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Bulgarian refused to give Kyrgios pace and chased down everything the Aussie could hit

Fast feet and slow backhands.
That was the mercurial mix that engineered Grigor Dimitrov's maiden ATP World Tour Masters 1000 title over Nick Kyrgios at the Western & Southern Open in Cincinnati on Sunday. Dimitrov won 6-3, 7-5, saving both break points faced while winning a dominant 69 per cent (18/26) of second serves, which was far superior to Kyrgios’ 44 per cent (8/18).
Dimitrov showed exemplary footwork and speed on defence, many times sliding on the hard court well behind the baseline, miraculously putting one more ball back in play. It had a cumulative effect on Kyrgios, who had no answer for his quicker opponent when rally lengths reached double digits.
There were 16 rallies in the match that were at least 10 shots long, and Dimitrov amazingly won 15 of them. Kyrgios dominated the “first-strike” rallies, 38-34, when a maximum of only four shots were hit in the court.
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But Dimitrov led 33-14 when a rally was extended to five shots or longer. That fifth ball in play was the line in the sand that clearly separated who was favoured to ultimately win the point.
It was one of those matches where there didn't seem to be a ball that Kyrgios could hit that Dimitrov couldn't run down.
Rally Length: Points Won
• 0-4 Shots: Kyrgios 38 / Dimitrov 34
• 5-9 Shots: Dimitrov 18 / Kyrgios 13
• 10+ Shots: Dimitrov 15 / Kyrgios 1
The main defensive weapon for Dimitrov was his slice backhand, which had the added benefit of giving Kyrgios less power for the Australian to use back at him.
When Dimitrov defeated Feliciano Lopez 7-6(5), 6-4 in his second-round match in Cincinnati, Dimitrov's average groundstroke speed was a quick 76 mph. But against Kyrgios, Dimitrov dropped it 10 mph on purpose, averaging just 66 mph, to Kyrgios’ 68 mph. Kyrgios simply had nothing to work with.

Kyrgios Groundstroke Errors
Once the point migrated past the explosive serve and return at the beginning of the point, Dimitrov was always looking to match up his forehand to the Australian's backhand. Kyrgios committed 12 backhand groundstroke errors for the match, with eight of them coming right after a probing Dimitrov forehand. Of the four backhands that followed a Dimitrov backhand, two were from a slice backhand, and two followed a topspin backhand.
Kyrgios also committed 12 forehand groundstroke errors, with eight preceded by a Dimitrov forehand, and four from a backhand. Interestingly, Kyrgios missed four low forehand approach shots, with three of them coming off a heavy slice backhand from Dimitrov that stayed low.
Read More: Kyrgios Pleased With Cincy Final Run
Overall, Kyrgios won only 5/9 (56 per cent) points at net, missing several more opportunities to come forward by not taking care of the approach shot.
Dimitrov's clever defensive game plan worked to perfection against Kyrgios. The Bulgarian shrunk the court with his blinding speed and made Kyrgios over play because he routinely had to hit the ball lower and slower out of strike zone. It was as smart a strategic match as Dimitrov has ever played.

Sweet 16. Rafael Nadal won a perfect 16 of 16 points at the net in claiming his 16th Grand Slam singles title at the US Open on Sunday. Everywhere you looked, there was a storyline, but his superiority in finishing points at the front of the court shone bright on the big stage. Nadal defeated Kevin Anderson 6-3 6-3, 6-4 in the final, putting a stamp on his recent resurgence back to No. 1 in the Emirates ATP Rankings.
There were six focal points for the Spaniard that highlighted his dominance in the past fortnight in the Big Apple.
1. Tournament Net Points Won 80% (96/120)
Nadal finished tied for fourth-best in points won at the net during the tournament and was tops among those coming forward at least 30 times. He turned in a dominant performance when coming forward on Sunday (16/16 won).
By contrast, Anderson only won 66 per cent (111/168) of points at the net for the tournament, including just 47 per cent (16/34) in the final. They actually won the exact same amount of points at net (16), but Anderson went there more than twice as much to accrue the same total.
2. Final Nadal Break Points Faced: 0
Nadal didn’t face a single break point in the final and was broken just seven times in seven matches throughout the tournament. It wasn’t until the last game of the match, with Nadal serving at 5-4 in the third set, that Anderson was finally able to extend a Nadal service game to deuce.
At deuce, Anderson jumped to his left to cover a first serve to the backhand, but Nadal was a step ahead with a serve out wide to the forehand. Anderson barely touched the ball. On his second match point, Nadal served-and-volleyed behind a curling slider out wide, and easily knocked off a backhand volley winner into the open court to win the match.
3. Final Baseline Points Won: 57% (54/95)
Once the point evolved past the serve and return in the final, Nadal completely dominated from the back of the court. Nadal won 57 per cent of his baseline points, while Anderson battled mightily, but only managed to win 32 per cent (25/77) of his baseline points. Anderson’s forehand yielded 27 errors, while the backhand was slightly higher at 35.
The baseline was the Spaniard’s domain from start to finish in New York, winning a tournament high 58 per cent (456/784). He was one of only nine players that had a winning record from the baseline in New York over the past two weeks.

4. Gateway Points Won: 100% (4/4)
Nadal was only pressured to 30/30 and deuce four times in the final and won all four of those points. In direct contrast, Anderson was pushed to 30/30 and deuce 21 times over three sets, winning just 14 (67 per cent) of those points.
Anderson’s first service game of the match went to deuce and he won it. It was a victory for Anderson, but also a victory for Nadal to immediately go deep in the South African’s opening service game. He had to endure seven deuces in his second service game before finally winning it. His third service game had five deuces, and he won that as well.
At 3-3, Anderson was stretched to deuce yet again. He double faulted, putting a 107 mph second serve into the net, and lost the ad point when he cooked a forehand just wide.
5. Tournament: Nadal Serve & Volley 100% (10/10)
Nadal had not served-and-volleyed until the semi-finals, where he won 5/5 against Juan Martin Del Potro. Nadal doubled up with the tactic, winning 5/5 against Anderson, following a wide slider immediately to the net in the Ad court on match point.
The overall win percentage serving and volleying for all players in New York was 66 per cent (375/572), which was higher than the average for general net points (65 per cent) and baseline points (47 per cent).
6. Final: 1st Serve Points Won Deuce Court: 91% (20/22)
Nadal peppered the Anderson backhand with his first serve in the deuce court, hitting 13 down the middle, three at the body, and just six out wide to the forehand. Nadal also went after Anderson’s backhand return in the Ad court, hitting 16 wide, two at the body, and only five down the T to the forehand. Nadal won 18/23 first serves in the Ad court.

