BRAIN GAME - artykuły ze strony ATP

[Damian]

Brain Game: Why Daniil Is Russian To Net

Spoiler:

Successful day at net underpins World No. 4’s victory over Thiem
It was Russian roulette on a tennis court. The Russian won.

Daniil Medvedev threw caution to the wind and courageously served and volleyed seven times behind his second serve against Dominic Thiem in the final of the Nitto ATP Finals in London Sunday. He won six of them.

Medvedev’s 4-6, 7-6(2), 6-4 victory was stunning in several ways, with his commitment to come forward in the big moments behind his second serve a driving force behind the biggest win of his career.

Pivotal moments in the match seemed to be constantly unfolding, but none moreso than Medvedev serving at the precarious scoreline of 3-3 30/40 in the second set. He misses his first serve down the T and then hit a heavy, 83mph kick second serve out wide that Thiem was sitting on with a potent run-around forehand return. The Austrian uncorked it at Medvedev’s feet but the Russian somehow managed to get it up and over the net and short in the court. It was pure desperation on both sides of the net.

Thiem raced forward looking to rip another forehand but the ball stayed low and Thiem was forced to slice it with his topspin grip. As is prone to happen, the wrong grip forces the ball wide and Medvedev won the point.

You May Also Like: Giant Killer! Medvedev Takes Nitto ATP Finals Title
Two points later, Thiem had another break point, and Medvedev reached into his serve and volley bag of tricks once more, this time hitting an ace with his first serve as he sprinted straight to the net. No desperate volley needed this time.

Overall, Medvedev served and volleyed 16 times in the final, winning 13 of them. In the previous game at 2-2 in the second set, Medvedev also trailed 30/40. He served and volleyed behind a first serve on and struck another ace right down the T.

The bigger the moment, the more chance you had of finding the Russian stalking the net.

Another pivotal moment in the match came in the second set tie-break with Thiem serving at 2-3. Medvedev got a look at a 100mph second serve straight to his backhand return where he could step into the shot. He surprised everyone with his only return approach of the match. The bold tactic caught Thiem off guard and his backhand slice passing shot only made it half way up the net. Medvedev won the next three points in quick succession to take the second set.

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Overall, Medvedev came to the net a staggering 48 times (including serve & volley), winning an impressive 38 (79%) of them. In set two alone, he won 21 of 27 points (78%). From 3-3, Ad Out in the second set to 2-2, 15-15 in the third set, Medvedev came to the net 16 times and won every single point. Thiem must have felt like he was running away from an avalanche.

Medvedev’s successful serve and volley strategy is right out of the Patrick Rafter playbook. The key is to hit the second serve with copious amounts of topspin that moves slow through the air but explodes off the court to kick up high around the returner’s shoulders. The slower serve is actually an advantage for Medvedev because it gives him more time to get in tight to the net. And when you factor in that Thiem stood way back against second serves - quite often five to six metres behind the baseline - then that provided Medvedev even more time to close in and cut off angles.

This is not Medvedev’s first time to showcase serve and volley on the big stage. He served and volleyed 29 times against Rafael Nadal in the 2019 US Open final, winning a very healthy 76 per cent (22).

Medvedev’s modern game style is a lethal mix of aggressive baseliner and short-ball hunter. It’s a swarming all-court strategy that just collected one of the biggest prizes in our sport.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/brain-g ... 8-analysis

[Damian]

Gone In 8 Minutes: Djokovic Sealed Medvedev's Fate Early

Spoiler:

Serb sinks Russian with dominant three-game opening to Australian Open final

You never know when the pivotal moment in a match is going to happen, when one player seizes momentum and never relinquishes it. Novak Djokovic won 12 of the first 15 points of the Australian Open final against Daniil Medvedev, holding for 3-0 in the first set with an ace followed by a serve/volley point that ended with a supremely confident Sampras-like jumping overhead winner at the net.

The start and finish of this match were happening at the same time.

Djokovic’s dominant start was underpinned by a massive difference in the players’ forehands: As the Serb raced to a 3-0 lead after eight minutes, he put all 11 forehands he cleanly struck into the court. On the other side of the net, Medvedev’s forehand was hemorrhaging errors as Djokovic went for the kill on that wing early on.

Djokovic would run away with the final 7-5, 6-2, 6-2, with this initial period of the match setting the tone and flow of baseline exchanges. After three games, Medvedev had hit 18 forehands and 11 backhands. Djokovic locked in on Medvedev’s forehand, extracting seven errors from it in the first three games. The first four times Medvedev hit a forehand groundstroke or return in the match, he yielded three errors. Medvedev did hit one forehand winner during this run, but it was inconsequential.

You May Also Like: Dominant Djokovic Seals Historic Ninth Australian Open Crown
Medvedev made the first nine backhands he struck of the match in the opening three games, but the pressure from the overloaded forehand helped to contribute to two straight backhand errors, including one on break point in his opening service game.

Djokovic had a masterful game plan of ripping apart Medvedev’s forehand before the Russian could assert any strategy of his own, sowing the seeds of anger and disappointment that Medvedev could not shake off for the rest of the match.

Overall, Medvedev would finish with 11 forehand winners, but also contribute 33 forehand errors. Djokovic, by comparison, had much cleaner numbers off the forehand wing, with eight winners and only 16 errors. Medvedev may very well have gone into this match thinking it was going to be a battle royale of the two best backhands in the game. That narrative didn’t exist in the Djokovic playbook.

Everywhere you looked on the match stats sheet, Djokovic asserted his strategic superiority.

Baseline Points Won
• Djokovic = 53% (46/87)
• Medvedev = 38% (35/92)

Net Points Won
• Djokovic = 89% (16/18)
• Medvedev = 62% (8/13)

Serve & Volley Points Won
• Djokovic = 100% (2/2)
• Medvedev = 0% (0/0)

The average rally length for the final was 5.2 shots, which was the longest for either player for the tournament. It didn’t matter if the rallies were short or long, Djokovic had an answer.

Rally Length - Points Won
• 0-4 Shots = Djokovic 52 / Medvedev 43
• 5-8 Shots = Djokovic 20 / Medvedev 12
• 9+ Shots = Djokovic 15 / Medvedev 13

An ironic match metric is that Medvedev got dominated on the scoreboard, but actually finished the match with more winners, hitting 24 to Djokovic’s 20. But this match was never about winners. It’s the error count that made up most of the points, with Medvedev racking up 67 to Djokovic’s 44. This is where separation between the two players occurred.

The match started with an eight-minute mauling of Medvedev’s forehand. There would be no recovery.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovi ... 2021-final

[Damian]

The King Of Clay's Gambit: How Nadal Turned Around Shapovalov Epic

Spoiler:

How Nadal's mid-match change in tactics spelled the end for Shapovalov
Rafael Nadal was playing Denis Shapovalov the wrong way.

Down a set. Down 0-3, 30/40 serving in the second set. Nothing was clicking for the nine-time Internazionali BNL d'Italia champion. The match was spiraling out of control and he had yet to establish any kind of strategy that he could hang his hat on. The scoreline was scary. The lack of a proven game plan even more so.

And then, at the eleventh hour, the winning tactic manifested itself. It may as well have been Plan F for the Spaniard. Keep searching. Keep looking for the way out of the hole. Why not unleash hell strictly on his opponent’s one-handed backhand?

