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Only one forehand winner in the Rogers Cup final was struck by the receiving player

It's a forehand unlike any other.

The 'Serve +1' forehand - struck as the first shot after a serve - is the biggest sleeper in our sport. It's perfectly disguised as a regular rally forehand, but it's actually the main offensive juggernaut once the return of serve is put back in play.

Rafael Nadal defeated Stefanos Tsitsipas 6-2, 7-6(4) in the final of the Rogers Cup on Sunday, with both players leaning heavily on Serve +1 forehands to collect their rally winners.

To the Toronto final, Nadal was hitting a remarkable 87 per cent forehands as the first shot after his first serve, and 77 per cent behind second serves. In the final against Tsitsipas, he blew those numbers out the window, hitting an astonishing 41 Serve +1 forehands (95 per cent) and just two Serve +1 backhands. Nadal won 18 of 20 (90 per cent) Serve +1 forehands behind his first serve, and 14 of 21 (67 per cent) Serve +1 forehands behind his second serve.

Tsitsipas was also heavily reliant on his Serve +1 forehand, hitting it 86 per cent (36/42) of the time behind all serves in the match.

The real question is why do these elite players have such a thirst for a forehand right after the serve? The answer is simple. The Serve +1 forehand enjoys the “halo effect” of a dominant serve, delivering the server more time and improved court position to immediately end the point before the returner can diffuse the rally into a neutral battle.

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The following breakdown shows just how offensive Serve +1 forehands really are.

Nadal Forehand Winners
• Serve +1 Forehands = 11
• All Other Forehands = 4

Tsitsipas Forehand Winners
• Serve +1 Forehands = 8
• All Other Forehands = 0

It's important to note that Serve +1 forehands contributed 19 winners, while the eight combined Serve +1 backhands didn’t register a single winner. Of the 23 total forehand winners hit at all rally lengths in the match, 83 per cent (19) were struck with a Serve +1 forehand.

There was only one forehand winner for the entire match that came after a player returned serve. It was Nadal returning in the first point of the 3-1 game in the opening set. The Spaniard hit a deep backhand return, and an even deeper forehand on the next ball that set up a crushing forehand blow standing right on the baseline.

With so much offence happening around Serve +1 forehands, is there also an inordinate amount of errors here as well?

The short answer is no.

Nadal Forehand Errors
• Serve +1 Forehands = 2
• All Others = 5

Tsitsipas Forehand Errors
• Serve +1 Forehands = 5
• All Others = 13

Serve +1 forehands accounted for 83 per cent (19/23) of all forehand winners, but only 23 per cent (7/25) of forehand errors. It’s stock just keep rising and rising.

Nadal's 11 Serve +1 forehand winners were sourced primarily from serving to Tsitsipas' backhand return. The Greek hit seven backhand returns (5 Ad Ct / 2 Deuce Ct) and four forehand returns (3 Deuce Ct / 1 Ad Ct) that Nadal immediately hit a Serve +1 forehand winner from.

The only dynamic that we have traditionally counted with groundstrokes is winners and errors. We can clearly see from this match that more layers are needed to paint an accurate picture of baseline performance - specifically who is serving and at what rally length was the ending shot struck.

On match point, with Nadal serving at 6/4 in the second set tie-break, He made a first serve and ran around a return directed to his backhand and crushed a Serve +1 forehand winner to win the match. What a fitting way to cross the finish line.

Brain Game discusses Novak Djokovic's keys to victory in the Western & Southern Open final
Just one ball in the court.

Novak Djokovic defeated Roger Federer 6-4, 6-4 in the final of the Western & Southern Open on Sunday with a one-shot rally accounting for a staggering 50 (39%) of the 130 points played.

Djokovic and Federer won 25 points each in the rally length of one shot, but collected them in very different ways.

Djokovic: One-Shot Rallies Won
• 4 aces
• 21 return errors from Federer (11 backhand / 10 forehand).

Federer: One-Shot Rallies Won
• 11 aces
• 14 return errors from Djokovic (8 forehand / 6 backhand).


Second-Serve Performance
Federer’s second serve return was often out of sync in the match, and he uncharacteristically missed more second-serve returns (11) than first-serve returns (10). Part of that was due to Djokovic going for more speed than normal on his second serve.

In the opening set, Djokovic’s average second serve speed was 98mph, slightly ahead of Federer’s 97mph. In the second set, Djokovic’s second serve speed dropped all the way down to 90mph, while Federer dialed his up to 102mph, trying to formulate a winning game plan.

Djokovic won an impressive 78 per cent (14/18) of his second-serve points for the match, which was considerably higher than his 2018 average of 54 per cent (638/1117) coming into the tournament.

Federer leads the tour with second-serve points won in 2018 at 62 per cent (642/1039), but that number got hammered down to just 47 per cent (15/32) against Djokovic in the final.

A head-turning stat from the match was that the average rally length behind Djokovic’s first serve was four shots, but that dropped down to just two shots behind second serves. Federer also averaged four shots behind his first serve, but the rally length climbed up to five shots behind his second serve.

The overall average rally length for shots in the final was a brisk 3.4 shots. Two shots in play for the server, but on average just one for the returner.

Two Shots In The Court
Djokovic won 12 more points than Federer for the match (71 to 59) with 10 of these coming in the rally length of two shots in the court. That means that either the returner hit a winner, or more likely, that the server missed their first shot after the serve, which was either a groundstroke or a volley.

2018 Cincinnati Final: Breakdown of Rally Length & Points Played / Won

Rally Length (Shots In)

Total Points Played

Federer Won

Djokovic Won

0

6

2

4

1

50

25

25

2

16

3

13

3

11

5

6

4

11

6

5

5

11

7

4

6

8

4

4

7

4

1

3

8

4

2

2

9+

9

4

5

TOTAL

130

59

71

A contributing factor to Djokovic’s 10-point advantage in the rally length of two shots was the superior speed with which he hit returns back to Federer.

Average 1st Serve Return Speed
• Djokovic = 61mph
• Federer = 55mph

Average 2nd Serve Return Speed
• Djokovic = 66mph
• Federer = 64mph

Once a rally did evolve, both players looked to control the baseline with more forehands than backhands.

Djokovic Groundstrokes
• Total Forehands = 74 (average speed 71mph)
• Total Backhands = 65 (average speed 68mph)

Federer Groundstrokes
• Total Forehands = 83 (average speed 73mph)
• Total Backhands = 72 (average speed 66mph)

Djokovic played four consecutive three-set matches to reach the final, often having to battle from behind in the match as he searched for his peak form. It turned up on Sunday in spades.

Be bold enough to walk into the lion’s den.

Novak Djokovic defeated Juan Martin del Potro 6-3, 7-6(4), 6-3 in the final of the US Open Sunday by attacking - not avoiding - the Argentine’s fearsome forehand.

Djokovic won 111 points for the match, with almost half of them (53) coming from a Del Potro forehand error. Del Potro did hit 16 forehand winners, but the net result of -37 was what the Serbian was constantly mining.

This kind of tactic is actually predicated on Del Potro hitting just enough forehand winners that he keeps swinging for his trademark knock-out blows. But Djokovic was playing a numbers game, constantly moving Del Potro side to side to the edges of the court to apply enough pressure with time and court position to extract a steady stream of forehand errors.

Absorb the punches. Trust the percentages.

Del Potro ran 3525 metres for the match (Djokovic 3679m), for an average on 21.1 metres per point. A lot of that was being initially moved to the Ad court to spar backhand to backhand, and then be pulled wide in the Deuce court to hit a tricky forehand on the run.

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Djokovic did hit 13 forehand winners of his own, while yielding only 21 forehand errors in the process. The average rally length per point for the match was a bruising 6.2 shots, with Djokovic winning 49.6 per cent (66/133) of his baseline points, and Del Potro winning 41.8 per cent (64/153).

Djokovic’s game is evolving once again, with the typical label of “aggressive baseliner” no longer doing justice to his superb “all-court” game. Djokovic came to the net a substantial 37 times (Del Potro 17) in the final, winning 28 (75.6%) of those points. The Serbian was constantly looking to use depth as his primary weapon to elicit a short ball, and then use direction, spin and power to the Del Potro’s backhand to force a difficult passing shot.

Djokovic came at Del Potro so many different ways. Djokovic hit 13 forehand winners, three backhand winners, seven volley winners, seven overhead winners, two approach winners and two drop shot winners.

It was the Swiss Army knife of strategies.