Federer tips the serve v. return battle heavily in his favour

Roger Federer broke down Rafael Nadal’s much-vaunted return game during his 6-4, 6-3 victory in the Shanghai Rolex Masters final by hitting the corners of the service boxes at will, and by staying a step ahead in the guessing game of which corner he was aiming at next. Federer’s serve was completely dialed in, leaving Nadal to continuously play catch-up on the quick indoor court.
The pair has now played 38 times, with the Spaniard holding a 23-15 advantage. The following metrics show how dominant Federer was on serve and how Nadal was unable to make an impact on return.
Nadal Return Statistics v Federer
Lowest: 2nd Serve Return Points Won = 21% (3/14)
It was the lowest percentage of second serve points won by Nadal in their 38 matches. The next lowest was 25 per cent (5/20) won at Indian Wells earlier this year, when Federer dominated 6-2, 6-3. Overall, Nadal has won 50 per cent (679/1348) of second serve points head-to-head against Federer.
Lowest: Percentage Return Points Won = 18% (8/44)
The 18 per cent return points won represents a career low for Nadal against Federer. In all of their other matches, Nadal has averaged winning 38 per cent (1347/3570) of his combined first- and second-serve return points.
Equal Lowest: Total Return Points Won = 8
This ties the lowest total for first and second serve points won with their 2011 Nitto ATP Finals clash, which Federer won 6-3, 6-0. Those two matches represent the only two times out of 38 that Nadal has been in single figures for return points won.
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Equal Third Lowest: Total First-Serve Return Points Won = 5
Nadal only won six points against Federer’s first serve in their 2017 Indian Wells encounter, and won one less Sunday in Shanghai, with just five points won.
2017 Shanghai Final - First Serve Location Deuce Court
It was all about the mix for the Swiss. Federer served 12 times out wide in the deuce court, and 14 times down the middle. This even mix constantly had Nadal guessing, and, more often than not, it was the wrong way.
Federer won 10 of 12 service points out wide in the deuce court, with four being backhand return errors from Nadal. Federer won a perfect 8/8 when he made his first serve down the middle T in the Deuce court, including four aces and a service winner.
In the ad court, Federer served 14 times out wide, making 10, and winning seven. He served nine times down the middle T, making eight, and winning five. Nadal had no idea where Federer was going, or when.
The Five-Match Win Streak
Federer has now beaten Nadal five straight times for the first time, with four victories coming this year, and one back in 2015. The following 10 metrics showcase just how dominant Federer’s serve has been during the five-match win streak.
When leading 15/0 on serve, Federer has held every time (42/42).
When Federer has been pushed to deuce, he has held 93 per cent (13/14) of the time.
Federer’s career first-serve percentage is 62 per cent. He is making 63 per cent (240/379) during the streak.
Federer has hit 52 aces and just seven double faults. Nadal has served just 14 aces, while also committing seven double faults.
Federer’s career first-serve points won is 77 per cent. He is winning 79 per cent (189/240) now against Nadal.
Federer has averaged saving 67 per cent of his break points in his career, but that has sky-rocketed to 80% (20/25) during the five-match win streak. Nadal is at 63 per cent.
Nadal has averaged winning 34 per cent of his first-serve return points for his career, but is only at 21 per cent (51/240) during the five matches.
Nadal has averaged winning 55 per cent of his second-serve return points for his career, but is only at 42 per cent (59/139) during the five matches.
Nadal has only won 19 per cent (4/21) of break points returning in the ad court.
Federer has only found himself down 0/30 seven times in the five matches, winning three of those games.
Nadal did make an adjustment in the Shanghai final by moving further back to return against Federer. That tactic worked for Nadal in the 2017 US Open final against Kevin Anderson, but didn’t make a difference against Federer yesterday.
More adjustments, more tweaks, and more video analysis of Federer’s streak will be needed by the Spaniard to figure out his recent returning conundrum.

The American sticks to his strengths for first ATP World Tour Masters 1000 crown

Upgrade, double and freeze. Jack Sock successfully tapped into the three main benefits of hitting a run-around forehand instead of a backhand from the baseline in the Ad court to defeat Filip Krajinovic 5-7, 6-4, 6-1 in the final of the Rolex Paris Masters on Sunday.
Sock relentlessly hunted forehands in the Ad court as his Serbian opponent pummeled that side of the court trying to give Sock a steady diet of backhands. Overall for the match, Sock hit 132 groundstrokes (62%) standing in the Ad court, and just 81 (38%) in the Deuce court. The following breakdown illustrates the American's thirst for the more lethal run-around forehand when standing in the Ad court.
Court Position & Stroke - Where Sock Stood To Contact The Ball.
• Deuce Court Forehands = 81
• Ad Court Forehands = 67
• Ad Court Backhands = 65
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Sock's backhand groundstroke did it's job of minimizing errors, and getting out of the way of the run-around forehand at every opportunity.
Shots Hit Standing In The Ad Court
• 67 run around forehands = 15 winners / 7 errors
• 65 backhands = 3 winners / 10 errors
When adding winners and subtracting errors, Sock's run-around forehand from the Ad court tallied +8 (15 winners - 7 errors), which was vastly superior to the -7 total (3 winners - 10 errors) that his backhand produced. Sock hit a lot of off-pace slice backhands to give Krajinovic no speed of shot to work with, and also to allow time for Sock to run around the next shot intended for his backhand and turn it into a forehand.
A good way to understand the relationship between forehands and backhands is that the forehand is the sword, that you attack more with, and the backhand is the shield, that you primarily defend with and look to minimize errors. Of the 15 run-around forehand winners Sock hit for the match, 11 of them were directed back behind Krajinovic to his backhand wing. This was the match-up that Sock constantly looked to enforce.
Double
Double in this instance means doubling the target area to attack. If Sock was to continuously hit neutral backhands standing in the Ad court, the natural angle goes back cross court to Krajinovic's stronger backhand wing. By upgrading to a forehand from the Ad court, Sock can hit a more powerful groundstroke, and thus launch attacks to both the Deuce and Ad court.
Freeze
Sock was constantly looking to freeze Krajinovic, essentially removing his anticipation because Sock’s open-stance, run-around forehand offers no visual clues as to where it will end up. It is beautifully disguised and steals tenths of seconds of anticipation, forcing more errors because it imposes less time to prepare.
Krajinovic committed 25 backhand errors for the match, with 14 of them coming straight from Sock's run-around forehand from the Ad court. Eight of the 14 errors from Krajinovic were trying to force backhands down the line from defensive positions. Leading into the Paris final, Krajinovic was hitting the majority of his backhands down the line, but doing it from Sock's run-around forehand in the final was a much tougher task.
Krajinovic Backhand Direction: To The Final
• 40% down the line
• 36% cross court
• 24% to the middle
Overall, Krajinovic committed 13 of his 25 backhand errors for the match going down the line. This successful pattern to the final ran into a buzz-saw in the form of the heavy spin and more powerful run-around forehands from Sock. At 5-7, 4-1 Sock's average topspin forehand speed was 132 km/h, while Krajinovic was only averaging 120km/h. Sock's heavy rotation of the forehand saw an average spin rate of 3364rpm, with Krajinovic hitting much flatter at 2506rpm. More power, more spin, and more determination to hit forehands instead of backhands made Sock a very tough match-up against the more traditional tactics of the Serb.
Sock was relentless at pounding the Krajinovic backhand with his forehand. For example, in Set Two Sock directed 60 per cent of his groundstrokes wide to the Krajinovic backhand, 13 per cent down the middle, and just 27 per cent to the outer third of the court to the Serb's forehand wing.
Run-Around Forehands vs. Normal Forehands
Sock's run-around forehand standing in the Ad court greatly outperformed his regular forehand hit when standing in the Deuce court.
Sock Forehands: Winners / Errors
• 67 run around forehands hit from the Ad court = 15 winners / 7 errors
• 81 regular forehands hit from the Deuce court = 5 winners / 12 errors
Sock's marauding baseline play promotes forehands to be struck from all baseline locations - especially from the Ad court. It's a reality of the modern game that the run-around forehand produces more winners and less errors than regular forehands, which is exactly how it played out in this match.
Serve +1 Forehands
Sock was always looking to combine the power of his serve with the strength of a forehand as the first shot after the serve - a tactic known as Serve +1. Overall for the match, Sock hit a substantial 88 per cent (38/43) forehands as the first shot after the serve, winning an impressive 66 per cent (25/38) of them. Of the five points that Sock started the point with a Serve +1 backhand, which were all second serve points, he failed to win a single one.
Summary
Sock's biggest advantage in the match was in the short rallies of 0-4 shots, where he had a 63-49 advantage in points won. Overall, Sock ran further than Krajinovic for the match (1813 metres to 1710 metres) mainly due to running around his backhand to upgrade to his forehand.
Sock's run-around forehand was the most dominant shot in the match, and serves as a blueprint for juniors all over the world to emulate. The run-around forehand wears the pants from the back of the court.