You May Also Like: Nadal Saves 2 M.Ps., Denies Shapovalov Upset In Rome Thriller
Nadal saved two match points en route to defeating Shapovalov 3-6, 6-4, 7-6(3) in three hours and 27 minutes. Locking onto Shapovalov’s backhand wing was what got Nadal over the line more than anything else. Nadal ran 3826 metres to Shapovalov’s 3065 metres for the match. That’s a massive deficit courtesy of an inefficient game plan for a set and half.

In the opening set, Shapovalov hit almost twice as many rally forehands as backhands. That’s bad math for Nadal any way you want to slice it. In the third set, Shapovalov hit more backhands than forehands. That’s got “King of Clay'' stamped all over it. Nadal increasingly went to the backhand to source his points. He avoided going to the forehand unless he could put it under immense pressure.

Shapovalov, Forehand & Backhand Rally Totals - Set By Set

Set Rally Forehands Rally Backhands
Set 1 64% (67) 36% (37)
Set 2 55% (69) 45% (56)
Set 3 49% (76) 51% (78)
Nadal brought the same intensity to attack the backhand return as well. In the first two sets, first serves to the forehand and backhand were basically even. In the deciding third set, Nadal hit more than twice as many first serves to the backhand (11-5) in the Deuce court.

Nadal, Deuce Court 1st Serve Direction

Set Wide (to backhand) Body T (to forehand)
Set 1 7 1 6
Set 2 5 4 4
Set 3 11 3 5
Similar metrics evolved hitting first serves in the Ad court as well. Nadal typically loves to hit his carving lefty serve out wide in the Ad court. He had to change that to down the T to attack Shapovalov’s backhand return. In Set 3, eight of 12 Ad court first serves were down the T to the backhand return.

Nadal, Ad Court 1st Serve Direction

Set
Wide (to forehand)

Body T (to backhand)
Set 1 5 2 4
Set 2 1 4 5
Set 3 2 2 8
When Nadal served at 0-3, 0/30 in the second set, he directed a second serve to Shapovalov’s backhand return. It didn’t come back in play. Until this moment in the match, Nadal had only won a jaw-dropping 43 per cent of his first serve points, while Shapovalov was at 72 per cent.

At 0-3, 15/30, he again served to the backhand and received a weak return. He dispatched it for a Serve +1 forehand winner and let out a robust “vamos”. A game plan was forming. He went to the backhand return at 30/30 but lost the point. Shapovalov had a break point for a 4-0 lead and Nadal again went at the Shapovalov backhand return. Shapovalov netted a backhand passing shot to lose the point.

Shapovalov then led 3-1, 40/0 serving, but made four backhand rally errors en route to being broken. The match would last for almost two more hours, but the game plan was now crystal clear in Nadal’s mind.

Hawkeye Innovations - Graphic courtesy of Hawk-Eye Innovations/ATP Media
Shapovalov’s average 1st serve return speed in set one was 101 km/h. It slipped to 98 km/h in set three. An even bigger loss of power came against Nadal’s second serve. The Canadian averaged hitting second serve returns at 122 km/h in set one. That dropped to just 113 km/h in set three, mainly due to Shapovalov placing backhand returns instead of ripping forehand returns.

When your empire is crumbling all around you, find your opponent’s backhand.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/nadal-b ... 1-thursday

[Damian]

Nadal's Plan: Strike Early, Win Rome!

Spoiler:

Learn how the Spaniard defeated Djokovic on Sunday
Two shots in the court from each player create a defining line in the sand — or crushed Roman brick — in a tennis point.

Rafael Nadal defeated Novak Djokovic 7-5, 1-6, 6-3 in the Internazionali BNL d’Italia final by owning the shorter rallies, specifically the 0-4 shot rally length. Nadal dominated in that category, winning 14 more points (50-36) than Djokovic. Once rallies drifted to five shots or more, Djokovic built a 14-point advantage, 58 points to 44.

Own the short. Lose the long. Add significant silverware to your Mallorcan trophy cabinet.

Djokovic’s advantage in longer rallies was even more significant in extended rallies of nine or more shots, where he won 20-5. Our sport obsesses about being consistent and having superior shot tolerance than your opponent, but the truth is that there is no more important statistic to own than winning the 0-4 shot rally length. Losing the longer rallies rarely means you lose the match. The Rome final was further proof of how winning titles in our sport actually happens.

You May Also Like: With Measures Of 'Luck & Suffering', Rafa Rules In Rome Again
Nadal’s Forehand
At the start of the week in Rome, Nadal worked on the practice court to tame his errant forehand. It flew on him. It lacked shape and control. As the tournament progressed, his hard work paid off and his forehand emerged as the key shot in the final.

Nadal found his range with his forehand early and often in the opening set, crushing 15 forehand winners to just two for Djokovic. For the match, Nadal finished with 26 forehand winners to just 11 for the Serbian. Nadal’s favourite place to hit forehand winners was as a run-around forehand standing in the Deuce court, directing the ball inside-out to Djokovic’s forehand wing. Nadal also hit a lot of rally forehands to Djokovic’s backhand side in the Ad court, but the knockout blows were directed more to the vacant Deuce court.

Both players struck more forehands than backhands for the match, but Nadal was able to feast on significantly more, helping him edge control and flow of the baseline exchanges.

Total Rally Forehands/Backhands

Nadal
• Forehands = 57% (184)
• Backhands = 43% (139)

Djokovic
• Forehands = 51% (159)
• Backhands = 49% (153)


Nadal’s average net clearance for the match was almost a metre over the net at 0.96 metres. This forced Djokovic to make contact with the ball on average at 1.24 metres. The combination of increased height and heavy spin made Nadal’s forehands land deep in the court where they were difficult to attack. Djokovic played lower over the net with an average net clearance of just 0.69 metres. This made Nadal make contact with his groundstrokes on average at just 0.98 metres. Nadal hit 80 per cent of his shots deep of the service line, while Djokovic was just at 73 per cent.

Own the short rallies. Own the more potent forehand. That’s enough to own any given Sunday.

Overall, Nadal’s ability to thrive on adversity, manage time, absorb power, be patient, and unleash hell on the right ball was rewarded with another major title. He did it with the forehand and he did it with being the first to attack in the point.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/nadal-d ... brain-game

[polo90]

Brain game to dobry temat. Mam małą zagadkę:
Czy da się wygrać mecz tenisowy nie przebijając przy serwisie rywala żadnej piłki na jego stronę:
Czekam na odpowiedzi ?

[Barty]

Przez krecza, czemu nie.

[polo90]

Rozwiązanie:
Da się nie trzeba przebić żadnej piłki przy serwisie rywala
Wygrywa się swoje gemy serwisowe a w tie breaku rywal popełnia 3 błędy serwisowe(przy swoim serwisie piłki się wygrywa) i tak samo w 2 secie



Do stworzenia tej zagadki skłoniła mnie sytuacja z meczu Ivo Karlovic Daniel Brands kiedy Ivo przegrał 1 piłkę przy swoim serwisie i wtedy dziwiłem się jak można przegrać tylko 1 piłkę przy swoim serwisie i przegrać seta( Było 4:4 w tie breaku i Ivo Serwował Daniel Brands wyszedł na 5:4 i wygrał 2 swoje serwisy

A okazuje się że nie trzeba przebić żadnej piłki przy serwisie rywala żeby wygrać mecz niech rywal samozaora

[Mario]

Banalna zagadka, żałuję, że się spóźniłem.