Djokovic’s game is stunningly complete in every which way you can imagine. He even served and volleyed twice in the final to provide a different look, winning one of those points.

Watch Tribute To Djokovic After He Completed The Big Titles Sweep


Another layer of confusion of what was coming next centred on Djokovic’s first serve location. In the Deuce court he served 20 times out wide and 19 down the T. In the Ad court, he served wide 13 times, 12 at the body, and seven down the T.

There was simply no chance Del Potro was going to win the guessing game of serve location.

The Argentine really struggled to find free points, only collecting six aces, with Djokovic missing just 18 of 88 returns for the match. The Serbian was especially rock solid returning in the Ad court, making 13 of 14 forehand returns and 19 of 21 backhand returns.

If there was a winning percentage to be mined anywhere on the court, that’s exactly where you would find the Super Serbian.

In many ways, this match was not about Djokovic at all. It was more far more important for him to hit the ball where Del Potro didn’t want it rather than trying to win with his own favourite patterns.

New World No. 2 won 59 per cent of points of five shots or fewer

Is consistency overrated?

Novak Djokovic defeated Borna Coric 6-3, 6-4 in the final of the Rolex Shanghai Masters on Sunday by dominating shorter rallies and playing even with Coric in the longer ones.

Long rallies are more memorable, more emotional, and more dramatic. That's why they receive so much attention and applause, and why they globally dominate the practice court. But consider this: there were 20 eye-popping rallies that reached double digits in the final, with Djokovic and Coric winning 10 each. Long rallies were a push in this match - as they normally are.

Long rallies are not the secret sauce of Djokovic 2.0. Striking first and eliminating early mistakes in the rally most certainly are. "Old school" consistency focuses on hitting 20 balls in a row in the court, and repeating it four times. "New school" consistency is all about hitting four balls in a row in the court and repeating it 20 times.

A new take on old folklore.

There were 20 rallies in the match that reached double digits, but there were 30 rallies in the match that totaled just one shot in the court. The serve went in, and either by an ace or a missed return, the ball never came back. That happened more than anything else in the match. The top five rally lengths in the match totaled 65% (81/124) of all points, with Djokovic winning a commanding 59 per cent (48/81) of them.

Shanghai Final: Top 5 Rally Lengths & Point Winner
1. 1 Shot In = 30 points (Djokovic 17/Coric 13)
2. 3 Shots In = 19 points (Djokovic 9/Coric 10)
3. 5 Shots In = 13 points (Djokovic 9/Coric 4)
4. 4 Shots In = 10 points (Djokovic 6/Coric 4)
5. 2 Shots In = 9 points (Djokovic 7/Coric 2)
TOTAL: 81 points — Djokovic, 59% (48)/Coric, 41% (33)

Djokovic won 20 more points than Coric for the match (72 to 52), and crafted 15 of them in rally lengths from one to five shots. That's a layer of our sport that matters more than we ever realised.

Djokovic held serve 47 straight times throughout the tournament to remain unbroken from Monday to Sunday. It's a scary thought that the world's best returner can also go a week without his serve being broken. Djokovic won an astounding 91 per cent (29/32) of first-serve points in the final, which was in stark contrast to the first-serve battles Coric endured, winning just 61 per cent (34/56) of his first-serve points.

Average Rally Length: Points Won On First Serve
• Djokovic = 3.8 shots
• Coric = 5.2 shots

Average Rally Length: Points Lost On First Serve
• Djokovic = 3.3 shots
• Coric = 6.2 shots

Overall, the champion played just three points that went to double digits when he started the rally with a first serve, while Coric had to battle through 10 of them.

Djokovic was also able to play shorter points behind his second serve as well, winning a commanding 70 per cent (14/20), with an average rally length of 5.2 shots. Coric won 56 per cent (9/16) of his second-serve points, but his rally length was much higher at 7.1 shots.

Djokovic won 72 points in the final, with 76 per cent (55) of them coming from a Coric error, and 17 coming off his own racquet as a winner. We play a sport of errors much more than winners, even at the elite level of our sport.

Our eyes would have us believe the recent rise of Djokovic (27-1 since the beginning of Wimbledon) is mainly due to dominance in the long rallies. It's not. He is back to being the apex predator hunting his hidden advantage in the 0-4 shot rally length. He forces mayhem in his opponents’ strokes and mind much more with serves and returns than by extending the rally.

Karen Khachanov's backswing on his forehand looks like a serpent coiling to strike. It's big and menacing and his extreme wrist bend provides opponents with no clue where this venomous shot is going to bite them.

Khachanov stunned Novak Djokovic 7-5, 6-4 in the final of the Rolex Paris Masters Sunday, with the Russian's forehand running rampant all over the court.

Djokovic at times looked exhausted from his three hour, three minute semi-final encounter with Roger Federer, and a week-long battle with the flu, but Khachanov still had to reach out and claim the biggest title of his career, with his unorthodox forehand being the driving force.

Khachanov Forehand Winners = 12

The most efficient strategy Khachanov employed to set up a forehand winner was to hit it as his first shot after a serve. He hit six Serve +1 forehand winners, with half rocketing past Djokovic's forehand wing and the other three directed to the backhand. The Russian also chipped in with a forehand return winner.

The other five forehand winners displayed the versatility of the 6'6" Russian's game. One was a standard groundstroke from the baseline, one was at the front of the court, another was an approach, and the other two were scintillating, on-the-run passing shots that brought the Parisian crowd to their feet and Djokovic to his knees.

Of the 13 forehand groundstroke errors Djokovic committed in the match, six came from a Khachanov forehand groundstroke, and one from a forehand return.


The backswing on Khachanov's forehand is extremely difficult to decipher any clues from as to what destination it will ultimately rocket towards, and his patterns of play are equally confounding.

Khachanov hit 41 per cent of his forehands to the outer third of the Ad court (to Djokovic's backhand), and 42 per cent to the outer third of the Deuce court, stretching Djokovic wide off the court to hit his own forehand. Only 17 per cent of Khachanov's forehands landed in the middle of the court. When Khachanov created time to wind up and crush a big forehand, it was simply unreadable for Djokovic to predict where it was going.

Khachanov was also far more likely to step forward to the ball on his forehand side to attack than off his backhand wing. The Russian made contact with 25 per cent of his forehands inside the baseline, but only managed to do that 11 per cent of the time on his backhand side.

Khachanov hit some blistering forehands in the match, but surprisingly he averaged hitting his forehand slower than Djokovic overall. The Russian would quite often add heavy spin with his extreme western grip to create a short angle and run Djokovic or hit it higher over the net with more shape to get the ball up out of the Serb's strike zone.

Average Rally Speed
Forehands

Khachanov = 113kph
Djokovic = 120kph



Backhands
Khachanov = 108kph
Djokovic = 111kph

Both players ended up hitting slightly more backhands than forehands for the match, but Khachanov was able to do more damage with his when he did get to hit it.



Total Groundstrokes

Khachanov = 105 forehands / 121 backhands
Djokovic = 109 forehands / 111 backhands

Djokovic took control of the match early in the first set, leading 3-1, 30-0 on serve, but inexplicably lost 10 straight points to lose all his early momentum. Khachanov's forehand had a lot to do with that purple patch, striking four forehand winners in the span of six points, with an additional two Djokovic groundstroke errors coming after a Khachanov forehand.

Khachanov's funky forehand technique may very well come with a "do not try this at home" label, but it was his weapon of choice that helped capture the biggest title of his career in Paris. He makes it work, and then some.



- Hawkeye data used in this story is courtesy ATP Media.

- Craig O’Shannessy is a member of Novak Djokovic’s coaching team.

The first set was from another world.

Alexander Zverev defeated Novak Djokovic 6-4, 6-3 in the championship match of the Nitto ATP Finals in London on Sunday on the back of one of the best sets of tennis he has ever played.

Zverev was soundly defeated by the World No. 1 6-4, 6-1 in round robin stage at The O2 earlier in the week, and also lost 6-2, 6-1 in the semi-finals of Rolex Shanghai Masters last month.

Then this set roared to life…

Zverev’s overall first-serve percentage this season is 64 per cent (3277/5117), but he made an eye-opening 86 per cent in the first set. He averaged 135 mph on his first serve in Set 1, which was simply on another level from Djokovic’s 123 mph average.

Zverev crushed seven aces in the opening set, and just three in the second set. He hit no double faults in Set 1, but three in Set 2. Zverev won a remarkable 86 per cent of his first-serve points in the opening set, and just 67 per cent in the second set.