Federer turns a seemingly counter-intuitive strategy into an early advantage
Hit them before they can hit you.
The match lasted an hour and a half, but Roger Federer was well on his way to winning it before a ball had been struck. Federer defeated Jack Sock 6-4, 7-6(4) in their opening round match at the Nitto ATP Finals on Sunday in no small part to winning the toss and electing to receive.
The decision went against Federer’s normal front-running tactics of serving first and letting his opponent chase him. This time around, Federer was on the hunt to immediately break and instantly unsettle his American opponent. Six points later, his goal was accomplished and Sock played the rest of the match in Federer’s rear-view mirror.
Federer’s early strategy of playing to Sock’s stronger forehand wing seemed counter-intuitive, but it was layered in strategic brilliance. Sock loves to run around his backhand and hit forehands from the ad court, so Federer simply went the other way, attacking Sock’s forehand out wide in the deuce court. Sock loves moving to his left, so Federer attacked him to the right. That works at every level of our sport.
Sometimes it takes a few games to figure out a player’s strategy. But in this match it took exactly four shots. On the opening point of the match, Sock predictably served to Federer’s backhand, and the blocked return predictably went to the ad court. On cue, Sock ran outside the doubles alley to hit his forehand as he loves to do, and he targeted the Federer backhand cross-court. It was all going to script, until Federer rifled a backhand down the line to the vacant deuce court for a dazzling winner. Gotcha.
At 30/30, Federer targeted the same location wide to Sock’s forehand in the deuce court for another clean winner — this time from his own run-around forehand. At 30/40, Federer blocked a backhand return cross-court, and then crushed his second backhand winner of the game down the line to the vacant deuce court.
The match was just six points old, but Federer had masterminded his early blitz to perfection. Sock’s confidence and momentum had taken a direct hit after just over two minutes of play.
Federer’s control of the match was also seen in the aggressive manner he collected his points. Overall, he hit 28 winners and forced another 24 errors, while also receiving 24 unforced errors from Sock.
Federer Points Won By Style Of Play
Style Points Won
Aggressive Play 64% (52 winners and forced errors)
Consistent Play 36% (24 unforced errors)
Federer won the “first strike” rally length of 0-4 shots 58-50, gaining an eight-point advantage in these shorter points. Of all rallies five shots or longer, Federer only won five more points than Sock (23-18). Seventy-two per cent of all points in the match featured a maximum of just two shots hit in the court, and Federer was on the front foot for the vast majority of them.
Federer only lost four points behind his first serve for the entire match (36/40), and backed that up with a healthy 65 per cent win percentage (15/23) behind his second serve. The power game of Sock was negated early by the precision game of Federer.
Sock’s average first-serve speed was eight miles per hour faster (124 mph to 116 mph), and his average second serve speed was a dominant 11 mph faster (107 mph to 96 mph). Sock was also more powerful off the ground, averaging 70 mph with his groundstroke speed to Federer’s 66 mph. How hard the ball was hit was trumped by where it went and when.
Crunch time in a match typically comes with the finish line in sight. On this occasion, it was just a few paces past the starting line.

Bulgarian took time away from Thiem during their Group Pete Sampras match
What you want to do is quite often in direct conflict with what you need to do.
Dominic Thiem wanted to step back as far as possible returning second serves against Grigor Dimitrov to buy time to take big cuts at the ball. After all, it’s what helped get him to London in the first place. But there was only one problem: It didn’t work nearly as well on the quicker, lower-bouncing indoor conditions of The O2.
Dimitrov defeated Thiem 6-3, 5-7, 7-5 in their Group Pete Sampras match at the Nitto ATP Finals on Monday, with the battleground of second serves as important as anything that transpired in the match.
Overall, Thiem won 23 per cent (12/52) of points against Dimitrov’s first serve, and 44 per cent (20/45) against the Bulgarian’s second serve. On the several occasions Thiem stepped inside the baseline to return serve, his win percentage skyrocketed to 63 per cent. When he moved back behind the baseline, his win percentage dropped to 40 per cent.
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In the opening set, Thiem put back into play only 57 per cent of second-serve returns, primarily because there was no set play he was sticking to.
His focus was time. Thiem wanted to move back to acquire more time to complete his big, aggressive backswings on his returns. But what worked better on this occasion was focusing on giving Dimitrov less time by stepping in and rebounding the ball quicker right back at him.
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When returning second serves, Thiem could quite often be found around six metres behind the baseline. But every now and then he would sneak in to around three metres inside it. Moving back was what made him feel more comfortable, but moving forward was where victory was more attainable.
The same return concept of time and space stood true for Dimitrov as well. When he made contact with his return of serve inside the baseline, he won an impressive 61 per cent of his return points. Rushing Thiem’s aggressive backswings was a key strategy that Dimitrov never wavered from.
Learn more about players' patterns with the Infosys Serve & Return Tracker
When Dimitrov returned serve from behind the baseline, primarily against Thiem’s powerful first serve, Dimitrov won only 26 per cent of his return points. Importantly for the Bulgarian, his average return hit point on second serves was farther up the court than when he returned first serves, while Thiem’s court position was the opposite.
The further back Thiem moved to return, the tougher it was for the Austrian to get the ball deep, which is really what mattered at the end of the day. When Thiem’s return landed in the service boxes, he won 35 per cent of the points. If it landed past the service line, he won 45 per cent of his return points. The depth of the return was more important for Thiem than how hard he struck the ball.
Similarly, Dimitrov won only 32 per cent of his return points that landed inside the service line, but that jumped to 69 per cent for points starting with a return that landed in the back part of the court, closer to the baseline than the service line. It often looks like we play a sport dominated by power and spin, but court position and depth of shot (where you stand to hit it, and where it lands) typically matter more to the win/loss column.
Overall Thiem hit 75 per cent of his baseline shots as a forehand, while Dimitrov was not far away at 70 per cent. Thiem averaged 73 mph with his groundstroke speed, which again was a little more dominant than Dimitrov’s 70 mph.
Thiem won a lot of the small battles over the court, but Dimitrov ultimately played the court and the opponent in a smarter fashion.

Austrian plays aggressively to have a chance at making the semi-finals
The conversation about winning and losing tennis matches begins with the second serve.
Dominic Thiem outlasted Pablo Carreno Busta 6-3, 3-6, 6-4 at the Nitto ATP Finals Wednesday evening with this key battleground being the crucible of the final outcome.
The first serve always reigns supreme in our sport, delivering a healthy win percentage because of its power, freedom, and accuracy. But as soon as it’s missed, the gateway to breaking serve becomes illuminated. The first serve is essentially a red light to collecting return points. The second serve is as green as it gets.
At 4-4, 15/15 in the third set, as the match clock ticked over to two hours on the dot, Carreno Busta chased a first serve down the middle to Thiem’s backhand. It clipped the net and went long, and in so doing, the point flipped from red to green for Thiem.
Carreno Busta kicked in an 83 mph second serve, which Thiem thumped with a forehand return straight to Carreno Busta’s backhand. Thiem followed it up with a leaping run-around forehand winner back behind to the backhand. The match essentially ended right there.
It was the gateway point to victory, as Thiem would win seven of the next nine points to seal a very tight encounter. Both players had a winning record behind their first serves, and both players had a losing record behind their second serves. That’s more common in our sport than we realise.
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The three main reasons second serves get beat up so much are because of the predicability of their location to the backhand return, the reduced speed at which they are hit, and the high volume that come back in the court, instantly putting the server on defence.
Carreno Busta’s fastest serve for the match was 122 mph, but his average second serve speed was 83 mph – just 68 per cent of his most powerful delivery. This dynamic allowed Thiem to mentally switch from defence to offence during the match as soon as the first serve was missed. The relationship between the speed of each serve, and the corresponding return speed, dictated who had first rights to enjoy offence.
Carreno Busta’s average first serve speed for the match was 109 mph, forcing Thiem to average 59 mph with his first serve returns – putting Thiem’s return speed at 54 per cent of the shot coming at him.
But how the weather changed when the first serve was missed.
Carreno Busta averaged 83 mph on his second serve, therefore enabling Thiem to average 80 mph with his second serve return – approximately a one-to-one ratio that let Thiem instantly wrestle control of the point.
Normally players step in closer to the baseline to return second serves, but not so with Thiem here in London. In this match, his average return hit point against a first serve was half a metre behind the baseline, but he then migrated back 1.7 metres behind the baseline to return second serves.
This was actually an improvement for Thiem from his opening-round loss to Grigor Dimitrov, where the Austrian averaged standing an astounding 3.3 metres behind the service line to hit second serves. That strategy works brilliantly on clay, but not so much on indoor hard.
Thiem essentially wants the ball to drop lower into his strike zone to crush it, rather than take the ball earlier and higher to get the ball back quicker to the server. Against Carreno Busta, Thiem’s average contact point against first serves was 1.31m, but that dropped to 1.19m against second serves.
The average net clearance of Thiem’s first serve returns was 1.16m, but that dropped to 1.06m against second serves as Thiem significantly upped his average return speed from 59 mph to 80 mph.
With Thiem serving at 5-4 in the third set, he made a first serve on the opening point and won it. Two second serve points followed, and he lost them both. He won the last three points of the match behind three first serves. Putting a first serve in the court at crunch time mattered a lot in this match, and then some.