[Damian]

Brain Game: Where Djokovic Hit Pay Dirt Against Nadal

Spoiler:

This Brain Game analysis looks at how the World No. 1 upset the 13-time champ
Novak Djokovic hit pay dirt on the red dirt in the sweet spot of the rally.

Djokovic defeated Rafael Nadal 3-6, 6-3, 7-6(4), 6-2 in the Roland Garros semi-finals on Friday by dominating mid-length rallies, which have traditionally been controlled by the Spaniard throughout his career. Overall, Nadal won the short exchanges and Djokovic barely edged his rival in the longer, extended rallies. Ultimately, Djokovic found the separation he desperately needed when the rally length was specifically between four and seven shots.

The average rally length for the match was 5.3 shots, so the more points that were played right around the average, the more success Djokovic enjoyed. The Serbian won an extremely healthy 51.2 per cent (95/185) of his baseline points for the match, while Nadal could only manage 44.8 per cent (90/201).

You May Also Like: Djokovic Dethrones Nadal After Roland Garos Epic
Rally Lengths - 0-3 Shots
Nadal committed an uncharacteristic eight double faults for the match, and combined with nine return errors, sunk his own ship too often before he had a chance to challenge Djokovic in heavyweight baseline exchanges. Those errors withstanding, Nadal still enjoyed a seven-point advantage for the match in short exchanges of zero to three shots.

Points Won: 0-3 Shots
• Djokovic = 41 points
• Nadal = 48 points

In the opening set, Nadal built a commanding 18-11 advantage in 0-3 shot rallies, hitting seven winners and collecting 11 total errors from Djokovic.

Rally Lengths - 4-7 Shots
This is where the Super Serbian exerted the most pressure on Nadal. These rallies typically included a deep return from Djokovic followed by a solid crosscourt backhand and a bruising forehand that proved too tough handle. Djokovic was relentless with these mid-length flurries. Get the point started, and then throw enough punches in quick succession that all stun Nadal and force him onto his back foot.

Points Won / Rally Length
• Four Shots = Djokovic 19 points/Nadal 9 points
• Five Shots = Djokovic 17 points/Nadal 15 points
• Six Shots = Djokovic 11 points/Nadal 11 points
• Seven Shots = 17 points/Nadal 5 points

Total
• Djokovic = 54 points
• Nadal = 40 points

Overall, Djokovic amassed 54 points in these four specific rally lengths, while Nadal totalled just 40. Djokovic won just 18 more points (142-124) for the match, with 14 of them coming in these mid-length rallies. The biggest disparity was in seven-shot rallies, where Djokovic was 12 points better (17-5).

A seven-shot rally can only be won by the server, because what’s counted is the ball landing in the court, not hitting the strings. So the end of a seven-shot rally is a winner from the server or an error on the ensuring shot from the returner, which is still seven balls in the court. So these exchanges involve Djokovic hitting three shots after the serve, typically leaning on the ball more and more until Nadal was stretched off court committing an error.

Rally Lengths 8+ Shots
When the points drifted longer to eight shots or more, it was Djokovic who stepped up and hit the most winners with 17 to 13. He was was able to squeak out a marginal advantage, winning three more points overall than Nadal.

Points Won 8+ Shots
• Djokovic = 39 points
• Nadal = 36 points

There were three main parts of the match that all played a pivotal part in Djokovic’s ultimate victory. The first was managing to win three games in the first set after trailing 0-5. Avoiding a first-set blowout quickly erased memories of Nadal doing just that to him in last year’s final.

The second element was winning the decisive third set in a tie-break. That set will go down as one of the greatest sets in the history of our sport. And lastly, it was winning six straight games in the fourth set after trailing 0-2. He was able to relax and really hit through the ball better than he did at any other stage of the match.

Nadal had 48 winners and 93 total errors for the match. Djokovic had 50 winners and yielded just 76 forced and unforced errors. Nadal missed more than normal. Djokovic successfully made Nadal uncomfortable on his most comfortable court in the world.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovi ... brain-game

[Damian]

Brain Game: Djokovic's Drop Shot Success vs. Tsitsipas

Spoiler:

How Djokovic won the drop shot battle – and the Roland Garros war – against Tsitsipas
Forty-nine drop shots.

Novak Djokovic defeated Stefanos Tsitsipas 6-7(6), 2-6, 6-3, 6-2, 6-4 to win his second Roland Garros title on Sunday, with drop shots being an integral part of his stunning comeback victory. Djokovic hit 27 drop shots, including nine for clean winners, while Tsitsipas was not far off with 22 drop shots of his own.

The two players combined for an average of one drop shot every six points, or basically one a game for 48 games. The drop shot moved from a side-show, secondary tactic, to become a key strategic ploy to yank the opponent to all compass points of Court Philippe-Chatrier.

You May Also Like: Djokovic Comeback Seals Historic Roland Garros Victory
The last drop shot of the match was hit by Djokovic with Tsitsipas serving at 30/15, 3-5 in the fifth set. Djokovic’s drop shot adroitly displayed the strategic cunning of the Serb to escape one pattern of play that favoured Tsitsipas and shift gears into another that attacked the Greek’s legs and spirit.

Tsitsipas hit two forehands cross court to Djokovic’s forehand to start the rally, trying to bulldoze a forehand error just like he had successfully done in the opening two sets. Djokovic bailed out of the Deuce court exchange by taking his second forehand high down the line to Tsitsipas’ backhand. The high percentage shot for the Greek was now cross court to Djokovic’s backhand.

That’s where the trap was set.

Djokovic stepped forward to the backhand groundstroke like he was going to rifle it back cross court to Tsitsipas’ backhand. He then switched at the last second and hit a deft drop shot up the line that Tsitsipas could only watch.

Wily from Djokovic. Deflating for Tsitsipas.

Djokovic started with a flurry of eight drop shots in the first set, while Tsitsipas hit back with nine of his own. These early drop shots were designed more as a clever surprise tactic by both players as well as inducing the lactic acid buildup in their opponent’s legs from sprinting forward.


Djokovic hit six drop shots in the second set, with two being outright winners from the forehand wing. He gradually moved away from drop shots with five in the third set and just one in set four. He had found other strategic ways to break down Tsitsipas’ game.

Djokovic came back to the tactic in the fifth set, hitting seven. As the match progressed, Tsitsipas attacked less and played neutral from deeper behind the baseline, which was to Djokovic’s benefit. Once the final set rolled around, Djokovic reached back into his bag of drop shot tricks to punish Tsitsipas for camping too far behind the baseline.

Break Points
In the initial two sets, Tsitsipas got a look at eight break points, converting three of them. In the remaining three sets, Tsitsipas failed to sniff a single break point, while Djokovic feasted on 13 break points, winning four of them. The depth of Djokovic’s groundstrokes pushed Tsitsipas back to a location from where he could not hurt Djokovic. Then the drop shot barrage savaged the Greek’s legs and lungs as he was constantly pulled to the front of the court. That took its toll as the break point opportunities evaporated.