Set 2 was solid. Set 1 was the launch pad to end-of-season glory.

Djokovic reached the London final on the back of putting so many serves back in play - but 48 per cent of Zverev’s first serves were unreturned in Set 1, which was much higher than the 33 per cent in Set 2.

As good as Zverev’s first serve performed in the opening set, his second serve metrics may have been better. Zverev averaged 104 mph on his second serve against Djokovic in the Round Robin stage, but that elevated to 109 mph in Set 1 on Sunday evening. In Set 2, it significantly dropped down to 98 mph. Zverev won a dominant 67 per cent of his second-serve points in the opening set, but that fell away to just 50 per cent in the second set.

Zverev brought the farm in Set 1, and it paved the way to the biggest title of his career.

Once the rally matured past the serve and return stage into a baseline contest in Set 1, Zverev employed a very aggressive down-the-line strategy that was aimed at making Djokovic have to hit the ball on the run.

Zverev Groundstroke Direction
• Set 1 = 33% line / 67% cross
• Set 2 = 21% line / 79% cross

Zverev’s return of serve was also much more dominant in Set 1 over Set 2. Zverev put 81 per cent of Djokovic’s first serves back in play in the opening set, but just 69 per cent in the second set.

Zverev stepped into returns in the opening set and blasted them back at Djokovic at will.

Zverev Average Return Speed
• 1st Serve Return Speed - Set 1 69mph / Set 2 61mph
• 2nd Serve Return Speed - Set 1 78mph / Set 2 76mph

In the opening set, Zverev was dominant in points won under nine shots, winning that metric 25-17. In Set 2, he lost it 23-24.

After two recent lopsided losses, Zverev had to make an adjustment. He had to come out swinging, and land as many punches as he possibly could. Almost every single one of them landed in the opening set and paved the way to victory.

Swiss fell in BNP Paribas Open final for second consecutive year
The conversation starts and ends with backhand returns. The rest is just window dressing.

Dominic Thiem defeated Roger Federer 3-6, 6-3, 7-5 to win the the BNP Paribas Open final on Sunday, with backhand returns meaning more to the outcome than any other shot.

In the opening set, with Thiem serving at 0-1, the Austrian directed all 10 serves in the game to Federer’s backhand return, and the Swiss put all 10 back in the court, breaking Thiem on the fourth break point of the game.

Federer also clocked a backhand return winner to break Thiem at 3-4 in the opening set. The stroke was completely dialed in early on, but the longer the match progressed, the more it missed its mark.

Flashback to 2017 when Federer won his fifth title in the desert, and his backhand return was the focal point of his renaissance. After dominating Rafael Nadal 6-2, 6-3 in the round of 16 in Indian Wells, Federer said post-match, “I am able to step into the court much easier than I ever have. By coming over my backhand return from the get-go in the point I can start dominating points from the start.”


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Federer 2.0, which originated at the 2017 Australian Open and spilled over to Indian Wells two months later, was born from total commitment to come over the backhand return.

It was the bullseye of his resurgence, but that asset turned into a liability in the second and third sets on Sunday against Thiem as Federer increasingly had to slice the return to make it, providing Them with more time to immediately attack with a powerful Serve +1 groundstroke following his serve.

After making his first 10 backhand returns of the match, Federer missed five for the rest of the first set (18/23), seven in set two (13/20) and six in set three (17/23). Those 18 backhand return errors were the difference makers.

With Federer leading 6-3, 1-1 and having a break point at 30/40, he had an opportunity to put the match to bed. Almost all opponents historically go away against Federer when down a set and break.

Thiem's first serve was always going to go out wide to Federer’s backhand return. In fact, at ATP Masters 1000 matches from 2014-2018 when serving at 30/40, Thiem has gone out wide in the Ad court almost two times out of every three (63%).

Thiem predictably went with his favourite strategy, kicking a heavy 101 mph first serve out wide to the backhand. Two years ago against Nadal, Federer stepped into the court and clocked it down the line for an outright winner as he surged to the finish line.

<a href='https://www.atptour.com/en/players/roge ... iew'>Roger Federer</a> hits a backhand at the 2019 <a href='https://www.atptour.com/en/tournaments/ ... rview'>BNP Paribas Open</a>

Sunday against Thiem, he shanked the break point backhand return straight into the court in front of him and bounced it over the net – table tennis style. Opportunity evaporates quickly in the desert heat.

Federer manufactured another break point two points later, but a backhand groundstroke error into the net at the end of an 11-shot rally brought the score back to Deuce. Two points later and Thiem held for a 2-1 advantage that provided the launching pad for his unlikely victory.

Thiem broke Federer in the following game, with the Swiss double faulting to start the game, then uncharacteristically served and volleyed on three consecutive second serves.

At 15/30, Thiem clocked a short-angled backhand return winner against the serve-and-volleying Swiss. On break point at 15/40, Federer attempted a forehand half-volley approach but buried it into the net, and out of nowhere he trailed 1-3.

The momentum was gone, and it would never return. Thiem suddenly was the one hitting backhand return winners when it mattered the most, and in the blink of an eye Federer went from being on his toes to on his heels.

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Federer missed a backhand return in the 1-3 game and again at 2-4. With Thiem serving at 5-3, Federer missed a backhand long on the opening point, another one at 30/0, and lost the set with a backhand return error long with Thiem serving at 40/15.

A drip had turned into a torrent, and Thiem had successfully established a “go-to” hole on the other side of the court any time he needed a point.

With Thiem serving at 0-1, 30/30 in the third set, Federer had another opportunity to pounce. Instead, he netted a backhand return.

Thiem won his next service game at 1-2 with another Federer backhand return error. With Thiem serving at 2-3, two more backhand return errors increased the hemorrhaging for the Swiss.

Federer had one last window of opportunity with Thiem serving at 3-4, 0/30 in the third set. He lost the last point of the three-deuce game with a backhand return error.

At 5-5 in the third set, Federer seemingly panicked again. When he got broken in the second set, he doubled down on the secondary pattern of serving and volleying three times on second serves.

At 5-5, 30/15, in the third set, the Swiss went with the risky gambit of drop-shotting on two consecutive points, losing both. Federer missed his last backhand return of the match with Thiem serving at 6-5, 30/15, setting up match point.

Federer’s backhand return was the primary reason he won Indian Wells in 2017, but it turned into a gateway to defeat against Thiem on Sunday. Back to the drawing board.

Does tennis possess the basketball equivalent of an assist?

Novak Djokovic defeated Stefanos Tsitsipas 6-3, 6-4 in the final of the Mutua Madrid Open Sunday, with the Serbian's forehand sizzling from start to finish. Djokovic struck 14 forehand winners to Tsitsipas' seven, but those numbers only begin to tell the story of overall forehand performance.

Forehand winners are often delivered as a decisive blow to end the point, bringing the crowd to its feet with spectacular speed, spin and direction. But we often fail to connect the dots to see where this dominant shot was initially born.

Djokovic and Tsitsipas combined to hit 21 forehand groundstroke winners, with a staggering 90 per cent (19/21) occurring when the player started the point serving. This uncovers an undeniable link between the first shot of the rally and the last, with the serve providing a valuable assist for the forehand winner.

All seven of Tsitsipas' forehand winners occurred when he was serving, while 12 of Djokovic's 14 forehand winners came after his serve. The following data shows the breakdown of forehand winners for the match.

Serve +1 Forehand Winners
• Djokovic = 3
• Tsitsipas = 4

Return +1 Forehand Winners
• Djokovic = 1
• Tsitsipas = 0

Rally Forehand Winners (from the fifth shot onwards)

• Djokovic 10 (9 when serving)
• Tsitsipas 3
Both Djokovic and Tsitsipas totaled four forehand winners each in the 0-4 shot rally length, displaying an evenness in the "First Strike" phase of the point. Once the rally reached five shots or longer, it was Djokovic who clearly took the honours, amassing 10 forehand winners to only three for Tsitsipas. Overall, 77 per cent (17/22) of all forehand winners for the match occurred in single digit rallies, with five making it to double digits.

Length of Rally/Forehand Winners
3 shots = 7
4 shots = 1
5 shots = 5
6 shots = 1
7 shots = 1
9 shots = 1
11 shots = 3
13 shots = 1
17 shots = 1

Over half of the forehand winners (12/21) struck by both players were in the three and five-shot rally lengths, which were essentially the first two times the player had an opportunity to hit a forehand winner after starting the point with a serve.

