuce Court - Wide Slider
There was no place Djokovic targeted more in the opening set with his first serve than a wide, slicing delivery in the deuce court.
He attempted 12, made 10, and won eight behind his first serve. Of the eight, three first serves were unreturned, and Djokovic hit five aggressive “Serve +1” forehands to ramp up the pressure and make Nadal run hard from well outside the deuce court alley to begin the point.
It speaks volumes to the amazing success of the tactic that Nadal was not able to make Djokovic hit a single backhand groundstroke as his first shot after the serve from this return location.
At 5-6, 15-15, with the pressure metre rising rapidly, Djokovic sliced his first serve out wide and hit two forehands and a backhand from a dominant court position right around the baseline. The Serb finished with an inside-in forehand winner from around the singles line in the ad court.
The forehand gets the credit for winning the point, but the wide slice serve was what really put him in the driver’s seat.
Leading 4-2 in the tie-break, Djokovic hit another wide slider for a let, then went straight back to the same location, procuring an easy Serve +1 run-around forehand winner from around the service line in the ad court.
At 5-5 in the ‘breaker, Djokovic went back to the same basic play, and Nadal split step the wrong way to the middle, missing a stretching wide backhand return long. It was a pivotal moment to stop Nadal’s three-point win streak from 2-5 in the tie-break.
Second Serves to the Backhand
Djokovic also went wide to the Nadal backhand in the deuce court with four second serves in the opening set, winning every one.
In Set 1, Djokovic committed three double faults, Nadal won 3/3 returning Djokovic’s second serve with a forehand return, but only 1/5 with a backhand return.
The four second serves that Djokovic won to Nadal’s backhand return were all sliced very wide to the Spaniard’s backhand in the deuce court at key moments.
The first was with Djokovic serving at 1-2, 30/30, then at 4-5, love -all, and deuce. The last one was at 5-6, 40/15 to send Djokovic into a tie-break.
Saving Set Point
Djokovic was down set point at 4-5, 30/40, and nailed a 118mph first serve down the middle in the ad court to Nadal’s backhand return. Djokovic then thumped two forehands from the middle of the court, with the second forcing a running forehand error from Nadal wide in the ad court.
Big points like this one demand the highest percentage pattern of play from the server. Djokovic nailed it.
Overview
With the pressure released from winning the opening set, Djokovic relaxed and found his game, only committing eight unforced errors in Set 2, while winning 100 per cent (7/7) on second serves. He didn’t face a break point.
It was a tough loss for Nadal, but also a very good one. Getting so close in Set 1 was a real positive, and the ability to dictate much more against Djokovic than we have recently seen will bring real hope that his game is headed in the right direction.
Sometimes it does not matter if a lot goes wrong in a tennis match, as long as you find a single ray of light to find your way home.

Brain Game shows why Novak Djokovic was a comprehensive winner in Indian Wells despite hitting fewer winners in the final than Milos Raonic
It’s not how many winners you hit. It’s how many errors you don’t make.
Novak Djokovic defeated Milos Raonic 6-2, 6-0 to win a record fifth BNP Paribas Open title by getting on the right side of the most important equation in our sport. Raonic won only two of the 14 games played, but amazingly hit more winners, 16-15.
That may seem like an anomaly, but it’s actually quite common for the match loser to accumulate more winners. In general, around 70 per cent of all points on the ATP World Tour end in errors and around 30 per cent end in winners.
Experience has taught the elite players to focus on dominating the larger pool of points and to generally care very little about hitting more winners than their opponents. In this final, there were 31 winners hit out of 101 points, producing a very typical ratio of 69 per cent errors and 31 per cent winners.
The final score may have looked abnormal, but the mix of winners and errors was extremely typical of a pro tour encounter. Djokovic has built a spectacular career dominating the much larger 70 per cent pool of points, which makes him for a very tough match-up for the free-hitting Canadian.
Raonic was clearly miss-firing with his ultra-aggressive game style and could not yield a big enough advantage out of the smaller 30 per cent pool of winners to trouble the World No. 1. Raonic left the court after the first set to have an injury attended to, and he was never able to sustain any kind of momentum to pressure the Super Serb.
2nd Serve Domination
In the opening set, Raonic only won 3/16 second serve points, and 0/14 in the second set. That’s a horror story for one of the biggest servers in the game.
In set one, Djokovic targeted 71 per cent (10/14) of his second-serve returns right down the middle third of the court, with the remaining four all wide in the ad court aimed at Raonic’s less potent backhand wing.
Deep returns to the middle of the court was the classic Andre Agassi strategy, giving the returner a big target to land a powerful return and providing no angle for the server.
Coming into the Indian Wells final, Raonic was winning 54 per cent of his second-serve points in his five preceding matches. He won 58 per cent in all of 2015 and had won 55 per cent so far this year. But against Djokovic, he managed to win 10 per cent (3/30).
With Raonic serving at 0-4 deuce in the second set, he had only 29 per cent of his serves unreturned, which was lower than Djokovic at 31 per cent. Those numbers would have seemed impossible to consider before the match.
Djokovic, as you would expect, performed admirably in this key strategic area, winning 67 per cent (8/12) of his second serve points, including hitting only four second serves in the entire second set and winning half of those points.
Baseline Superiority
Once the point extended past a serve and return, Djokovic won a staggering 80 per cent (41/51) of the baseline rallies. Djokovic blended amazing defense with suffocating court position, extending the 6’5” Canadian out to the edges of the court.
Raonic was pressing hard against the World No. 1, especially off the forehand wing, where he committed 18 unforced errors to the Serb’s one. Raonic was credited with 27 unforced errors for the match to Djokovic’s four. Those are the numbers that form the bull's-eye of who won and why.
Ultimately it does not matter if Djokovic loses the battle of hitting winners by one (15-16) if he can get his opponent to miss the court as much as Raonic did.
Overall, 62 per cent of points ended in the first four shots, 31 per cent in the five-to-nine shot range, and only seven per cent were extended past nine shots, with Djokovic having a healthy winning percentage in all three.
Victories like this one send a chill through the rest of the tour as opponents desperately search for answers to get the upper hand against the rampaging Serb.