Rally Length
The dominant grouping of points in the final was in the 0-4 shot range, where almost 54 per cent of total points were played. That means each player hit a maximum of just two shots in the point for over half of all points played.

Rally Length Breakdown

0-4 Shots = 53.7% (167)
5-8 Shots = 27.7% (86)
9+ Shots = 18.6% (58)
Total = 311
When Tsitsipas had to hit two shots or less to win the point, he forged a three-point advantage (85-82) against Djokovic for the match. In the first two sets which Tsitsipas won, his winning margin in the 0-4 shot rally length was a healthy 40-25. Djokovic dominated the match when the rally reached five shots or longer, winning 82 points to 62. In the last three sets, that margin was a resounding 48-32.

Tsitsipas started so strongly, but the energy and focus that was required to build a two-set lead ultimately became unsustainable. Once Djokovic broke early in the third set, he said post-match, “I liked my chances from then onwards. I felt like he was starting to overthink… I got into his head,” he said.

Sprinting side to side against Djokovic in a Grand Slam final on the crushed red earth is challenging enough. Lunging forward to also cover 27 drop shots in the shadow of the net proved a bridge too far.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/brain-g ... arros-2021

[Damian]

Brain Game: How Medvedev Rewrote A Losing Game Plan To Stop Djokovic

Spoiler:

In US Open final, Russian refused to allow Djokovic to 'rinse and repeat' tactics from Melbourne
Novak Djokovic needed forehands. He settled for backhands. The rest is history.

Daniil Medvedev defeated Djokovic 6-4, 6-4, 6-4 in the US Open final Sunday evening in New York, stopping the Serb from being the first player since Rod Laver in 1969 to win all four majors in a season. Making Djokovic’s forehand a non-factor in the final was the strategic engine room of the stunning victory.

Medvedev’s cunning plan was to overload the Ad court with a plethora of backhand-to-backhand exchanges, where he could neutralise and torment Djokovic with his ultra-flat backhand that proved extremely difficult to attack. It worked in spades. Djokovic ended up hitting more backhand groundstrokes than forehand groundstrokes for the match.

Total Groundstrokes (excluding returns, volleys & overheads)

Novak Djokovic
Total Forehands = 43% (122)
Total Backhands = 57% (161)
Daniil Medvedev
Total Forehands = 46% (136)
Total Backhands = 54% (159)
Surprisingly, Djokovic ended up hitting 39 more backhands than forehands for the match. As a comparison, when Djokovic defeated Stefanos Tsitsipas in the quarter-finals of the Rome Masters 1000 this year (4-6, 7-5, 7-5), he hit 58 per cent (266) forehands and 42 per cent (194) backhands.

Djokovic is partly to blame for the overload of backhands against Medvedev, as there were dozens of balls he could have hit a run-around forehand instead of a backhand. He either chose not to upgrade the stroke, did not fully comprehend Medvedev’s maddening strategy, or didn’t have enough gas left in the legs to seize the opportunity.

Medvedev struck almost triple the number of groundstroke winners (16-6) in the match while committing fewer errors overall (33-38).

Novak Djokovic
Winners = Forehand 3 / Backhand 3
Errors = Forehand 18 / Backhand 20
Daniil Medvedev
Winners = Forehand 11 / Backhand 5
Errors = Forehand 16 / Backhand 17
All tournament, Djokovic didn’t show his typical thirst to upgrade to a run-around forehand over a backhand standing in the Ad court. He was content to go toe-to-toe with opponents banging backhands back and forth. That strategy helped get him to the final, but it wasn’t a winning game plan against Medvedev’s menacing backhand, which gives you nothing to work with.

Djokovic Run-Around Forehands (Standing in the Ad court)

Total = 47 (39% of total forehands)
Ball came back in play = 38 (81%)
Winners = 1
Errors = 4
Forced an error = 4
Djokovic hit 39% of total forehands as a run-around in the Ad court, but they were not the lethal blows we are used to seeing from the Serb. He only struck one winner from a run-around forehand in three sets while committing four errors. More than 80 percent came back in play, rendering this normally potent tactic insignificant in the final outcome.

Djokovic hit only six groundstroke winners in 283 shots, which averages at one winner every 47 shots. That’s not the Novak Djokovic that won three majors this year. Medvedev hit 16 groundstroke winners from 295 shots, which averages as one winner every 18 shots. Medvedev clearly turned the baseline into his playground in the final.

Game plans can succeed, fail, or get lost in the wash and dissolve in a player’s mind in the heat of battle. Once Djokovic reacted emotionally to not breaking Medvedev when leading 0-40 at 0-1 in the second set, and failed to convert two break points in the following service game, the clarity needed to find a winning game plan vanished.

In the second set, Djokovic hit just 39 per cent (46) forehands and 61 per cent (73) backhands. That was good for just one groundstroke winner and 15 errors. Djokovic had defining moments of tactical lucidity after losing the opening set in his four previous matches in New York. That mental strength proved to be a bridge too far in the final.

In the 2021 Australian Open final, Djokovic defeated Medvedev by mauling his forehand. Medvedev committed seven forehand errors in the first three games of the final. The Russian only committed four in the entire first set in New York last night.

Ultimately, Medvedev attained victory because Djokovic did not copy and paste a winning strategy from Melbourne in January as well as not being able to diffuse Medvedev’s Ad court dominated backhand strategy with run-around forehands. In the end, Medvedev made Djokovic bend to his intentions, having to contend with ultra-flat backhand knuckleballs in endless, backhand-to-backhand exchanges.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/brain-g ... -open-2021

[Damian]

Brain Game: Why Norrie's Backhand Was Basilashvili's Kryptonite

Spoiler:

Brain Game examines how the Briton won his biggest title
Cameron Norrie’s blocking backhand versus Nikoloz Basilashvili’s free-wheeling forehand. This was the micro-battle that decided the fate of the BNP Paribas Open final.

Norrie defeated Basilashvili 3-6, 6-4, 6-1 Sunday evening in the desert by absorbing, redirecting, and ultimately dismantling the barrage of power that was thrown at his backhand wing through the Deuce court. It was a masterful display of counter-attacking that took time to develop, with Norrie trailing a set-and-a-break (6-3, 2-1) early on. But from 4-4 in the second set, Norrie reeled off eight of the next nine games and 70 per cent (37/53) of points to run away with a stunning victory.

Norrie’s backhand is a study in efficiency. His straight-arm technique starts with minimal backswing. It has no moving parts to break down. It devours power for breakfast, and it was the ideal kryptonite to disassemble Basilashvili’s flamboyant forehand.

Basilashvili committed 50 groundstroke errors (excluding returns, volleys & overheads) in the final, including 34 on his forehand and 16 on his backhand. If you dig a layer deeper and examine the preceding shot from Norrie before these errors, the real narrative of the match unfolds before your eyes.

50 Basilashvili Groundstroke Errors & Preceding Shot From Norrie

21 forehand errors following a Norrie backhand
13 forehand errors following a Norrie forehand
10 backhand errors following a Norrie forehand
6 backhand errors following a Norrie backhand
Norrie’s master plan of shoveling his backhand crosscourt and providing Basilashvili absolutely nothing to work with took time to mature. Basilashvili only yielded one forehand error in the opening set from a Norrie backhand. That grew to eight in the second set as Norrie wrestled control of the momentum and blossomed to 12 in the third set as the British lefty raced to the finish line. Basilashvili did accumulate 20 groundstroke winners (15 forehand / five backhand), but they were largely inconsequential, as were Norrie’s seven groundstroke winners.