Backhand Performance
When you compare forehand metrics to backhand for this match, you can clearly see very different behaviour to what provided the assist the most. Djokovic hit 10 backhand groundstroke winners for the match, with only four of them coming behind his own serve. Tsitsipas hit three backhand winners for the match, with only one of them occurring when he was serving.

This type of analysis helps look at our sport from a slightly different perspective. Is it better to evaluate how a point ended by initially recognizing how it began?

Brain Game explains how the Spaniard changed his strategy midway through the Roland Garros final
The wheelhouse was not working, so Rafa lit up Paris with Plan B. Rafael Nadal defeated Dominic Thiem 6-3, 5-7, 6-1, 6-1 in the Roland Garros final on Sunday despite two of his “go-to” strategic categories yielding no advantage at all.

Nadal won 23 games to 12 for the match, so you would expect him to be about twice as good as Thiem across all columns of the stats sheet. But after almost two hours of play, and both players a set apiece, the match was not going at all to script for the Spaniard.

The first problem for Nadal was the baseline. It was betraying him. Nadal won the first set, winning only 45 per cent (20/44) of baseline points. He lost the second set, winning a lowly 38 per cent (13/34) of points from the back of the court.

The main reason for his demise from the baseline was extended rallies of nine-plus shots. You can normally pencil in a point won for Nadal at Roland Garros any time a rally reaches double digits, but he won only 46 per cent (16/35) of long rallies in the first two sets.

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Bonjour Plan B. Nadal played 35 extended rallies in the nine-plus rally length in the first two sets. He played only 11 in the final two sets.

He turned the rules of engagement from the end of the rally to the beginning. Instead of developing the point, he ended it before it had a chance to begin, extinguishing Thiem’s early strategic advantage.

In the final two sets, Nadal crushed Thiem in the short-rally length of zero-to-four shots. Nadal won 29 points to Thiem’s 14 in the category, winning a very healthy 67 per cent. Nadal upped his aggression with the first two touches of the ball, and it carried him to the title.

Plan A was out the window. No more grinding. Plan B was succeeding, and Nadal doubled down on bringing pressure at the front of the point.

In the fourth set, Nadal came to the net the most out of any set in the final, winning eight of nine points at the front of the court. Overall, Nadal won a dominant 85 per cent (23/27) points at net, which was far superior to the 50 per cent (67/134) he won from the back of the court.

Nadal stuck to his traditional first-serve patterns throughout the match, serving mainly down the T in the Deuce court and out wide in the Ad court.

Nadal First-Serve Location
Deuce Court
Wide = 10
Body = 9
T = 20

Ad Court
Wide = 23
Body = 8
T = 8

As Nadal wrestled control of the match in the third set, he won a stunning 100 per cent (8/8) first-serve points, 100 per cent (4/4) second-serve points and 100 per cent (5/5) of net points.

Nadal faced six break points for the match, saving four. Interestingly, he made a first serve on all six, with five of the six directed out wide.

This match was played in two halves. The first two sets were a heavyweight battle. The last two were a gallop.

The match was also played with two separate strategies. The first two sets were long and grinding. The last two were a sprint to the finish line. The average rally length in the first set was 7.76 shots. That was greatly reduced in the third set to 4.23 shots.

Nadal proved once again that he is a master tactician, modifying his primary strategy mid-match to give his opponent a healthy dose of what he didn’t want to see. It was more important for Nadal to employ the strategy that Thiem didn’t want rather than what he wanted to do.

Want to win the 2019 US Open final? You better serve and volley.

Rafael Nadal defeated Daniil Medvedev 7-5, 6-3, 5-7, 4-6, 6-4 in four hours and 50 minutes, with a combined 49 serve-and-volley points naturally occurring from both players to counter each other’s ruthless baseline patterns of play.

When push came to shove in the deciding fifth set, Nadal served and volleyed seven times, winning six (86%) of those points. Overall, Nadal served and volleyed a jaw-dropping 20 times in the final, winning 17 (85%) points. When all seemed equal from the back of the court, the Spaniard cleverly decided to take the battle forward, and reaped the rewards of his aggressive net rushing tactics.

The following breakdown identifies just how dominant Nadal’s serve-and-volley strategy was in such a closely contested final.

Rafael Nadal: US Open Final Points Won
• Baseline Points Won = 47.0% (96/204)
• Net Points Won = 77.2% (51/66)
• Serve & Volley Points Won = 85% (17/20)

Nadal had only served and volleyed five times in five matches to the final, winning all of those points. With Medvedev consistently returning so many crushing baseline shots the Spaniard threw at him, it made perfect sense to move the battle forward to the front of the court to mine a critical advantage in the final.

How did Medvedev answer Nadal’s foray’s forward? By also dominating at the front of the court himself.

Daniil Medvedev: US Open Final Points Won
• Baseline Points Won = 39% (75/194)
• Net Points Won = 68% (50/74)
• Serve & Volley Points Won = 76% (22/29)

To the final, Medvedev only served and volleyed five times - all in the first three rounds - winning four of those points. He massively ratcheted up his aggression at the front of the court in the final against Nadal, winning 22 points serving and volleying against the Spaniard, including winning eight of 12 (67%) in the fifth set.

The average rally length in the final was 5.45 shots, which was the longest of any match Nadal played to the final.

Rafael Nadal: Average Rally Length
• Rd 1 vs. J. Millman = 5.1 shots
• Rd 2 vs. T. Kokkinakis W/O
• Rd 3 vs. H. Chung = 4.6 shots
• Rd 4 vs. M. Cilic = 3.7 shots
• Qtr vs. D. Schwartzman = 5.3 shots
• Semi vs. M. Berrettini = 4.1 shots
• Final vs. D. Medvedev = 5.5 shots

So why did Nadal and Medvedev combine to serve and volley 49 times in the final when they had only combined to serve and volley 10 times (5 Nadal / 5 Medvedev) through to the final?

The answer is simple. Baseline pressure of the highest order.

Nadal was constantly under attack from the back of the court in the final against Medvedev, only winning 47 per cent (96/204) of points from the back of the court. The final against Medvedev was the only match that the Spaniard dipped below 50 per cent with baseline points won in any match for the past two weeks in New York.

The biggest takeaway from the final is that there were 49 combined serve-and-volley points from two of the strongest baseline players in the game, who combined to win 61 per cent (30/49) of their points immediately rushing the net behind a serve. If you can’t craft an advantage from the back of the court, the front of the court always remains a viable option.

Infosys ATP Beyond The Numbers explains one key stat behind the former World No. 3's push

One way to evaluate second-serve performance is to examine how many points you win. The more the merrier. Another way is to look at how many points you don’t lose through the self-inflicted wound of a double fault. Less is always best.

An Infosys ATP Beyond The Numbers analysis of double faults as a percentage of second serve points lost from the current Top 20 in 2019 identifies a hidden weapon that Stan Wawrinka has used to surge back to the elite level of our sport.

Wawrinka entered the 2018 US Open with an ATP Ranking of No. 101. He left the 2019 US Open back inside the Top 20, with second-serve performance a big key to his comeback.

In the past 52 weeks, Wawrinka is ranked seventh on the ATP Tour in second-serve points won, at 55.4 per cent. But if you dig a little deeper, you find a hidden metric where he is head and shoulders above any other player in the Top 20.

The first part of the analysis is to only examine the second-serve points Wawrinka has lost in 2019 before uncovering how many of them were double faults. It is by far the fewest of the current Top 20. Wawrinka’s double faults only account for 11.5 per cent (85/740) of his second-serve points lost, which is well below the Top 20 average of 22.3 per cent, or about one out of every five second serve points. In this analysis, the lower the percentage the better.

The leading five players of the current Top 20 that hit the least amount of double faults per points lost on second serve are below.

1. Stan Wawrinka = 11.5% (85 double faults/740 second-serve points lost)
2. Roberto Bautista Agut = 14.6% (91/625)
3. Roger Federer = 15.2% (89/586)
4. Matteo Berrettini = 16.3% (121/743)
5. Stefanos Tsitsipas = 16.5% (137/832)

Essentially, these five players “score own goals” the least with double faults when losing a second-serve point. On the other end of the spectrum, there were three Top 20 players that crossed the 25 per cent barrier, meaning that at least one out of every four second serve points they have lost so far in 2019 was a double fault. Those players are:

• Alexander Zverev = 40.9% (342/837)
• Nikoloz Basilashvili = 30.9% (261/844)
• Gael Monfils = 27.7% (172/622)

Double faults will always be a necessary evil in our sport, with some players employing a more aggressive strategy of going for more on second serves and absorbing some double faults in the process of finding their highest win percentage.