Learn how Goffin got the better of his good friend in London
Off pace worked off the charts for David Goffin at The O2 on Friday afternoon. Goffin defeated Dominic Thiem 6-4, 6-1 at the Nitto ATP Finals to advance to the semi-final stage of the season finale against Roger Federer on Saturday. Read & Watch Match Report
It actually started badly for Goffin, who found himself struggling at 0-3, 0/15 in the early stages of the match. The Belgian then went on a tear, winning 15 straight points to shock Thiem and light up the packed house in London.
How did Goffin do it? By delivering a steady of diet of exactly what Thiem didn’t like to devour - slower balls that completely disrupted Thiem’s rhythm and timing.
Quite simply, Thiem loves for the ball to come to him. He wants to stand deep in the court and utilise his opponents’ power right back at them.
Goffin failed to oblige.
Instead, he upped his consistency, lowered the rally speed, and enjoyed extracting 27 unforced errors from the exasperated Austrian.
By Thiem’s own admission, he craves power and spin in the rally. “It’s not easy, the surface, for a player who plays a lot of topspin,” Thiem said post-match. It seemed highly unlikely that Goffin would dominate this winner-take-all encounter, given that the Belgian lost 6-0, 6-2 to Grigor Dimitrov at the Nitto ATP Finals just two days earlier.
From serving, to returning, to trading blows from the back of the court, Goffin purposely hit the ball slower so that Thiem didn’t have the ammunition to fire directly back at him.
It was a bold move that took courage and conviction to execute. It’s not easy to play slower, because you risk getting blown off the court. It’s not easy to provide your opponent something juicy to hit, unless you clearly understand that a slower ball is sometimes tougher to connect with than a more powerful delivery.
Consider the following eight areas of the match where Goffin generally avoided going toe-to-toe with Thiem in speed of shot.
THIEM vs. GOFFIN: SPEED OF SHOT
# Strategy Thiem
Goffin
1 Fastest First Serve 130mph
121mph
2 Average 1st Serve Speed 115mph
110mph
3 Average 2nd Serve Speed 98mph
90mph
4 Average 1st Serve Return Speed 63mph
63mph
5 Average 2nd Serve Return Speed 76mph
65mph
6 Average Groundstroke Speed 74mph
70mph
7 Average Forehand Speed 80mph
74mph
8 Average Backhand Speed 73mph
67mph
To what lengths was Goffin willing to go to slow down the ball and give Thiem nothing to work with? Consider this…
Serving at 6-4, 4-1, deuce, Goffin hit an 86 miles per hour first serve out wide that clipped the net and sailed long. His second serve was faster, at 90mph. Goffin’s number one strategy at this advanced stage of the match was to get Thiem to play out in front of the ball and miss.
A secondary theme of the match was Thiem’s low first-serve percentage. He is averaging 59 per cent first serves in 2017 coming into London, but only managed to put a lowly 43 per cent first serves in play against Goffin. Combine that with the 36 per cent (10/28) second-serve points won, and it’s no wonder Thiem felt so out of sorts in the match. He simply had nothing to lean on, to find a pathway to victory.
This is the third straight time Goffin has defeated his higher-ranked opponent, and now enjoys a 7-3 FedEx ATP Head2Head series lead over Thiem. Hitting through an opponent is easy. Letting your opponent hit themselves out of the match requires supreme confidence in the game plan.
Once again, Goffin nailed it.

Roger Federer has strategically gone back to the slice.
Federer defeated Alexander Zverev 7-6(6), 5-7, 6-1 to be the first player to advance to the semi-final stage of the Nitto ATP Finals after a masterful performance at The O2 on Tuesday night.
If you caught just one sentence of his post-match press conference, all you needed to hear was this: “I think I was able to stay the course and use my slice quite effectively, then try with variation and go into his forehand,” Federer said.
Federer is back to hitting a lot more slice returns and slice backhands in London because the court conditions and the opponent simply dictate it.
Federer Returns
The Federer renaissance in 2017 has been built around coming over his backhand return, but that’s not what got him over the line against Zverev on the quicker hard court in London. Overall, Federer hit a dominant 64 per cent of his returns as a slice, flattening out his return only 36 per cent of the time. This was in stark contrast to Zverev, who came over 95 per cent of his returns, hitting only five per cent as a slice.
This clever strategic adjustment from Federer reduced his return speed (which is not always a bad thing), lowered the rally when he returned shorter, and also provided less power to be immediately used back at him.
Average Return Speed
First Serve
Federer 50 mph / Zverev 62 mph
Second Serve
Federer 59 mph / Zverev 73 mph
Federer put a commendable 70 per cent of his first serve returns back in play, and 84 per cent against second serves. He attacked his returns much more with his feet than with his hands.
Average Return Contact Point
First Serve
Federer 0.9m behind baseline / Zverev 1.8m behind baseline
Second Serve
Federer 0.4m inside baseline / Zverev 0.7m behind baseline
Federer’s return tactics could even be seen in the return height over the net. Against first serves, his slice return generally floated a little higher to increase the consistency and depth of the return. Federer’s first serve return height had a net clearance of 1.34m, which was slightly higher than Zverev’s 1.24m.
Variation To The Forehand
Once the rally began, Federer still went to the slice a lot, hitting 25 per cent of all groundstrokes with backspin, and 75 per cent with topspin. As he mentioned in his press conference, Federer wanted variation against an opponent who typically brings the same aggressive look on every shot. Zverev hit a dominant 96 per cent of his groundstrokes with topspin, which was not always comfortable to do against Federer’s low slice backhands.

Federer constantly targeted Zverev’s forehand throughout the match, directing 55 per cent of his own forehands to the outer third of the court, to Zverev’s forehand wing, just 11 per cent down the middle and 34 per cent out wide to the backhand in the Ad court.
Federer also hit 30 per cent of his own backhands straight down the line to Zverev’s forehand, trying to stretch him out wide, and also to rebound the ball back crosscourt to Federer’s forehand.
A main reason Federer targeted Zverev’s forehand in rallies is that the tall German tends to hang back deeper in the court when hitting it. Overall, Zverev hit a considerable 35 per cent of all forehands standing in the deep zone of at least two metres behind the baseline, but just 22 per cent of all his backhands were struck from back there.
Federer hit 157 forehands (57 per cent) and 120 backhands (43 per cent) for the match, while Zverev was basically dead even, hitting 135 forehands and 134 backhands.
As great as Federer is, he still views himself as the second most important person on the court. His strategy is primarily dictated by the person standing opposite him.