Norrie was a dog with a bone, mining forehand errors as the sun set in the California desert.

You May Also Like: Norrie Scoops Biggest Career Title In Indian Wells
The inner workings of this micro-battle uncover an unusual dynamic that almost always ends up with the forehand taking the honours. Not this time. Firstly, it’s important to recognise that Norrie is left-handed. If this was a righty-to-righty match-up, Basilashvili would be attacking his opponent’s backhand with a more potent run-around forehand through the Ad court. That’s typically right in the Georgian’s wheelhouse.

But to get to Norrie’s backhand, Basilashvili had to attack crosscourt through the Deuce court, which is where Norrie’s cunning trap was set. Normally you see a player under fire on the backhand wing try and redirect the ball away from the opponent’s more powerful forehand. Not Norrie. The Brit was steadfast going back crosscourt to Basilashvili’s forehand, and the more angle that developed in the rally the better. Basilashvili was constantly presented with a low, ultra-flat ball out wide in the Deuce court that he could do almost nothing with — except miss. It was about as far out of his strikezone as a ball could get, and extremely difficult to go down the line with because it was so low and short in the court.

Norrie fed off Basilashvili’s power, counter-punching his way to the biggest title of his career. Norrie normally looks for more forehands in a match, getting the ball up high to his opponent’s backhand wing, but that was not where the errors existed in this match. Norrie wanted backhands to break down Basilashvili’s forehand, and he hit more backhands in the final compared to his previous four rounds.

Norrie’s Backhand to Forehand Ratio Leading To The Final

Final v Basilashvili = 50% backhands (138 backhands / 136 forehands)
SF v Dimitrov = 41% backhands (147 forehands / 102 backhands)
QF v Schwartzman = 42% backhands (131 forehands / 93 backhands)
R16 v Paul = 32% backhands (244 forehands / 113 backhands)
R32 v Bautista Agut = 46% backhands (302 forehands / 259 backhands)
The bunt backhand bamboozled the swashbuckling forehand. Welcome to the Top 20, Cameron Norrie.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/norrie- ... brain-game

[Damian]

Brain Game: How Nadal Powered Up For Record-Breaking Australian Open Title

Spoiler:

Learn how turning up the aggression paid dividends for the Spaniard
The points were going long. Ironically, the match was slipping fast.

Rafael Nadal orchestrated a stunning comeback in the Australian Open final to defeat Daniil Medvedev 2-6, 6-7(5), 6-4, 6-4, 7-5. The match lasted five hours and 24 minutes and finished at 1:11 a.m. Monday morning. Figuring out the winning game plan finally materialised for the Spaniard in the dead of the night.

The length of the rally ended up being the canary in the coal mine for Nadal as you examine his performance throughout the match and the tournament. The average rally of his first six matches en route to the final was a routine 4.05 shots per point. His quarter-final victory over Denis Shapovalov was a brisk 3.11 shots per point, while his victory against Adrian Mannarino in the previous round averaged a crisp 3.55 shots per point. Rafa was clearly reaping the benefits of an attacking game style as he marched through the Melbourne draw on courts that felt liked the ball was “skidding” more than “sitting” after the bounce.

Then Medvedev turned up on the other side of the net and all the attacking went out the window.

More From 2022 AO Final
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Nadal Adds To 'Big Titles' Count
Relive The Final In Pictures

The Russian grounded Nadal’s aggressive game style to a screeching halt in the opening set, with the average rally length skyrocketing to 6.27 shots per point. The longest rally length to the final for Nadal was in the first round, in which he defeated Marcos Giron, averaging 4.75 shots per point.

The first set of the final seemed like the players were hitting in slow motion. Cat and mouse replaced shock and awe for the Spaniard. The slower, longer rallies stalled Nadal’s offence as he coughed up 23 errors to just 10 for Medvedev in the opening stanza. Slower speed. Different height. Reacting rather than playing on the front foot.

Set one was a grind. Set two was even more so, as the average rally length ballooned to 6.83 shots per point. Slice backhands were replacing the typical run-around forehands in the Deuce court for Nadal. A hefty 28 points were played in rallies of nine shots or more in the second set, with Medvedev winning the tie-break 7/5. They were happy to trade blows with a 40-shot rally early in the second set. Extended rallies felt like the new norm.

The deepest hole Nadal found himself in was serving at 0/40 at 2-3 in the third set. He was a heartbeat away from certain peril. Once he doggedly held serve, he started playing with more aggression and looked to force the issue more than wait for Medvedev to hand him an error.

And then the rally length came down, the power went up, and an unlikely victory was born from refusing to call it a day.

Average Rally Length By Set
- Set 1 = 6.27 shots
- Set 2 = 6.83 shots
- Set 3 = 5.56 shots
- Set 4 = 5.03 shots
- Set 5 = 4.31 shots

You May Also Like: Look Back At Nadal's Four Comebacks From Two Sets Down
The more Nadal sunk his teeth into the match, the more the average rally length came back to his wheelhouse, not Medvedev’s.

In the deciding fifth set, there were fewer long rallies of at least nine shots compared to any other set.

Rallies Of 9+ Shots By Set
- Set 1 = 15
- Set 2 = 28
- Set 3 = 15
- Set 4 = 12
- Set 5 = 11

One of the greatest tennis strategies of all time is to simply hang around. When things are not going your way, just hang around. Don’t go away. Things change. Seasons change. Night can turn to day. Twenty can turn to 21 if you just hang around long enough to figure out the problem at hand.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/nadal-m ... brain-game

[Damian]

The Surprise Strategy Alcaraz Perfected To Make His Historic Breakthrough

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the Miami final between Alcaraz and Ruud
The antidote for the deep returner is to serve and volley.

Carlos Alcaraz defeated Casper Ruud 7-5, 6-4 in the Miami Open presented by Itau final on Sunday, winning all eleven serve-and-volley points he played. When Alcaraz needed a point on serve, it was his go-to strategy. The Spaniard used it twice in the final game of the match, including on match point.

Serve and volley is an offensive strategy that is an ideal fit for the teen, who is always looking to dictate with court position, power, and direction. Alcaraz initially served and volleyed down 0-3 30/15 in the opening set to help reverse the early tone of the match, when Ruud was being solid and Alcaraz was pressing. It successfully wrestled the early momentum back from the Norwegian and started the process of climbing back into the match.

You May Also Like: Alcaraz Wins First ATP Masters 1000 Title In Miami
All eleven serve-and-volley points by Alcaraz were in the Ad court, with 10 of them coming behind a kick serve out wide. The Spaniard was taking advantage of Ruud’s deep return position. To add to Ruud’s problems, he would also move back to let the kicking serve drop, so he might as well have been returning from the stands with little hope of getting it past the fast-charging Alcaraz.

Alcaraz broke Ruud at 5-5 in the opening set and served and volleyed four times at 6-5 to clinch the set, including on a break point. Remarkably, on three of the serve-and-volley points, Ruud did not get the return back in play from his ultra-deep return location. On set point, he returned the ball in play, but it was to gift Alcaraz a sitter overhead from on top of the net.