Wawrinka’s unique serve motion, with two arms high in the air early in the serve motion, may arguably not be the simplest technique to teach young players. But the impressive end result of only losing about one out of approximately 10 second-serve points with a double fault is a goal players at all levels of our game should be trying to emulate.

Daniil Medvedev’s mastery of a tennis match is mesmerising.

Medvedev defeated Alexander Zverev 6-4, 6-1 in the final of the Rolex Shanghai Masters on Sunday, with Zverev saying post-match that, “Daniil is somebody that plays a way that we have never seen before.” You can’t beat what you can’t understand.

Medvedev did a lot right in the final, with the following five areas contributing significantly to the outcome.

1. Pound The Zverev Forehand
Medvedev is typically a fast starter in his matches and this final was true to form. The Russian won 12 of the first 15 points of the match to race to a 3-0 lead. Nine of those 12 points won were Zverev forehand errors.

Medvedev unveiled his primary strategy on the very first point of the match, winning a 13-shot rally with Zverev missing a forehand down the line from out wide in the Deuce court. With Medvedev leading 40/15 a few points later in his opening service game, Medvedev would go on to win six of the next seven points, with all six resulting in a Zverev forehand error.

Medvedev’s baseline strategy focused on trading backhands through the Ad court with Zverev until an opportunity presented itself to attack the German out wide in the Deuce court, forcing a forehand error on the run.

2. Dominate Three-Shot Rallies
The most common rally length in the final was one shot in the court, which involves the serve landing in and the ball not coming back from either an ace or a missed return. There were 28 one-shot rallies, which equated to 27 per cent of all points. This was a very even battleground in this match, with both players winning 14 points each.

The next most common rally length was three shots in the court, with 15 points played (14% of total points). Medvedev completely dominated this phase of the match, winning 12 of the 15 points.

NOTE
• A “Serve +1” shot is the first shot after the serve.
• A “Return +1” shot is the first shot after the return.
• Rally length is defined by the ball landing in the court - not hitting the strings.

Medvedev: 3-Shot Rallies Points Won = 12
• Zverev Return +1 forehand error = 5
• Medvedev Serve +1 backhand winner = 4
• Medvedev Serve +1 forehand winner = 2
• Medvedev Serve & volley / backhand volley winner = 1

Zverev: 3-Shot Rallies Points Won = 3
• Zverev Serve +1 forehand winner = 1
• Medvedev Return +1 backhand pass error = 1
• Medvedev Return +1 backhand error = 1

3. Zverev Double Faults = 3
Zverev has struggled mightily with double faults throughout this season, but has improved lately and only committed one each in his quarter-final victory over Roger Federer and his semi-final win over Matteo Berrettini.

Zverev’s three double faults could not have come at worse times against Medvedev, as they were directly responsible for losing the first set and heavily contributed to getting broken at the start of the second set.

Serving at 4-5, 30/30 in the opening set, Zverev double faulted twice in a row in the net to gift the set to Medvedev. Zverev then double-faulted leading 40/30 on serve at 0-1 in the second set. Two points later, he lost his serve. The pressure of the moment and Medvedev’s merciless game style that yields precious few free points were both contributing factors.

4. Medvedev Serve & Volley = 3
Medvedev is far from a one-dimensional baseline player. He served and volleyed three times in the final, winning two of those points. Three times may not sound like a lot, but this specialised secondary tactic is also about creating doubt and indecision in the opponent’s mind, trying to also stop the returner from blocking the serve back slow and high over the net.

By putting just three serve-and-volley points on the table, Medvedev was able to affect Zverev’s return strategy and win the guessing game of “will he or won’t he” come straight to the net next time he serves. By comparison, Zverev elected not to serve-and-volley at all during the match.

In this year's US Open final against Rafael Nadal, Medvedev served and volleyed a staggering 29 times, winning 76 per cent (22/29) of those points, including winning 8/12 (67%) in the deciding fifth set.

5. Medvedev’s Backhand Return
Medvedev’s backhand return of serve is a rock-solid part of his overall arsenal. Zverev simply overplayed it. The majority of Zverev’s serves went to Medvedev’s backhand and the German constantly leaked points in this specific area.

Medvedev Return Performance
• Starting Point With A Backhand Return = Won 70% (14/20)
• Starting Point With A Forehand Return = Won 61% (11/18)

Return Errors
• Backhand Return Error = Medvedev 2 / Zverev 5
• Forehand Return Error = Medvedev 5 / Zverev 5

Medvedev has now contested six straight finals, winning three, and has won his past 18 sets in a row to prevail in St. Petersburg and Shanghai. He comes at you so quickly, so flat, and in so many ways, that he is a nightmare to strategise against.

The Russian’s meritorious victory can be boiled down in equal parts to a high level of execution on his side of the court and a high degree of confusion of exactly how to play him on the other side.

Infosys ATP Beyond The Numbers shows how Nadal dominates with his second serve

For the past three seasons, Rafael Nadal’s second-serve performance has elevated to beast mode.

An Infosys ATP Beyond The Numbers analysis of the Spaniard’s second-serve win percentage since he first won an ATP event in 2004 identifies that 2017, 2018, and 2019 occupy three of his best four years on Tour.

Consider the following three second-serve achievements from Nadal:

1. Best Three-Year Streak
Nadal is currently first in second-serve points for the 2019 season at 59.97 per cent (836/1394). Federer is the only player within striking distance of taking year-end honours in this category, as the Swiss currently sits at 59.56 per cent (885/1486) won.

If Nadal does finish first in this category in 2019, it will be the first time in his career that he will have finished first in second-serve points won for three consecutive seasons.

Best Three 2019 Tournaments: Second-Serve Points Won
Rome = 67.44% (58/86)
Acapulco = 67.16% (45/67)
Indian Wells = 66.67% (60/90)

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2. 2017 Was The Best
Nadal’s best year since 2004 winning second-serve points was just two years ago in 2017, when he averaged winning 61.17 per cent (1095/1790).

At Roland Garros in 2017, he charged through the draw to win the title without dropping a set. Of the 20 sets he won, opponents won a maximum of two games in 14 of them. He went on a rampage with second-serve points won, winning a jaw-dropping 74.17 per cent (112/151).

His best three tournaments with second-serve points won in 2017:
Roland Garros = 74.17% (112/151)
Shanghai = 66.25% (53/80)
Brisbane = 66.10% (39/59)

3. No One Does It Better
Nobody has a higher win percentage on second serves during their career since statistics in tennis were first kept in 1991. What’s also extremely impressive is that Nadal has been positioned in the Top 10 in this category for the past 16 years.

The top three players in career second-serve points won:
R. Nadal = 57.45% (15006/26122)
R. Federer = 56.85% (24079/42353)
J. Isner = 56.11% (9972/17773)

Nadal’s 2019 US Open title saw him win an impressive 57.02 per cent (138/242) on the hard courts in New York. He is now just 0.03 of a percentage point away from winning 60 per cent or more for the third time in his career.

What will it take to tip the scales to 60 per cent in 2019? Win just one more second-serve point.

2004 - 2017: Rafael Nadal Second-Serve Win Percentage / Second-Serve Position

Year


Win %


Position

2017


61.17%


1

2008


60.12%


1

2019


59.97%


1

2018


59.57%


1

2010


59.52%


1

2013


59.14%


2

2005


57.30%


2

2006


57.18%


2

2012


57.07%


2

2009


57.01%


3

2011


56.72%


2

2007


56.49%


3

2014


55.44%


6

2015


55.44%


9

2016


54.38%


10

2004


53.92%


10

Serbian dominates with serve and return, no long groundstroke rallies needed
Imagine a Novak Djokovic match where more than half the points played featured only a serve and a return. Impossible, right?

Djokovic defeated Denis Shapovalov 6-3, 6-4 in the final of the Rolex Paris Masters on Sunday by dominating the really short points that featured no groundstrokes at all. Of the 104 points played, 56 of them (54%) featured only a serve and return, which played right into the Super Serb’s “first- strike” strategy.

No groundstrokes. No problem for Novak.

It’s important to note that rally length is dictated by balls landing in the court, not shots hitting the racquet. In rallies that lasted either zero (double fault), one or two shots, Djokovic collected 34 points, which represented more than half (56%) of the 61 points he won for the match.