American's ability to break down an opponent deserves recognition
Your number one job in a match is not to play great. It’s to make the opponent play bad.
Jack Sock defeated Alexander Zverev 6-4, 1-6, 6-4 on Thursday evening at the Nitto ATP Finals by doing exactly that. Sock didn’t play amazing tennis, but that’s not really the point.
Sock didn’t beat himself, which has much more to do with why he has successfully navigated his way through to the semi-finals this weekend.
At 4-4 in the third set, Zverev was surging hard after winning 11 of the previous 15 points to erase a 1-4 deficit. Sock had won 17 of the first 22 points of the third set, so nobody really knew how this was going to finish.
At 4-4, Zverev’s ‘A-Game’ game struggled - and Sock needs to take all the credit for that.
“I choked. It's quite easy,” said Zverev, afterwards. “I won the second set 6-1. I was 1-0 with a break. He got a point penalty. I was down 1-4 within 10 minutes where I didn't put many balls in the court,” Zverev said. “So, yeah, I just choked.”
Fast forward to 4-4 in the third set and you can see by the patterns of play that the flow and control of points, whether won or lost, were played much more on Sock’s ‘first strike’ preferred terms of engagement.
Serving at 4-4, on the first point, Sock directed his second serve to Zverev’s forehand, and the return went straight into the net. The door just cracked open a little for the American. Sock double faulted, then at 15/15 he hit a Serve +1 forehand approach winner off a short forehand return. Sock won the next point with a drop shot, and closed out the game with a serve and volley point to Zverev’s forehand.
No rhythm for Zverev. No backhands for Zverev. No oxygen for his game at The O2.
With Zverev serving at 4-5, Sock missed a forehand return on the opening point. If he was going to lose a point at this stage of the match, it was actually better to do it this way than let Zverev feel comfort and consistency with his groundstrokes. On the next point, Sock approached with a Return +1 forehand and finished with an overhead.
The 4-5, 15/15 point provided a perfect snapshot of the tense nature of Zverev’s game. Sock hit a forehand return, then directed his backhand down the line trying to find Zverev’s forehand. The tall German moved to his right to hit a backhand standing in the Deuce court to protect his mis-firing forehand. Sock went straight back down the line and found Zverev’s forehand on the next shot, and it sprayed wide.
Sock’s strategy had nothing to do with his side of the net. It was simply to hunt down Zverev’s forehand.
You can definitely connect the dots with the double fault at 30/30, and the forehand Zverev missed on the previous point, and the one he missed on match point that was pushed wide down the line.
Zverev would finish with six forehand winners and 18 forehand unforced errors for the match. Overall, Zverev hit 140 backhands and just 79 forehands. It becomes very difficult to win a match on this stage without the forehand being a dominant force. In the third set, Zverev hit 62 backhands and just 39 forehands.
Zverev’s court position also told a story of the defensive nature of his mindset. Zverev made contact with 39 per cent of his ground strokes more than two metres behind the baseline. Sock was only back there 23 per cent of the time.
We all see Sock’s serve and forehand are his big weapons, but his ability to dissect an opponent and break down their strengths deserves just as much recognition.

Federer at the Nitto ATP Finals
An unexpected loss is easier to understand once you connect the statistical dots.
David Goffin stunned Roger Federer 2-6, 6-3, 6-4 to move through to the final of the Nitto ATP Finals at The O2 after starting slow, but running all over the six-time champion at the finish line.
The opening set was all Federer, and then the pendulum swung towards the Belgian as he broke for a 2-0 lead in the second set, and then again for a 2-1 lead at the beginning of the third. Set one looked nothing like sets two and three as Federer went from dictating points with authority to spraying loose balls with dismay.
In the first set, Federer laid down the law. He attacked at will, felt the magnetism of the baseline, and forced a nervous Goffin to miss balls he would normally make in his sleep. But in sets two and three, it was Goffin who relaxed more, upped his power level, and forced Federer to miss balls he routinely made in set one.
There were five metrics from the match that clearly showed the obvious difference in who controlled the strategic flow of points from set one to the last two sets.

1. Goffin: Average 2nd Serve Return Speed
Second serves are the real battleground in tennis, and Federer won a lot of these points on serve early in the match, forcing a slower Goffin return from a more confident second serve delivery. That changed dramatically the longer the match unfolded.
Goffin Average 2nd Serve Return Speed / Federer 2nd Serve Win Percentage
• Set 1 = Goffin 64mph average / Federer won 88%
• Set 2 = Goffin 71mph average / Federer won 50%
• Set 3 = Goffin 76mph average / Federer won 45%
It’s clear to see that the bolder Goffin became attacking Federer’s second serve, the better off he was. Goffin started too passive in this key area, but owned Federer by the end of the match by attacking it with his feet well inside the baseline, and with his hands, rifling powerful returns right back at the Swiss star.
2. Average Backhand Speed
These numbers clearly show who was leaning on who as the match unfolded. In the opening set, Federer had a one mile per hour advantage (68mph to 67mph) in average backhand speed, mainly because of several blistering backhands down the line. But by set three, Goffin was enjoying a 13mph advantage (70mph to 57mph) in this critical battleground.
Goffin Average Backhand Speed
• Set 1 = 67mph
• Set 2 = 68mph
• Set 3 = 70mph
Federer Average Backhand Speed
• Set 1 = 68mph
• Set 2 = 63mph
• Set 3 = 57mph
3. Goffin: Average Return Net Clearance
In the opening set, Goffin was returning the ball higher over the net against both Federer’s first and second serves compared to sets two and three. You could clearly see that he was defensive in set one, hoping to neutralise the point much more than initially taking the battle right back at Federer. Goffin found his offensive range much better in sets two and three.
Goffin Average Return Net Clearance - vs. 1st Serves
• Set 1 = 1.15m
• Set 2 = 0.71m
• Set 3 = 0.93m
Goffin Average Return Net Clearance - vs. 2nd Serves
• Set 1 = 1.02m
• Set 2 = 0.69m
• Set 3 = 0.82m
4. Average Rally Net Clearance
As Goffin’s confidence increased as the match developed, the harder he pounded his ground strokes. An insightful measurement of this dynamic was net clearance. The longer the match went, the lower Goffin played over the net - and the higher Federer was forced to play as a result.
Goffin Average Net Clearance
• Set 1 = 0.75m
• Set 2 = 0.70m
• Set 3 = 0.59m
Federer Average Net Clearance
• Set 1 = 0.63m
• Set 2 = 0.74m
• Set 3 = 0.75m
5. Average Groundstroke Speed
Hitting the ball harder forces more errors, takes precious tenths of seconds away from the opponent’s shot preparation, and creates a better chance of getting the ball past the outstretched racquet of the opponent for a winner. Like most metrics in this match, Goffin improved in the area from start to finish, which forced Federer the other way.
Goffin Average Groundstroke Speed
• Set 1 = 69mph
• Set 2 = 70mph
• Set 3 = 73mph
Federer Average Groundstroke Speed
• Set 1 = 70mph
• Set 2 = 66mph
• Set 3 = 68mph
The scoreboard shows us that Federer started strong, but it was Goffin who took the honours at the end of the match. It’s only when we break down the overall result into specific tactical metrics that we really understand why Goffin ultimately triumphed.

Roger Federer struck early and struck often to win an unprecedented 20th Grand Slam tournament title at Melbourne Park on Sunday night.

Federer defeated Marin Cilic 6-2, 6-7(5), 6-3, 3-6, 6-1 in a captivating final that was completely dominated by short rallies. The serve and return took centre stage over bruising baseline exchanges to deliver the Swiss maestro his sixth Australian Open crown.

The line in the sand in the final was clearly the fourth shot landing in the court. Two shots for the server, two for the returner, and then daylight.

Rally Length
• 0-4 Shots = 76% (212)
• 5-8 Shots = 19% (52)
• 9+ Shots = 5% (16)

More than three out of every four points had just a maximum of four shots - or two shots for each player. Federer ultimately triumphed because of his performance in the big pool of short points.

Points Won
• 0-4 Shots = Federer 120 / Cilic 92
• 5-8 Shots = Federer 25 / Cilic 27
• 9+ Shots = Federer 7 / Cilic 9

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Federer had a massive 28-point advantage in the 0-4 shot rally length. He crafted his advantage with hitting his spots better serving, making more returns, and attacking immediately with his Serve +1 and Return +1 combinations. Federer hit 24 aces in the final, which was eight more than Cilic’s 16. The Croatian came into the final with 107 aces, while Federer had just 71.

Cilic out-aced Federer to the final, but the tables were turned with the silverware on the line. The same dynamic played out in the 2017 Wimbledon final between these two players as well. In typical Federer fashion, his favourite first-serve locations in both the deuce court and ad court were out wide.

Federer 1st Serve Location
Deuce Court
• Wide 26
• Body 2
• Center 22

Ad Court
• Wide 17
• Body 2
• Center 15

Cilic roped a couple of spectacular forehand return winners cross-court during the final, but overall Federer owned this specific serve location. The Croatian only put 38 per cent (13/24) of Federer’s wide slice serves back in play. The Swiss cleverly dropped the power level on a lot of these wide serves, electing to pull Cilic off the court with heavy slice, making the ball leap away from the 6’6” Croatian. Cilic put a higher 54 per cent (19/35) of his backhand returns back in play in the deuce court.