Serve and volley was not only a perfect strategy for the match, it also served as a metaphor for how each player was employing his game plan. Alcaraz was all about offence, and also employed scintillating defence when it was required. Ruud is more of a neutralising player, who too often sprayed balls in this match when he needed offence. At 5-5 in the opening set, which proved to be the pivotal moment in the match, Ruud missed three offensive forehands while Alcaraz roped a 102 mph forehand winner that set the tone for the break.

Someone was feeling it. Someone wasn’t.


Alcaraz collected more winners overall (27-22) and was more successful at net, winning 16 of 23 net points to Ruud’s 13 of 22. Coming into the final, Alcaraz had been wildly successful hitting drop shots, winning a mind-blowing 51 of 59 points in which he used his drop shot. But this strategy fizzled in the final, as Alcaraz only won three of 10 points with drop shots.

Alcaraz ultimately won this final because his offensive game style wrestled control of the majority of points. Ruud played a solid match, but his offence was lacking when a blow needed to be landed. Alcaraz could be found serving and volleying in the big moments, while Ruud moved backwards to the extremities of the court chasing what he thought was a high-percentage play, but all too often failed to even get the return back in court.

There is something to be said for moving forward when pivotal moments arrive.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/alcaraz ... brain-game

[Damian]

How The Battle Of The Forehands Proved Critical In Tsitsipas' Monte Carlo Win

Spoiler:

Brain Game digs into the Monte Carlo final
The Rolex Monte-Carlo Masters final was won in the deuce court.

Stefanos Tsitsipas claimed back-to-back Masters 1000 titles in the Principality with a 6-3, 7-6(3) victory over Alejandro Davidovich Fokina on Sunday. The two players played even when battling through the Ad court, pounding backhands and run-around forehands. It was Deuce-court forehands where the 6’4” Greek stood tall and wrestled control of baseline exchanges.

Deuce-Court Forehands
Tsitsipas hit 65 forehand groundstrokes standing in the Deuce court and Davidovich Fokina slightly less with 55. It was Tsitsipas who won the honours on this half of the court, mainly by keeping his errors considerably lower than his opponent.

Winners/Errors Tsitsipas Davidovich Fokina
Winners 2 3
Errors 9 15
Total -7 -12
What’s also important to note is that Tsitsipas forced eight errors when hitting his forehand from the Deuce court. Davidovich Fokina was far less potent, only able to extract two errors with his forehands originating from the Deuce court.

Ad-Court Forehands

Both players were looking to hit as many run-around forehands as possible when standing in the Ad court. Tsitsipas hit 56 while Davidovich Fokina was slightly higher at 59.

Winners/Errors Tsitsipas Davidovich Fokina
Winners 4 5
Errors 5 7
Total -1 -2
Overall, there was very little separating the two players when hitting run-around forehands in the Ad court. Davidovich Fokina was more potent from this side, forcing seven errors, while Tsitsipas managed just four.

Backhands

Davidovich Fokina slightly took the honours with backhand performance, striking four winners while yielding 15 errors. The Spaniard also hit considerably more backhands during the final with 106 to the Greek’s 84.

Winners/Errors Tsitsipas Davidovich Fokina
Winners 1 4
Errors 14 15
Total -13 -11
Davidovich Fokina was always looking to take hit backhand down the line to attack Tsitsipas or play back behind him wide through the Ad court. Tsitsipas committed 12 errors from a Davidovich Fokina backhand, while the Spaniard made 13 errors from Tsitsipas’ backhand wing.

When you combine all winners and errors in the Ad court from run-around forehands and backhands, Tsitsipas was -14 to Davidovich Fokina’s -13. This one-point difference for the Spaniard is in stark contrast to the five-point gap in the Deuce court for the Greek.

Forehands vs. Backhands
Another pivotal layer of the match that fuelled Tsitsipas’ hard-fought victory was simply the volume of forehand groundstrokes he was able to hit.

Tsitsipas Groundstrokes
• Forehands = 59% (121)
• Backhands = 41% (84)
• Total = 205

Davidovich Fokina Groundstrokes
• Forehands = 52% (114)
• Backhands = 48% (106)
• Total = 220

Tsitsipas was able to hit 59 per cent (121/205) of groundstrokes for the match, while Davidovich Fokina was considerably lower at 52 per cent (114/220). Advantage, defending champion.

Forehand Returns
Forehand returns were another critical area where Tsitsipas’ forehand stood tall against Davidovich Fokina’s forehand. Tsitsipas hit 25 forehand returns for the match and only missed one of them. Davidovich Fokina hit 18 forehand returns and failed to put eight of them back in play.

Overall, Tsitsipas’ backhand did exactly what it needed to — it did not bleed errors. He also turned 65 backhands into run-around forehands in the Ad court, providing pivotal support against Davidovich Fokina’s heavy backhand cross court.

But Tsitsipas can especially look to his forehand performance in the Deuce court as a key location where he was able to arm-wrestle control of critical baseline exchanges on the red dirt by the sea.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/tsitsip ... brain-game

[Damian]

Brain Game: Rock-Solid Alcaraz Can Do Everything Under The Sun

Spoiler:

Learn how Alcaraz eased past Zverev in the Madrid final
Carlos Alcaraz is a 360-degree player. He comes at you from every possible angle.

Alcaraz defeated Alexander Zverev 6-3, 6-1 in the Mutua Madrid Open final on Sunday by bamboozling the German with a scintillating array of Spanish shotmaking. Alcaraz comes at you with a laser forehand. Or a crushing backhand. Or a devilish drop shot. Or serving and volleying. He comes at you so many ways, you don’t know which way is up.

Alcaraz hit six drop shots in the final and won the point on all of them. Four came from a forehand groundstroke while two came from a forehand drop volley. The 19-year-old Spaniard also served and volleyed five times in the final and won them all. The skill level that exists across the entire spectrum of strategy is simply off the charts. Watching Alcaraz is like watching something for the very first time, even though you have watched the sport for decades.

You May Also Like: Alcaraz Topples Zverev For Madrid Title
Alcaraz Forehands & Backhands
Overall, Alcaraz hit 60 per cent (50/84) forehand groundstrokes for the match, which excludes returns, volleys and overheads. Thirty-six of them were regular forehands standing in the Deuce court and 14 were run-around forehands standing in the Ad court.

The following breakdown includes Alcaraz’s forehand and backhand winners and errors as well as errors that were also extracted from Zverev from that particular shot.

Regular Forehands
- 36 hit
- 2 winners
- 6 errors
- 5 errors extracted from Zverev

Run-Around Forehands
- 14 hit
- 5 winners
- 2 errors
- 3 errors extracted from Zverev

Backhands
- 34 hit
- 2 winners
- 5 errors
- 9 errors extracted from Zverev

Alcaraz’s forehand is a formidable weapon, with his run-around forehand especially so. Of the 14 times he struck this shot standing in the deuce court, he immediately won the point eight times from a winner or forcing an error. It’s a prolific strike-rate, especially when you consider he only yielded two errors in the process.

What’s fascinating is that Alcaraz’s backhand immediately produced more errors on the other side of the court from Zverev than his forehand did. Alcaraz extracted nine errors from his backhand wing and eight errors from his forehand. This is a key to the teenager’s success. There simply is no weaker wing for opponents to prey on.