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More than eight points out of 10 in the final saw either player touch the ball a maximum of only two times. Djokovic’s initial touches simply went in the court a lot more than Shapovalov’s.

What mattered most to Djokovic in these ultra-quick exchanges? Extracting an error was the primary focus. Of the 34 points Djokovic won when the rally length was zero, one or two shots, only four were his winners, with 30 being errors from Shapovalov. The Canadian committed only three double faults, but 27 return errors were what sunk the ship.

2019 Paris Final: Rallies Without A Groundstroke

Rally Type

Djokovic Won Point

Shapovalov Won Point

Double Faults

3

1

Aces

2

12

Return Errors

27

9

Return Winner

2

0

Total Points Won

34 (61%)

22 (39%)

Shapovalov committed 15 forehand return errors and 12 backhand return errors for the match, with most of them (15/27) coming in the Deuce Court. The Canadian made eight forehand return errors from a Djokovic first serve down the T in the Deuce Court, and six on sliders out wide to the backhand. Overall, Djokovic was able to extract 22 return errors from a first serve and five from a second serve.

Shapovalov Errors
Double Faults = 3
Return = 27
Serve +1 = 5
Return +1 = 4
5+ Shot Rallies = 12
Total = 51

Djokovic’s serve was a major asset all week in Paris, and it was his primary weapon in the final. “It was tough for me to find a groove just because he was really, really picking his spots on the serve,” Shapovalov said.

We often think of Djokovic as a master of long rallies, but they had no bearing on this match at all, with only four points featuring in the nine-plus shot rally length and only two rallies maturing to double digits.

Total Points Played
0-4 Shots = 84 (81%)
5-8 Shots = 16 (14%)
9+ Shots = 4 (5%)
Total Points = 104

Shapovalov won the three-shot rally length 7-6 and drew even with Djokovic 4-4 in four-shot rallies. But the Canadian was heavily in debt in zero-, one- and two-shot rallies.

The 0-4 Shot Rally Length Broken Down

0-4 Shot Break Down

Djokovic Won Point

Shapovalov Won Point

0 Shots (double fault)

3

1

1 Shot

29

21

2 Shots

7

2

3 Shots

6

7

4 Shots

4

4

TOTAL

49

35

Djokovic’s game has morphed perfectly at the end of the season to excel on indoor hard courts, where striking first is dictated by the faster conditions. It must have been nice to put the lethal groundstrokes on the shelf for a day and let the serve and return collect the silverware.

Editor's note: Craig O'Shannessy is a member of Novak Djokovic's coaching team.

Greek goes more than 30 minutes without making a backhand error

Imagine playing a set and half of tennis in the biggest match of your life and not missing a single backhand groundstroke.

Stefanos Tsitsipas defeated Dominic Thiem 6-7(6), 6-2, 7-6(4) to win the Nitto ATP Finals on Sunday, with his swashbuckling one-handed backhand providing the rock he needed to lean on after losing the opening set.

In the first set, Tsitsipas hit 34 backhand groundstrokes (excluding returns and volleys), collecting one winner, while making eight errors. At 6/6 in the first-set tie-break, Tsitsipas miss-hit a backhand long to gift Thiem a set point. This innocuous backhand error would prove to be a pivotal moment in the final. The match was 65 minutes old, and Tsitsipas would incredibly not miss a backhand groundstroke for the next 35 minutes, until 0-0, 30/40 in the third set.

View Infosys ATP Scores & Stats Match Center

During that 35-minute period, the Greek made 19 straight backhands while Thiem’s backhand faltered with 11 errors and no winners from 40 shots. Basically, Thiem made a backhand error one out of every four times he hit that stroke, while Tsitsipas simply couldn’t miss the court.

Fast forward to the end of the match, and it was once again the Tsitsipas backhand that stood tall. He made his last nine backhands in a row, including all seven in the thrilling third-set tie-break. Thiem, on the other hand, hit seven backhand groundstrokes in the third-set tie-break, and crucially missed two of them.

Backhand Performance: Tsitsipas v Thiem

All Three Sets Tsitsipas Thiem
Backhand Groundstroke Winners 2 3
Backhand Groundstroke Errors 15 26
Total Backhand Groundstrokes 93 95
Both players struck exactly 34 backhand groundstrokes in the opening set, with Tsitsipas averaging one error for every 4.3 backhands (8/34), which was superior to Thiem’s average of one backhand error for every 2.8 backhands (12/34). In the second set, Tsitsipas didn’t commit a backhand groundstroke error. Thiem missed five of his 10 backhands.

Tsitsipas Ad Court First Serves Down The T
Another key battle that the Greek dominated was first serves in the Ad court. Overall, he lost seven first-serve points in the Deuce court, dropping just three in the Ad court. Tsitsipas’ strategy was to overwhelmingly serve down the T in the Ad court, where he didn’t lose a single point, winning all 16 points he directed there.

Tsitsipas 1st Serve Direction & Win Percentage

First Serve Direction First Serve Made First Serve Won Win Percentage
Deuce Court Wide 20 15 75%
Deuce Court Body 2 2 100%
Deuce Court T 12 10 83%
Ad Court Wide 8 5 63%
Ad Court Body 1 1 100%
Ad Court T 16 16 100%
When you combine Deuce Court and Ad Court, Tsitsipas won a mind-blowing 93 per cent (26/28) of first-serve points going right down the T for the match.

ATP Infosys Second Screen: Thiem's First Serve vs. Tsitsipas, Ad Court

Thiem First Serve In Ad Court vs. Tsitsipas

Thiem served out wide in the Ad court at the highest rate (62%) of any location on both sides of the court combined. By doing so, he went to Tsitsipas' backhand. That did not pay dividends, as he only won 60 per cent of those points (12/20) and did not hit one ace.

Tsitsipas' serve was on fire, and the backhand simply refused to break. That combination can get you places.

Brain Game explains how Djokovic won his 17th Grand Slam title
Novak Djokovic created five degrees of separation to defeat Dominic Thiem 6-4, 4-6, 2-6, 6-3, 6-4 in the final of the Australian Open on Sunday.

Djokovic won just 10 more points for the match (157-147), and looked in serious trouble trailing two sets to one. But in five specific areas, he clearly outperformed Thiem to win his 17th Grand Slam singles title.

1: Second-Serve Points Won
The dividing line for success in this metric is always right around the 50 per cent mark. The tournament average this year was 51 per cent (5154/10147) second-serve points won, and that’s exactly what Djokovic attained for the match (24/47). Thiem was able to win only 45 per cent (28/62) of his second-serve points.

When you compare second-serve performance to sets won, you quickly draw a straight line between the two metrics.

Second-Serve Performance - Sets Won/Lost
Djokovic three sets won = 61% (14/23)
Djokovic two sets lost = 42% (10/24)
Thiem two sets won = 59% (17/29)
Thiem three sets lost = 33% (11/33)

2: Serve And Volley
Djokovic served and volleyed four times in the final, winning three of them. What’s strategically puzzling is that Thiem had served and volleyed 11 times coming into the final, winning every single one of those points, but failed to employ the aggressive tactic against Djokovic.

With Djokovic serving at 1-1, 30/40 at the start of the fourth set, trailing two sets to one, Djokovic boldly served and volleyed and won the point. He served and volleyed again on break point at 2-1, Ad Out in the fifth set, also winning the point.

Those were two huge moments in the match that Djokovic gambled with serve and volley and was richly rewarded for his aggression.


3: Zero-To-Four Shot Rally Length
Djokovic won the zero-to-four shot rally length 89-80, creating the most distance from Thiem in any of the three rally lengths.

Rally Length - Points Won/Lost
0-4 Shots = +9 (89 won/80 lost)
5-8 Shots = Even (37 won/ 37 lost)
9+ Shots = +1 (31 won / 30 lost)

In all three sets Djokovic claimed, he won the zero-to-four rally length by a combined 14 points. In the two sets Djokovic lost, Thiem won the important “First-Strike” rally length by five shots (34-29).

Rally Length: Djokovic 2020 Australian Open Seven Matches
0-4 Shots = +115 (505 won / 390 lost)
5-8 Shots = +25 (162 won / 137 lost)
9+ Shots = +33 (117 won / 84 lost)

4: Baseline Points Won
Djokovic had a losing record in baseline points won in the final, winning just 48 per cent (94/196) when he stood at the baseline at the end of the rally.