Overall, Federer had 48 serves unreturned for the match, while Cilic only had 41. Again, these numbers were in Cilic’s favour leading into the final, but Federer owned them in the last match of the tournament.

Serve and volley was a strategic play that Federer employed seven times in the final, winning all seven points. Federer won 80 per cent (41/51) of his serve-and-volley points for the tournament. Those 51 points represent eight per cent (51/603) of all first and second serve opportunities.

The only area of Federer’s game that was not humming was making first serves when facing break point. Overall, he faced nine break points in the final, and only made a first serve on three of them. Cilic, meanwhile, faced 13 break points and made a first serve on eight of them.

Is there any coincidence that this 36-year old is still going so strong by organising his game around short, quick-hitting points rather than grinding out long points that add wear and tear to his body?

The renaissance of Roger is all about dictating at the start of the point. It’s a blueprint to take titles for players at all levels of our sport.

The 'Tower of Tandil' keeps his focus for his first ATP World Tour Masters 1000 crown

The paradox of tennis is that our minds quickly dismiss the short points, but they are by far the most influential to the final outcome.

Juan Martin Del Potro defeated Roger Federer 6-4, 6-7(8), 7-6(2) to win the BNP Paribas Open in Indian Wells on Sunday by forging his winning advantage in the abundant short rallies in the match. He won the short, lost the long, and emerged the victor, saving three match points along the way.


Fans all over the world that tuned in to watch this instant classic will no doubt enjoy discussing the extended, bruising baseline exchanges from these two heavy hitters. But the reality of this battle, lasting two hours and 42 minutes, was that only seven per cent (16 points) of rallies reached double digits - and Del Potro actually lost that battle.

Rally Length - Points Won

0-4 Shots (65% total points)
Del Potro = 80 won
Federer = 67 won

5-9 Shots (28% total points)
Del Potro = 34 won
Federer = 28 won

10+ Shots (7% total points)
Del Potro = 6 won
Federer = 10 won

Just 10 per cent of Del Potro’s total points through six matches reached double digits in rally length. Our eyes certainly don’t pick up that 90 per cent of all his points had either Del Potro or his opponent hitting a maximum of just five consecutive shots in the court.

Del Potro - Six Match Total
0-4 Shots = 539 points (59%)
5-9 Shots = 282 points (31%)
10+ Shots = 89 points (10%)

In the final against Federer, Del Potro crafted a 13-point advantage in the 0-4 rally length, and a six-point advantage in the mid-length rallies of 5-9 shots. The Argentinian actually lost the long rallies six to 10, but with so few of them played, it didn’t hurt to lose that category.

Overall for the tournament, Del Potro’s winning margin (points won minus points lost) was the most abundant in the ‘first strike’ rally length of 0-4 shots.

Del Potro - Six Match Total
0-4 Shots = 292 won / 247 lost. Margin = +45 points
5-9 Shots = 152 won / 130 lost. Margin = +22 points
10+ Shots = 51 won / 38 lost. Margin = +13 points

The Final Stanza: Federer Serving Third Set 5-4, 40/15
The match looked to be all but over with Federer serving at 5-4, 40/15 in the final set. It seemed imminent that there would be just one more point to be played, but instead, there would be another 26, and it would be Del Potro that would win 65 per cent (17/26) of them.

From 5-4, 40/15 in the third set, Federer only made 31 per cent (5/16) of his first serves and would hit two double faults in the tie-break. He also went for two backhand drop shots serving at 5-4. which uncharacteristically felt like a reach for the finish line.

From 5-4, 40/15, Federer’s forehand also went awry. He committed six forehand errors, including one return, while contributing just one forehand return winner. While Federer struggled mightily to find the court with the match on the line, Del Potro was finding another level. The Argentinian hit three forehand winners and three backhand winners (including one return), while committing just six total groundstroke and return errors to Federer’s nine.

Winning doesn’t happen evenly all over the court as much we think. Win the battle of the abundant short points, and the much smaller pool of longer points can quite often be a loss and not be detrimental to the final outcome.

John Isner battled past Alexander Zverev to claim his maiden ATP World Tour Masters 1000 title
Our understanding of forehands and backhands has just added another layer - ironically from one of the greatest servers our sport has ever seen.

John Isner defeated Alexander Zverev 6-7(4), 6-4, 6-4 to win the Miami Open presented by Itau on Sunday, with an analysis of his forehands and backhands shedding new light on what other factors heavily contribute to their overall performance.

The following five areas break down Isner’s forehand and backhand proficiency with a new lens. The analysis does not include returns, volleys or overheads, but does include baseline groundstrokes and approaching the net.

1. The Serve Protects The Backhand
On the surface, there is nothing special about uncovering that Isner hit 24 backhands in the opening set. What will stop you in your tracks is that 20 of them occurred when he was receiving serve, and only four occurred when serving.

Quite simply, Isner can hide his backhand behind his potent serve. When returning, the server can find it at will. In the second set, Isner hit 18 backhands, which were evenly split at nine apiece when serving and returning.

In the deciding third set, Isner hit another 18 backhands, with an overwhelming 16 of them hit when he was returning. Overall, Isner hit 60 backhands, with 75 per cent (45 in total) of them being struck after a return of serve.

It certainly begs the conversation that simply recording forehand metrics such as winners, errors and totals in isolation does not even begin to tell the story.


2. Run Around Forehands = No. 1
You can divide Isner’s baseline and approach performance into three distinct categories.

1. Normal Forehands (struck from the deuce-court)
2. Run-Around Forehands (struck from the ad-court)
3. Backhands
The number one thing that Isner did in this match was hit run-around forehands - standing in the ad-court. Zverev directed 123 shots to the ad-court, but Isner upgraded 63 (51 per cent) of them to forehands.

The following breakdown shows how the American short-circuited Zverev’s baseline tactics.

Isner - Shots Hit / Location
• 28 per cent - Normal forehands (Isner standing in the Deuce court)
• 37 per cent - Run-around forehands (Isner standing in the Ad court)
• 35 per cent - Backhands

Is the backhand considered a weakness if you don’t actually have to hit it?

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3. Forehands Struck Around 2 to 1.
Zverev constantly tried to attack Isner’s backhand, but he had a great deal of trouble finding it. Overall, Isner hit 65 per cent total forehands for the match.

• 112 forehands (11 winners / 24 errors)
• 60 backhands (4 winners / 9 errors)

The role of the forehand is to attack, so it will typically have more winners and errors, just like this match. Isner averaged committing a forehand error one out of every 4.7 forehands, which was worse than the 6.7 error average hitting backhands.

The role of the forehand is to make the opponent miss. The role of the backhand is not to miss. Mission accomplished for the American.


4. Set Three: Run-Around Forehands Skyrocketed When Returning
It’s always tougher to hit the preferred run-around forehand when returning, but Isner did a solid job in the opening two sets, hitting 19 run-around forehands when serving, and 21 when returning. In the deciding third set, he was impressively able to hit 18 when returning, which was almost as much as the 21 from the first two sets combined.

In Set 3, he hit an amazing 75 per cent (18/24) of his run-around forehands when returning, while hitting 6 behind his serve. This created a tremendous amount of pressure in Zverev’s service games, with Isner finally breaking him at 4-all.

5. Set Three: Backhand Solid As A Rock
Isner committed eight backhand errors through the first two sets, but only made one in the third set, starving Zverev of a location on the court to attack. Importantly, of the 16 backhands Isner hit when returning serve in the third set, he didn’t miss a single one.

Thanks to a server, forehand and backhand analysis just took a step forward.

Normally, it’s Rafael Nadal’s run-around forehand that steals the spotlight as he prodigiously racks up titles in Monte-Carlo. Not so today. This time it was the backhand that stole the show.

Nadal defeated Kei Nishikori 6-3, 6-2, crushing a backhand winner cross-court on match point to notch a record 11th victory at the Rolex Monte-Carlo Masters. The scorching backhand was the perfect icing on the cake.