Alcaraz only yielded five groundstroke errors (two forehand/three backhand) in the opening set, which set the tone for the one-sided final. Throw in two drop-shot points won and three serve-and-volley points won and Zverev had no discernible strategy to claw his way back into set two. To end the opening set, Alcaraz committed only one error from his last 16 backhands. It must have been a torturous time for Zverev, who regularly relies on his backhand to break down his opponent’s backhand. Not this time. Not even close.

The analytics of Alcaraz’s matches uncover a player who is solid as a rock and can do everything under the sun.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/alcaraz ... brain-game

[Damian]

Brain Game: Where Djokovic Zeroed in To Defeat Tsitsipas In The Rome Final

Spoiler:

Rome final was a tale of three phases
Pound the backhand to get off to a flyer. Pound the backhand to put two hands on the trophy.

Novak Djokovic defeated Stefanos Tsitsipas 6-0, 7-6(5) in the Internazionali BNL d’Italia final on Sunday by unleashing against the Greek’s one-handed backhand in a straight-sets final that actually had three very distinct phases.

Overall, Tsitsipas hit 100 forehand groundstrokes and 90 backhand groundstrokes for the match, but the road to a record-extending 38th ATP Masters 1000 crown for the Super Serbian definitely went through the Greek’s backhand wing.

You May Also Like: Djokovic Defeats Tsitsipas For Record-Extending 38th Masters 1000 Title
Phase 1: Set 1 Djokovic 6-0
Djokovic was mentally locked in to begin the match, winning the first six points of the final to lay the groundwork for the first-set bagel. Tsitsipas committed an error on four of the first 10 backhands he struck, ultimately coughing up nine backhand errors in the opening set while collecting no winners.

The backhand was misfiring. Djokovic swarmed.

Too many backhands hit the frame or landed short as the Greek tried to roll the ball up high to Djokovic’s backhand wing. It appeared Tsitsipas had very little time to prepare for the shot as Djokovic was stepping into almost every ball he hit. What is even more startling is that Tsitsipas had zero backhand groundstroke winners in set one, and not one backhand groundstroke in the opening set extracted an error from Djokovic.

Phase 2: Set 2 Tsitsipas led 5-2
Tsitsipas raced to a 4-1 then 5-2 lead in the second set courtesy of Djokovic missing more and becoming increasingly agitated with his game as the pro-Greek crowd came alive, throwing their support behind Tsitsipas to extend the match to a third set.

Tsitsipas hit 29 backhands in this second phase of the match and remarkably committed zero errors while also hitting one winner and extracting two errors. It’s like a light switch was flicked and the Greek figured out a way to immediately stop the bleeding off this wing. Tsitsipas hit 34 forehand groundstrokes in the second period of the match, committing seven errors and collecting just one winner.

The backhand had suddenly become the star at the Foro Italico.

ATP WTA Live App

Phase 3: Set 2 Djokovic wins 7-6(5)
Tsitsipas had a break point with Djokovic serving at 1-4, 30/40 in the second set, but yielded a backhand winner to the Serbian, who was on the front foot desperately trying to play through Tsitsipas to save the set. Had Tsitsipas won that point, he would have served for set two and the final outcome could have been much different.

From 2-5 in the second set, Djokovic doubled down on pounding Tsitsipas’ backhand, making him hit 36 backhands in six games. In the second phase, Tsitsipas hit 29 backhands for no errors. In the third period, Tsitsipas hit 36 backhands for seven errors. In the third, Tsitsipas’ forehand only yielded two groundstroke errors.

It was once again the Tsitsipas backhand that was misbehaving.

Tsitsipas Backhand Groundstroke Performance
- Phase 1 = 6 games/25 backhands/9 errors

- Phase 2 = 7 games/29 backhands/0 errors

- Phase 3 = 6 games/36 backhands/7 errors

It was clearly the backhand groundstroke that faltered at the start and end of the match for the Greek. Djokovic mentally and emotionally lost his way in the middle of the encounter but took care of business when it mattered at the end of the match to notch his first title of the 2022 season.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovi ... brain-game

[Kamileki]

Brain Game: Where Nadal Drew A Line In The Parisian Clay Against Ruud

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses where Nadal excelled in the championship clash

What happened when Rafael Nadal hit three — and only three — balls in the court against Casper Ruud?

Calculated clay-court carnage.

Nadal defeated Ruud 6-3, 6-3, 6-0 in the Roland Garros final on Sunday on the back of dominating points in which he hit exactly three balls in the court when serving and receiving. In a one-sided final that saw the Spaniard win the final 11 games of the match, Nadal and Ruud surprisingly played very evenly in the 0-4 shot rally length, with Nadal winning 28 points and Ruud 27.

And then the fifth shot of the rally arrived, and it acted like a proverbial line in the Parisian clay.

You May Also Like: Nadal: 'Having This Trophy Means Everything'

Five-Shot Rallies (Nadal Serving)
Rally length in tennis is dictated by the ball landing in the court, not hitting the strings, which means the server can only win odd-numbered rallies, and the returner can only win even-numbered rallies. A five-shot rally is an ideal rally length for Nadal’s chess-like strategy, giving him two more strategic moves after the serve to either construct a winner or force an error. This is where his dominance in the final blossomed in all its glory.

Points Won In Five-Shot Rallies
Nadal = 11 points won (3 winners/8 errors extracted from Ruud)
Ruud = 3 points won (1 winner/2 errors extracted from Nadal)

Ruud won four-shot rallies 9-6, but things dramatically changed when one more shot was hit in the court. Nadal forged an impressive 11-3 advantage in five-shot rallies. Getting to hit two more shots after the serve is a sweet spot for Nadal to initially gain a positional advantage and then extract errors from his scrambling opponent.

Six-Shot Rallies (Nadal Receiving)
The returner is typically on defence to start the point in six-shot rallies, weathering the storm of an aggressive serve and then playing defence with a Return +1 groundstroke. Getting to neutral on the third shot is typically considered a minor victory for the returner. Those rules simply didn’t apply to Nadal in the final.

Points Won In Six-Shot Rallies
Nadal = 13 points (10 winners / 3 errors extracted from Ruud)
Ruud = 3 points (0 winners / 3 errors extracted from Nadal)
Nadal forged an eight-point advantage in five-shot rallies (11-3) and was even more dominant in six-shot rallies, creating a 10-point advantage (13-3). Of all the rally lengths played in the final, Nadal hit the most winners (10) in six-shot rallies. You can picture in your mind the Spaniard rolling back a high return from deep in the court, then moving quickly to the baseline to attack the next shot to Ruud’s backhand and then hitting a run-around forehand winner through the vacant deuce court, out of reach of Ruud’s running forehand.

Nadal forged a dominant 24-6 point advantage when you combine five and six-shot rallies. It is important to note that in both five and six-shot rallies, Nadal hits exactly three shots in the court.

What’s fascinating is that seven and eight-shot rallies had far less bearing on the outcome. Ruud won seven-shot rallies 5-4, and Nadal won eight shot rallies 6-3. There were a sizable 30 points played in five and six-shot rallies and just 18 points played in seven and eight-shot rallies.