It may seem like a low number, but it’s actually quite healthy. Thiem, by comparison, won only 43 per cent (84/194) of his baseline points in the final. In the deciding fifth set, the baseline was well and truly Djokovic’s domain.

Fifth Set Baseline Points Won
Djokovic = 52.3% (23/44)
Thiem = 40.5% (17/42)

Overall for the tournament, Djokovic won 54 per cent (427/795), which was tied for fourth best.



5: Forehand Performance
Both Djokovic and Thiem were credited with 18 forehand winners for the match. It’s the error count where Djokovic found his separation.

Forehand Forced Errors
Djokovic = 15
Thiem = 36

Forehand Unforced Errors
Djokovic = 23
Thiem = 26

Djokovic committed 38 forehand errors for the match, while Thiem was significantly higher at 62. In the deciding fifth set, Djokovic had only eight forehand errors in total, while Thiem committed 21. When push came to shove, Djokovic’s forehand found the court a lot more than Thiem’s.

The three-hour, 59-minute match had several momentum swings, but Djokovic stayed the course and ultimately wrestled control of enough small battles all over the court to take home a record-extending eighth Australian Open singles title.

Rally length of gruelling fifth set was almost double the rally length of the second set
Dominic Thiem was tight. In fact, he himself acknowledged in his victorious US Open press conference that he was “super, super tight.”

“The problem was my nerves,” Thiem said post-match. In much the same way that Stan Wawrinka was shaking and crying in the locker room before defeating Novak Djokovic in four sets in the 2016 US Open final, Thiem said he was tight the whole day.

Because of the tightness, he quickly fell behind two sets to love and a break down in the third. Because as Thiem said, “the belief was stronger than the body,” he won his first Grand Slam title, defeating Alexander Zverev 2-6, 4-6, 6-4, 6-3, 7-6(6) in one of the most physically and mentally draining finals in recent times. Both players cramped at the end, their bodies failing them when they needed it most. Their minds went to hell and back trying to reach the finish line first.

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Zverev was not tight at all to begin the match, but he too succumbed to nerves trying to close a huge lead instead of continuing to employ the aggressive, net-rushing game style that positioned him so far ahead in the match. Knowing that the wolves were howling in the head of both players during the final provides the necessary lens to understand the match analytics, which dramatically changed from beginning to end.

For example, Zverev had 10 forehand winners and 17 forehand errors in the first two sets. It was the most dominant shot on the court. In the remaining three sets, he only had seven forehand winners and committed 40 errors. Nerves mercilessly took this shot out at the knees.

At the 61-minute mark of the final, Thiem walked up to the baseline to serve trailing 6-2, 5-1, 30/40. He ended up saving three break points in that game, providing the first speck of light at the end of the tunnel. He reeled off three straight games to 4-5, including breaking Zverev for the first time in the match.

This is where the winds started to change for Thiem.

In Zverev’s post-match interview, he said, “The match turned when he broke me for the first time in the second set (at 5-2). I think he started playing much better and I started playing much worse.” If Zverev ever has any doubts about the game style best suited for his athletic 6’6” frame, he needs to look no further than the first 14 games of the final where he led 6-2, 5-1. He is a power baseliner who relentlessly hunts the short ball. And yes, serving and volleying is a line item that sits right at the top of the game plan.

Zverev Coming Forward
In the final, Zverev served and volleyed 40 times (a stat that includes aces, unreturned serves and five double faults, when he was moving forward), winning a commanding 68 per cent (27/40). Zverev won five of six points serving and volleying in the opening set, including serving and volleying on a second serve leading 2-1, 15-0. The strategy worked so well because Thiem stood as far back as possible to take up his return position, often times double checking where the linespeople were in his immediate vicinity, so as not to collide with them.

Zverev was credited with approaching the net 66 times in the match, winning a healthy 65 per cent (43/66) of points, which was far superior than the 45 per cent (72/160) he won standing at the baseline. With Thiem wanting to stand back as far as possible to return and rally, coming forward was the perfect antidote for Zverev.

Thiem Extending The Rallies
Zverev put on a north-south masterclass in the first two sets. Thiem desperately wanted to turn the match east-west and make it a groundstroke duel with lots of heavy topspin, heavy slice and side-to-side pain. He wanted to wear Zverev out and was willing to sacrifice every ounce of his own fitness to make it happen.

The average rally length of the five sets identifies exactly how Thiem scraped his way back into the match.

Average Rally Length

Set Avg. Rally Length Outcome
1 4 Zverev 6-2
2 3.3 Zverev 6-4
3 4.6 Thiem 6-4
4 5 Thiem 6-3
5 6.3 Thiem 7-6(6)
The average rally length in the fifth set (6.29 shots) was almost double that of the second set (3.30 shots) when Zverev was basically untouchable.

Double Faults
Zverev’s 15 double faults played a major part in him losing the final. He was broken seven times in the match, with seven double faults occurring in five of those service games. Two double faults reared their head in the fifth set tie-break.

Zverev saved one match point at 5-6 in the fifth set tie-break with a 68mph second serve that barely crept over the net. Serving at 3-4 in the fourth set, he hit seven second serves and was ultimately broken. One was a double fault, two were over 130mph, while the other four were 83mph and lower. Nobody knew what was coming or where they were landing, especially Zverev.

Distance Run
Overall, both players ran a 5K during the final, with Thiem running 5206 metres and Zverev running 5138 metres. The average distance run per point for Thiem was a lactic-acid-inducing 16.17 metres, with Zverev averaging 15.96 metres. Thiem’s desperate game plan of extending rallies to outlast Zverev was a dangerous one, as it took him to the very brink of exhaustion to pull it off. He could not stand still toward the end of the match for fear of his body locking up.

This final was about survival. It was about believing there was a way forward when one didn’t exist.

Learn how drop shots played a critical role in Monday's final
Twenty eight drop shots in 21 games.

Novak Djokovic defeated Diego Schwartzman 7-5, 6-3 in the final of the Internazionali BNL d’Italia on Sunday in Rome, coming from two breaks down in the first set and a break down in the second set to secure a record-breaking 36th ATP Masters 1000 crown.

The drop shots came thick and fast from the racquet of the World No. 1, beginning on the second point of the match when he hit a backhand drop shot up the line with heavy backspin for a clean winner. It was a premeditated strike that sent an immediate message to Schwartzman. If the Argentine was going to set up shop further back than two metres behind the baseline to exchange side-to-side groundstrokes, he was going to have to do a lot of running forward to the net as well.


The drop shot barrage extended all the way to match point when Djokovic hit an identical backhand drop shot, with Schwartzman running this one down, but missing it wide to end the final. At any moment, especially from backhand groundstrokes, you knew Djokovic wanted to lean onto the ball and show a driving backhand, but then switch his grip in the backswing behind his body and carve out another drop shot to pull Schwartzman out of his deep trench. Twenty-six of the 28 drop shots from both players came off the backhand side.

The only problem for Djokovic was winning them.

Overall, Djokovic hit 20 drop shots in the match and only won seven. Winning just 35 per cent (7/20) of any tennis strategy is typically considered a disaster, but there were still benefits for the Serbian other than moving a point ahead on the scoreboard. Schwartzman’s game plan was to play exceptionally deep in the court and not miss. After the first set, Hawk-Eye graphics created an imaginary line deeper than two metres behind the baseline and highlighted that Schwartzman hit 50 per cent of his groundstrokes from this very deep location. The benefit for Schwartzman with this strategy was that Djokovic’s ball would slow down considerably at contact and be less venomous. The downside was Schwartzman’s considerable distance from the front of the court.

Schwartzman's Rally Hit Point vs. Djokovic

<a href='/en/players/diego-schwartzman/sm37/overview'>Diego Schwartzman</a>

Djokovic's Rally Hit Point vs. Schwartzman

<a href='/en/players/novak-djokovic/d643/overview'>Novak Djokovic</a>

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Djokovic only hit five drop shots for a clean winner. Five more went straight in the net. Nineteen of the 20 drop shots were struck off his backhand wing and 14 of the 19 were struck straight down the line. If Djokovic was going to lose the point, he made sure his opponent would pay the physical price running side to side as well as chasing down a menacing short ball.

Djokovic won with his first drop shot, but then lost his next four. Both players combined to hit four drop shots in the 4-4 game in the opening set, with Djokovic winning three of the points. Two games later at 5-5, Djokovic hit three drop shots, winning one. Djokovic was so obsessed with drop shots that he actually hit two in one point on the first point of the second set. The second one went wide.