Nishikori’s strategic intentions to attack Nadal’s backhand was obvious early on, as the Spaniard hit 17 in his opponent’s opening service game of the match. Nadal committed three backhand errors in that game, but would then successfully make 26 consecutive backhands to find himself leading 5-2 in the opening set.

The insurmountable lead was built with backhands.

Nadal’s backhand did not buckle once for five straight games from 1-1 to 5-2, laying the foundation for the stunning victory. In the opening set, Nadal hit 65 rally backhands. That total does not count returns, volleys or overheads, but does include approach shots.

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Those 65 backhands were supported by just 25 run-around forehands from the Deuce court. In many of Nadal’s matches, he actually hits more run-around forehands than backhands, but not today. He trusted his backhand, and it delivered more sparkling silverware.

Overall for the match, Nadal hit 87 (73 per cent) rally backhands and just 33 (27 per cent) run-around forehands. Nadal’s backhand accounted for five winners and just seven errors over two sets. That means he averaged a backhand error one out of every 12 shots. Simply outstanding for a shot that was supposed to be under attack.


On the forehand side, the Spaniard hit 102 rally forehands, committing 13 errors, for an average of one error out of every eight forehands. The backhand clearly outperformed the forehand on Sunday on the red clay by the sea.

Nishikori actually won the longer, extended rallies of 9+ shots by a tally of 10-6. The only problem was that it didn’t represent a large enough grouping of points to make a difference. Nadal won the short rallies of 0-4 shots 34-19, and the mid-length rallies of 5-8 shots 23-15. It’s important to understand that if a maximum of just four shots were struck by either player, Nadal crafted a massive 23-point advantage (57-34).

Nadal’s forehand spread Nishikori to the edges of the court, with 57 per cent of Nadal’s forehand in the first set going wide to Nishikori’s backhand, and 43 per cent directed wide to the forehand wing. Amazingly, Nadal did not land one single forehand in the opening set in the middle third of the court.

In previous rounds to the final, Nadal had hit 61 per cent of his forehands cross court and just 39 per cent down the line. That’s a normal, high percentage mix for any of the competitors at Monte-Carlo this week.


But in the opening set on Sunday, Nadal hit more forehands down the line than cross court, signaling just how confident he was with this specific shot. He hit 56 per cent of his forehands down the line in the opening set, and just 44 per cent cross court.

The backhand was an immovable rock. The forehand was flung down the line at will. Nadal is arguably playing the best clay court tennis of his life.

The metrics behind Alexander Zverev’s 6-4, 6-4 victory over Dominic Thiem in the Mutua Madrid Open final on Sunday make you take a deep, hard look at where winning and losing really occurs in a tennis match.

It’s in the first two touches. And then daylight.

When Zverev and Thiem either struck the ball once, which was a serve and a return, or they added just one more shot each to the rally but no more, that counted for 65 per cent (70/108) of all points.

A maximum of two shots in the court for each player basically equalled two out of every three points in the match. This is where winning and losing really occurs – even on clay with two players born and bred on the surface. The match court is front-end loaded, while the practice court tends to focus more on the longer, extended rallies.

The practice court needs a make-over.

Consider this: When the length of the rally consisted of either one shot or two shots in the court by either player, Zverev crafted a substantial 41-29 point advantage. Those twelve points were the only separation that he was able to find in the match.

When a fifth ball or more landed in the court, Zverev and Thiem both won exactly 19 points each. This clearly illustrates a hidden dynamic in our sport. The longer the point extends, the more even it becomes. Globally, players are taught to develop a higher shot tolerance so that one more ball in play becomes their pathway to victory. It’s a smokescreen.

This match consisted of 20 games, but only two had any real significance – the opening service games of both sets in which Thiem was broken.

Following are the rally length of points in the opening games of both sets. It’s important to note that the ball must land in the court to be counted as a shot in the rally.

Opening Game 1st Set (5 points)
1. 6 shots - Thiem won
2. 2 shots - Zverev won
3. 2 shots - Zverev won
4. 2 shots - Zverev won
5. 0 shots - double fault / Zverev won

Average Rally Length = 2.4 shots

Opening Game 2nd Set (6 points)
1. 7 shots - Zverev won
2. 6 shots - Zverev won
3. 7 shots - Thiem won
4. 1 shot - Thiem won
5. 4 shots - Zverev won
6. 8 shots - Zverev won

Average Rally Length = 5.5 shots

Not one rally in either of these critical games was extended to double digits, which drives home another hidden dynamic about our sport. Short rallies are the norm – not the long ones.

Zverev is quickly eliminating any perceived soft spots in his game. His backhand has always been rock solid, and his forehand stood tall in the Madrid final with nine winners and just eight unforced errors for the match. Thiem, by comparison, had eight winners and 15 unforced errors.

Zverev is also starting to really key in on the important real-estate battle that occurs in a match. Up until the final, he had made contact with 22 per cent of his rally shots inside the baseline, which was considerably more than Thiem’s 14 per cent. That magnetism to the baseline carried over to the final as Zverev found his way to the net twice as much as Thiem, winning 11/14, compared to 5/7 for the Austrian.

Zverev’s serve was from another planet in Madrid. He was not broken for the entire tournament, and amazingly faced only one break point.

That improvement may very well be because of his improved toss. At Madrid in 2017, the spread of first-serve contact points when serving in the Deuce court was 65 centimetres. That shrunk almost in half to just 37 centimetres in 2018 leading into the final. In 2017 in the Ad court, the spread was 60 centimetres. That shrunk to just 44 centimetres in 2018.

A more consistent ball toss is creating an unbreakable first-strike weapon.

Start at the end.

Start with knowing exactly what happens at the pinnacle of our sport in a clay-court final, and it becomes much clearer what you need to focus on in practice to also reach these lofty heights.

In other words, let data from the match court make the practice court smarter.

Rafael Nadal defeated Alexander Zverev 6-1, 1-6, 6-3 in a riveting Internazionali BNL d’Italia final on Sunday. Zverev had a real chance at victory, up an early break in the third set, before rain threw a curveball into the match, allowing Nadal to reset and win the final five games.

It was a high-quality final, with several long, grueling rallies bringing the Italian crowd to their feet in appreciation of the effort and impressive shot-making of both players. There were 24 rallies that went at least double digits (10 shots), totaling 313 shots in the court by both players.

Was this where the match was won by Nadal? No. Not even close.


Our eyes remember the long, spectacular rallies, but quickly forget the short rallies – even dismissing them as not important to the final outcome.

Make no mistake about it, Nadal found his way to the finish line first by forging his advantage in the short rallies much more than the longer ones. It’s important to note that rally length is defined by the ball landing in the court.

On clay in Rome, with Nadal and Zverev competing for two hours and nine minutes, the most common rally length in the final was just one shot. A one-shot rally, which was either an ace, service winner, or missed return, occurred 23 times. The next closest were three- and four-shot rallies, which happened 15 times each.

Nobody in the packed house at the raucous Foro Italico would guess that one shot in the court happened more than anything else. Those points are quickly forgotten. In fact, a zero- and one-shot rally happened more than all 10+ shot rallies combined (25 points to 24 points).



There were 791 shots hit in the court in the final, with 60 per cent (478) occurring in single-digit rallies, and 40 per cent (313) hit in double-digit rallies of 10 shots or more. It’s completely counter-intuitive, but there were more shots hit in shorter rallies than longer ones.

The average rally length for the final was 5.8 shots, meaning each player put right around three shots in the court. It’s not as many as our imagination would guess.

We also learn from the following table that the “halo effect” of the serve lasts for just one shot after the serve on clay before an even baseline duel unfolds. That explains why a rally length of three shots in the court happens more than two. The power of the serve makes the ensuing Serve +1 groundstroke (third shot) a very dominant force in the rally.

2018 Rome Final: Rally Length Totals

Rally Length (Balls In)

TOTAL

0 (double faults)

2

1

23

2

9

3

15

4

15

5

14

6

8

7

10

8

9

9

8

10

5

11

5

12

6

13

0

14

2

15

0

16

2

17

0

18

2

19

0

20

2

TOTAL

137

The following breakdown identifies how Nadal was far more dominant in the shorter rallies than the longer ones.