Nadal’s Rally Advantage
0-4 Shot Rallies = 1-point advantage (28-27)
5-6 Shot Rallies = 18-point advantage (24-6)
7-8 Shot Rallies = 2-point advantage (10-8)

Hitting three balls in the court, whether serving or receiving, was the sweet spot of Nadal’s lopsided victory. He did well to survive the initial onslaught of the 0-4 rally length and then went straight to work hitting 13 winners and extracting 11 errors from his third shot of the rally.

Three shots in the court is an ideal strategic blend of defending first, outmaneuvering second, and dropping the hammer on the third shot. The Parisian mid-length master plan was hidden in plain sight.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/nadal-r ... brain-game

[Damian]

Brain Game: The Moment Djokovic Flipped The Wimbledon Final Against Kyrgios

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the championship match
The longest rally had the biggest effect on the final outcome.

Novak Djokovic defeated Nick Kyrgios 4-6, 6-3, 6-4, 7-6(3) in the Wimbledon final on Sunday, turning around his fortunes early in the second set by finding his consistency and rhythm in a 23-shot rally when serving at 1-1, 30/30. It was the longest point of the match, and the exact tonic Djokovic needed to reinvigorate his game after dropping the opening set. He won that long point and a 19-shot rally on the next point at 40/30.

Those two points were the dividing line in the match. They signaled exactly when the momentum shifted and where Djokovic took control of the match with his championship mojo. The following breakdown identifies the change in fortunes in extended rallies before this moment in time and after it.

Rallies Of 9+ Shots
First 8 Rallies (Up to 1-1, 30/30, Second set): Kyrgios won 7/Djokovic won 1
Rest Of The Match: Kyrgios won 3/Djokovic won 16

You May Also Like: Djokovic Wins Wimbledon, Extends 'Big Titles' Lead
Djokovic’s confidence was suddenly brimming after hammering home his advantage in longer rallies, and he broke Kyrgios’ serve to love in the next game. It was the first time Djokovic had broken Kyrgios in just more than five sets of tennis, dating back to their two matches in 2017, which the Australian won. Breaking serve broke the focus and concentration of Kyrgios, whose body language became increasingly irritated for the remainder of the match.

Djokovic only won 36 per cent (4/11) of all rallies that went five shots or longer in the opening set, but that escalated to 63 per cent (36/57) over the remaining three sets as Djokovic figured out it was far better to grind with Kyrgios than go toe-to-toe with him playing first-strike tennis.

Djokovic craved baseline exchanges and his winning percentage from the back of the court proves his plan worked to perfection.

Baseline Points Won
Djokovic: 63% (61/97)
Kyrgios: 33% (33/100)

Djokovic won almost double (61-33) the number of points when he finished the point at the back of the court compared to Kyrgios. His primary target was to go after Kyrgios’ forehand out wide in the Deuce court, breaking it down by making the Australian repeatedly have to hit his forehand on the run. Djokovic only committed 14 forehand errors for the match, while Kyrgios notched 41.

It is important to note that the final, like most matches on Tour, was not won by the player that hit the most winners. The following breakdown speaks to the reality of taking titles on the world’s biggest stage.

Total Winners
Djokovic: 46
Kyrgios: 63

Total Errors
Djokovic: 50
Kyrgios: 86

As Djokovic’s groundstroke game blossomed, that success spilled over to other areas of his game, particularly with his first serve.

Djokovic First-Serve Points Won
First Two Sets: 74% (29/39)
Last Two Sets: 92% (33/36)

The Serbian only lost three points behind his first serve in 11 service games in the last two sets. Once he got his teeth into the match by winning the 23 and 19-shot rallies early in the second set, it felt like a light switch had been flipped. Until then, Djokovic had been mostly reacting to the heat Kyrgios was throwing at him with big serves and aggressive net play. After that, Djokovic was the more confident and positive player, running Kyrgios side to side from the back of the court.

The two long rallies settled Djokovic’s game and gave him a pathway forward for his fourth straight Wimbledon title and 21st Grand Slam trophy overall.

https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovi ... brain-game

[Damian]

Where Coric Dominated Tsitsipas To Claim The Cincinnati Crown

Spoiler:

Brain Game analyses the Cincinnati final
Borna Coric put Stefanos Tsitsipas in the backhand cage and threw away the key.

Coric defeated Tsitsipas 7-6(0), 6-2 in the Western & Southern Open final on Sunday in Cincinnati by dominating baseline exchanges through the Ad court. The engine room of Coric’s game has always been a rock-solid backhand, and he led with his strong suit to win his maiden ATP Masters 1000 title.

Coric was always looking to go backhand-to-backhand with Tsitsipas, where the Croatian proved to be more consistent and more powerful.

Coric Backhand Groundstrokes

86 backhands
4 errors
10 winners
Tsitsipas Backhand Groundstrokes

94 backhands
15 errors
0 winners
Tsitsipas raced to a 4-1 lead after 16 minutes of play on the back of making his first 16 backhands of the match. The Greek then went through a period missing four out of five backhands, and the early break and the momentum quickly dried up. Coric’s backhand went into lockdown mode for the rest of the set, making his last 25 backhands of the first set, which included four winners.

Overall for the match, Coric’s backhand groundstroke racked up 10 winners while yielding just four errors. Tsitsipas was unable to hit a single backhand groundstroke winner, committing 15 errors. Coric’s average backhand speed was 70 mph, which was significantly faster than Tsitsipas’ 60 mph. In fact, Coric’s average backhand speed was just one mile per hour slower than Tsitsipas’ average forehand speed (71 mph), and almost as fast as his own forehand (72 mph average).

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The Croatian felt at home standing in the Ad court crushing backhands and using his run-around forehand to hit high and heavy back cross court. Coric had the perfect game plan of nullifying and frustrating Tsitsipas’ powerful game by keeping the ball flowing back and forth through the Ad court until the right ball presented itself to attack somewhere else.

Coric hit 43 run-around forehands for the match, which was almost identical to Tsitsipas’ 44. That stat alone is a win for Coric as Tsitsipas possesses a more penetrating forehand that can do more damage as a run-around shot. Both players hit five winners and committed five errors from run-around forehands.

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The champion’s minor weak spot in the match was hitting regular forehands standing in the Deuce court. He hit 69 forehands for the match standing there, hitting three winners while contributing 14 errors. Deuce-court exchanges favoured Tsitsipas overall, but with Coric hitting 65 per cent (129/198) of all groundstrokes standing in the Ad court, Tsitsipas could not run his preferred strategy often enough.

Coric was simply more dominant from the back of the court. He won 56 per cent (46/82) of his baseline points, while Tsitsipas was way off that mark, winning just 41 per cent (29/71) from the baseline.

The 25-year-old also enjoyed serving success by going after Tsitsipas’ backhand return.

Tsitsipas Returns

Forehand returns = 24, including five errors
Backhand returns = 37, including 11 errors
Tsitsipas hit 61 per cent (37/61) of returns as a backhand return, yielding 11 return errors from that side.

Impressively, Coric managed to execute his favorite pattern of play to take his biggest title. Controlling the Ad court with his solid backhand and heavy run-around forehand was always going to be the preferred way to wrestle control of points against Tsitsipas.

It must feel good to win on the biggest ATP stage with your “go-to” pattern of play.

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