Schwartzman, by comparison, was far more efficient with his drop shots, winning six of eight, including four of four in the second set. Drop shots are typically a secondary tactic in a match that rarely reach double digits in total. It’s interesting to note that between the two players the drop shot still had a losing record in this match, winning just 46 per cent (13/28) of the time. Djokovic lost six straight attempts in four games from 5-5 in the first set to 0-1 in the second set.

Winning the point is one outcome of hitting a drop shot. Building up lactic acid in your opponent’s legs and pulling them out of their comfort zone for the next point doesn’t exist on a stats page. But if they did, Djokovic would rightly point to these side benefits as to why he won the match.

- Hawkeye graphics courtesy ATP Media

Learn how the "Serve +1" played a key role for the Spaniard
The first shot after the serve is called “Serve +1” and it’s precisely where Rafael Nadal buried Novak Djokovic in Sunday’s Roland Garros final.

Nadal defeated Djokovic 6-0, 6-2, 7-5 by stamping his authority at the beginning of the rally much more than grinding the Serbian down in longer exchanges. The lopsided scoreline suggests Nadal dominated all statistical facets of the final, but he only crafted a one-point advantage (53-52) once the rally was five shots or longer.

Nadal crushed Djokovic 53-25 in the “First Strike” 0-4 shot rally length, with the third shot of the rally being by far the most influential. Overall, the point ended 32 times on the third shot of the rally, which was considerably more than any other rally length for the match.

Serve +1 Performance (3-shot rallies)

Nadal
• 8 winners
• 1 unforced error

Djokovic
• 6 winners
• 1 forced error
•16 unforced errors

Nadal’s impenetrable defensive skills saw him commit just one Serve +1 error, while Djokovic yielded a combined 17 forced and unforced. As a side note, Nadal is always bringing some type of pressure to his opponents’ shot, so the “unforced” label against Nadal on Court Philippe Chatrier in a Roland Garros final is somewhat of a stretch.

Djokovic only won 50 per cent (33/66) of his first-serve points and 48 per cent (16/33) of second-serve points for the match, while being broken seven times. The 17 Serve+1 errors had a lot to do with that.

Djokovic Errors When Serving
• Shot 1 (Double fault) = 4
• Shot 3 (Serve +1) = 17
• Shot 5 = 6
• Shot 7 = 3
• Shots 9+ = 7

Quite simply, Djokovic committed his most errors (17) for the match in a three-shot rally, while Nadal collected his most winners (8). The decisive contrast that existed between the two players manifested itself right here.

Groundstroke Performance
Nadal used his forehand like a heavy, stone-cutting hammer, constantly battering away through the Ad court up high to Djokovic’s backhand. It was an unrelenting strategy that fueled his baseline engine.

Nadal (including passing shots / approach shots / drop shots)

• Forehand = 17 winners / 11 errors = +6
• Backhand = 7 winners / 9 errors = -2
• Total = 24 winners / 20 errors
Djokovic (including passing shots / approach shots / drop shots)
• Forehand = 10 winners / 25 errors = -15
• Backhand = 13 winners / 35 errors = -22
• Total = 23 winners / 60 errors

When you compare all groundstroke winners to errors, Nadal’s forehand and backhand come out at +4 (24 winners / 20 errors). Djokovic’s numbers seem from a different match, as he ended up at -37 (23 winners / 60 errors).

In their last Grand Slam encounter, Djokovic defeated Nadal 6-3, 6-2, 6-3 in the 2019 Australian Open final by initially rallying to Nadal’s backhand and then attacking the Spaniard’s forehand out wide in the Ad court. Starting with the first few points of Sunday’s final, you could sense Nadal had an answer for that tactic, which was to put Djokovic in the “backhand cage”.

Nadal controlled the flow of baseline exchanges with his forehand, spinning it up as high as he could to Djokovic’s backhand, which gained him initial control of the point. After just a couple of minutes, Nadal’s game plan was obvious while Djokovic had no counter, which should have been to upgrade to more run-around forehands. The Serbian would fall behind two sets and a break (3-2) in the third set before finally breaking Nadal’s serve for the first time in the match to level at three games all.

Ultimately, Djokovic overplayed the drop shot and struggled to find a consistent Serve +1 strategy. The clarity of game plan was obvious for Nadal. For Djokovic, he could never latch onto that one tactic that could be repeated enough to take a set. Nadal simply out-thought and out-played the World No. 1.

Learn how court-positioning made the difference against Zverev
Daniil Medvedev feels the strategic magnetism of the baseline.

Medvedev defeated Alexander Zverev 5-7, 6-4, 6-1 in the final of the Rolex Paris Masters Sunday by playing with superior court position in their inevitable flurry of bruising baseline exchanges. When we watch Medvedev hit the ball, we are mesmerised by his long, wieldy strokes that look more like he is swinging a heavy axe than a tennis racquet. It’s essential to also look at where he is standing when he swings that metaphorical axe because it is often in a more advantageous place relative to the baseline than his opponent.

Rally Contact Point
Medvedev hit 27 per cent of his rally balls from inside the baseline, which was almost double that of Zverev’s 15 per cent. A vast majority of these rally balls for Medvedev were struck from a zone within two metres inside the baseline where he dined on the superior geometry of the rectangular court to extend Zverev out wide, hitting forehands and backhands loaded with directional pressure.

Players typically trade baseline blows standing in a zone two metres behind the baseline, and this match was no exception. Zverev hit 50 per cent of his baseline shots from here, while Medvedev was at 46 per cent.

The last, deep contact zone starts two metres behind the baseline and extends all the way to the back of the court. This is where players retreat to find more time to defend. The problem is that it’s almost impossible to attack from this far back, and it’s another key battleground that Medvedev exploited.

The Russian only hit 27 per cent of his groundstrokes from this area, while Zverev was at 35 per cent. Zverev hit almost a third of his shots from this deep zone, where he typically found himself running and defending and falling further and further behind in the point.

Medvedev Rally Hit Points:

Medvedev Paris 2020 Final Rally Hit Points

Zverev Rally Hit Points:

Zverev Paris 2020 Final Rally Hit Points

Depth
Playing up in the court also helped Medvedev land his shots deeper in the court as a result. Medvedev landed 89 per cent of his groundstrokes past the service line, which was superior to Zverev’s 83 per cent. This gap was accentuated in the third set, in which Medvedev was at 90 per cent past the service line, while Zverev only managed 75 per cent as the finish line rushed forward in Medvedev’s favour.

Power
With Medvedev hovering more around the baseline and taking the ball earlier, he was also able to hit the ball harder as a result. Medvedev’s average groundstroke speed was 116 kph, with Zverev at 112 kph. In the third set it was 117kph for Medvedev and 110kph for Zverev. The German was standing too deep, hitting too short, and not employing enough power to make the Russian uncomfortable.

Backhands
As expected, the vast majority of points were traded through the Ad court with each player trying to break down his opponent’s backhand wing. Medvedev hit 49 per cent of all groundstokes wide to Zverev’s backhand, 14 per cent down the middle, and 37 per cent wide to the forehand.

On the surface, these backhand-to-backhand blows looked fairly even, but Medvedev constantly had an advantage because he was not getting pushed back. Overall, Medvedev made contact with his backhand inside the baseline 29 per cent of the time, which was far superior to Zverev’s 10 per cent. Medvedev was leaning on his backhand, while Zverev was leaning off his.

Medvedev Backhand Hit Points:

Medvedev Backhand Hit Points Paris 2020 Final

Zverev Backhand Hit Points:

Zverev Backhand Hit Points Paris 2020 Final

Another key factor was that Zverev simply hit too many backhands in the match. The German hit 183 backhands for the match and 162 forehands, giving him a surplus of 21 backhands. That’s not a winning plan of attack. Medvedev hit 158 backhands and 175 forehands, giving him 17 more aggressive, penetrating forehands at his disposal.

The following breakdown from the match shows the superior speeds forehands deliver.

Average Groundstroke Speed

Forehands
• Medvedev=126kph
• Zverev=123kph

Backhands
• Medvedev=108 kph
• Zverev=105 kph

The end result is an accumulation of a lot of small battles that Medvedev won that helped pave the way to victory. Medvedev comparatively hit more forehands, hit them harder, and when he did hit backhands, he applied more pressure by standing further up the court.

How you hit the ball matters. So does where you hit it from.

- HawkEye data and visuals courtesy ATP Media