Rallies of single digits (0-9 shots)
Nadal won 62

Zverev won 51

Nadal was +9

Rallies of double digits (10+)
Nadal won 13

Zverev won 11

Nadal was +2

A common view in our sport is that Nadal becomes more dominant the longer the rally goes, but that definitely did not play out in the Rome final. Indeed, what we find in our sport is that the longer the rally goes, the more even it naturally becomes.

The Rome final can be a roadmap for the practice court for players at all levels of our game. First-strike tennis, consisting of shorter points, happens way more in a match than we realise. Consistency, shot tolerance and grinding get more respect than they deserve. It’s time for the serve, return and Serve +1 strategies to carve out more time in practice.

Just one shot in the court rules our sport much more than we ever thought.

Finish to A.

Rafael Nadal pounded 126 forehand groundstroke winners from around the baseline over the past two weeks in Paris to win an unprecedented 11th Roland Garros title on Sunday. No piece of real estate mattered more to him than Position A.

Nadal defeated Dominic Thiem 6-4, 6-3, 6-2 in Sunday’s final, hitting 14 forehand winners from the back of the court, with nine (64 per cent) of them powering through his favourite forehand finishing location of A.

Tennis is a very much a C to C sport when rallying. Typically, two right-handed players trade blows through the Ad court at each other’s backhands, but don’t rally wide to D because there is too much risk with the singles sideline in play.

For Nadal, C is the perfect place to set up the point. Position A is where he drops the hammer.


A study of Nadal’s forehand winners from seven matches at Roland Garros this year reveals the key patterns of play that formed the foundation of the Spaniard’s run to the title – and undoubtedly heavily contributed to his preceding 10 titles in Paris.

Nadal’s forehand has never been studied in such detail, with the following four elements revealing the inner workings of the biggest baseline weapon in the modern game.

1. Winners Go To A
Being left-handed, we naturally fixate on Nadal dominating through the Ad court to C and D against right-handed opponent’s backhands. That’s just where he sets the point up. Those are the body blows.

Nadal played five right-handed and two left-handed opponents at Roland Garros the past two weeks, and his game plan remained basically the same against them all: run around his own backhand in the Deuce court and finish out wide to A.

Location of Nadal's Forehand Winners
Position A = 66% (83)

Position B = 2% (2)

Position C = 1% (1)

Position D = 32% (40)

2. Forehand Winners Are Struck From B & D
Nadal loves to run around his backhand and hit forehand winners standing in B, as well as go big from out wide in the Ad court from D.

Nadal Forehand Winners – Position Hit From
Position A = 20% (25)

Position B = 33% (41)

Position C = 14% (18)

Position D = 33% (42)

When Nadal was standing in B hitting a forehand winner, 68 per cent (27/40) were run-around forehand winners hit inside-out to Position A. This was a huge part of his run to his 11th Paris title. Just 32 per cent (13/40) were hit inside-in from B down the line to D. The modern forehand is all about inside-out.

When Nadal was standing in D, he hit a remarkable 80 per cent (33/41) of his forehand winners right down the line to Position A. Opponents typically want to cover the crosscourt, sitting on Nadal’s heavy, lefty forehand to their backhand. That’s exactly the finishing trap that the Spaniard looks to exploit.

3. Forehand Winners Happen More When Serving
We have never really made the connection between hitting forehands and hitting serves, but the two lived in perfect harmony for Nadal at Roland Garros. Right at two out of three of his forehand winners came when he was serving.

Forehand Winners
When Serving = 65% (82)

When Receiving = 35% (44)

4. The Run-Around Forehand Dominates
With Nadal being left-handed, the natural place for him to make contact with forehands is standing in the Ad court. Not so for forehand winners. Nadal’s run-around forehands standing in the Deuce court produced more winners at Roland Garros than his forehands from the Ad court.

Winners: Location Contact Hit From
Deuce Court = 52% (66) - Run Around forehands.

Ad Court = 48% (60) - Normal forehands.

Overall, Nadal hit 126 groundstroke forehand winners and committed 166 errors. That means if the last shot of the rally was a forehand groundstroke, 43 per cent of the of the time it was a winner, and 57 per cent of the time it was an error.

On the surface that does not seem impressive, but take into account that errors made up 66 per cent of total points at Roland Garros this year, and those 43 per cent of errors are viewed in an upgraded light.

Forehands to A took another major title in Paris on Sunday.

Cultivating break point opportunities is the beating heart of Novak Djokovic’s return to Grand Slam glory.

Djokovic defeated Kevin Anderson 6-2, 6-2, 7-6(3) to win his fourth Wimbledon title on Sunday, creating exactly 100 break points as he successfully navigated his way through seven matches during the past two weeks at SW19.


Since 1992 at The Championships, Lleyton Hewitt is the only other player to hit triple digits with break points created. Djokovic now takes over two of the top three spots on the critical leaderboard.

Top 10: Break Points Created at Wimbledon Since 1992

2002: Lleyton Hewitt = 110

2018: Novak Djokovic = 100

2013 Novak Djokovic = 96

2002: David Nalbandian = 95

1995: Andre Agassi = 91

1992: Andre Agassi = 90

1998: Tim Henman = 90

2012: Roger Federer = 89

1999: Tim Henman = 89

2002: Andre Sa = 86

It took exactly five points in Sunday’s final for Djokovic to dive into his predatory element – ready to pounce on a critical break point. Djokovic was poised to lace a trademark forehand or backhand return right back at Anderson, but both of Anderson’s first and second serves missed their mark, and Djokovic broke to start the match with a double fault gift.

Djokovic would see just four break points in the final, and would convert every single one of them. Twice during the tournament, he orchestrated a staggering 19 break points in a single match.

Djokovic Break Points: Wimbledon 2018

Round

Opponent

Break Points Won

Total Break Points

Conversion Percentage

1

T. Sandgren

7

19

37%

2

H. Zeballos

6

13

46%

3

K. Edmund

4

17

24%

4

K. Khachanov

7

14

50%

QF

K. Nishikori

7

14

50%

SF

R. Nadal

4

19

21%

F

K. Anderson

4

4

100%

-

TOTAL

39

100

39%

The tournament average for break points converted was 36 per cent (804/4753), so Djokovic’s 39 per cent conversion rate was nothing special.

But when you look at how many break point opportunities were created by the other 127 players in the draw, you start to get a feel for the relentless scoreboard pressure the Super Serbian created. Djokovic was simply head and shoulders above everyone else who went deep in the tournament.

2018 Wimbledon: Break Points Created Leaderboard

100 = Novak Djokovic

68 = Rafael Nadal

63 = Juan Martin del Potro

62 = Kevin Anderson

58 = Roger Federer

Djokovic is widely regarded as one of the best returners in the history of our sport, and his return game was spectacular during the entire two weeks at Wimbledon.

2018 Wimbledon: Djokovic Returning Serve

No. 2 = Return Points Won vs. First Serve 36% (189/519)

No. 2 = Return Games Won 34% (39/116)

No. 5 = Returns In 74% (574/777)

No. 9 = Return Winners 10

T-13th = Return Points Won vs. Second Serve 56% (159/282)

When Djokovic broke Anderson, the average rally length on those break points was just three shots in the court.

Anderson Serving At Break Point

Set 1 0-0, 30/40 = 0 shots (double fault).

Set 1 1-3, 15/40 = 4 shots (Anderson backhand volley error).

Set 2 0-0, 15/40 = 6 shots (Anderson backhand groundstroke error).

Set 2 1-3, 15/40 = 2 shots (Anderson forehand groundstroke error).

Djokovic was also at his best from the baseline during The Championships this year, winning a higher percentage of points from the back of the court than any other year he has walked away with a Wimbledon title.

Baseline Points Won: Novak Djokovic Title Years

2018 = 55.9% (450/805)

2011 = 55.7% (397/712)

2015 = 53.7% (408/760)

2014 = 48.6% (427/877)

It wasn’t that long ago that Djokovic was being bundled out of the first round at March's two ATP World Tour Masters 1000 events – the BNP Paribas Open in Indian Wells and the Miami Open presented by Itau.

A lean year just turned gloriously golden.